UNITED STATES
v.
UNION SUPPLY COMPANY

U.S. | 1909-11-08
No. 120
215 U.S. 50 Supreme Court of the United States (1909) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 54 L. Ed. 87 · 30 S. Ct. 15 · 1909 U.S. LEXIS 1730 · SCDB 1909-005
Cited by 60 cases

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Synopsis

The Supreme Court reversed a district court's decision dismissing an indictment against a corporation for violating federal oleomargarine regulations, holding that the term "any person" in the criminal penalty clause applied to corporations despite the statute prescribing both fine and imprisonment as punishments. The Court reasoned that corporations could be held criminally liable for willful violations even though they could not be imprisoned, and that if one penalty was impossible to impose, the defendant should not escape liability for the penalty that could be imposed.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an indictment, of a corporation for wilfully violatingthe sixth section of the act of Congress of May 9, 1902, c. 784, § 6, 32 Stat. 193, 197. That section requires “wholesale dealers” in oleomargarine, etc., to keep certain books and to make certain returns. It then goes on as follows.'“And any person who wilfully violates any of the provisions of this section shall, for each such offense, be fined not less than fifty dollars and not exceeding five hundred dollars, and imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than six months.” The corporation moved to quash the indictment and the District Court quashed it on the ground that the section is not applicable to.corporations. Thereupon the United States brought this writ of error. The argument for the defendant in error is drawn from an earlier decision by the same court. It is. that § 5.applies in express terms to corporations, and gives the court discretionary power to punish by either fine or imprisonment, or both, whereas in § 6 both punishments are imposed in all cases and corporations are not mentioned; that it is impossible to imprison a corporation, and that the statute warrants no sentence that does not comply with its terms. United States v. Braun & Fitts, 158 Fed. Rep.

456. We are of opinion that this reasoning is unsound. In the first place,' taking up the argument, drawn from' § 5, that corporations were omitted intentionally from the requirements of §6, it is to be noticed that the sixth section of the present act copies its requirements from the act of October 1, 1890, c. 1244’, § 41, 26 Stat. 567,621, which did not contain the penal clause* In its earlier form the enactment clearly applied to corporations, and when the same words were repeated in the later act it is not to be supposed that their meaning was changed. The words “wholesale dealers” are as apt to embrace corporations here as they are in § 2, requiring such dealers to pay certain taxes. We have no doubt that they were intended, to embrace them. The words “any person” in the penal clause are as broad as “wholesale dealers” in the part prescribing the duties.

U. S. Rev. Stat., § 1. It is impossible to believe that corporations were interntionally excluded. They are as much within the mischief aimed at as private persons, and as capable of a "wilful” breach of the law. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. v. United States, 212 U. S.

481. If the defendant escapes, it does so on the single ground that as it cannot suffer both parts of the punishment it need not suffer one.

It seems to us that a reasonable interpretation of the words' used does not lead to such a result. . If we compare § 5, the application of one of the penalties rather than of both is made to depend not on the character of the defendant, but on the discretion of the judge; yet there corporations are mentioned in terms. See Hawke v.

E. Hulton & Co. Limited, (1909) 2 K. B. 93, 98. And if we free our minds from the notion that criminal statutes must be construed by some artificial and conventional rule, the natural inference, when a statute prescribes two independent penalties, is that it means to inflict them so far as it can, and that if one of th$m is impossible,-it does not mean on that account to let the defendant escape. See Commonwealth v. Pulaski County Agricultural & Mechanical Association, 92 Kentucky, 197, 201. In Hawke v.

E. Hulton & Co. (1909), 2 K. B. 93, it was held that the words “any person” in one section of a penal act did not embrace a corporation, notwithstanding a statute like our Rev. Stat., § 1. But that was not so much on the ground that imprisonment was contemplated as a punishment, as because the person convicted was to be “deemed a rogue and a vagabond.” Moreover it was thought that corporations could be reached under another section of the act.

Judgment reversed.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (21 total)

  • United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1943)
    …its purposes, its terms, and extended practical construction lead away from such a result once “we free our minds from the notion that criminal statutes must be construed by some artificial and conventional rule.” United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50, 55. The Act is concerned not with the proprietory relation to a misbranded or an adulterated drug but with its distribution. In the case of a corporation such distribution must be accomplished, and may be furthered, by persons standing in various…
  • Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (U.S. 1910)
    …extent, because to some extent the legislature was mistaken as to its powers. But this I contend is to indulge in an assumption which is unwarranted and has been directly decided to the contrary at this term in United States v. Union Supply Company, 215 U. S. 50. In that case a corporation was proceeded against criminally for an offense punishable by imprisonment and fine. The corporation clearly could not be subjected to the imprisonment, and the contention was that the lawmaker must be presumed to have in…
  • United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (U.S. 1947)
    …, read in the light of its legislative history and its purpose, repel the result reached by the Court once “we free our minds from the notion that criminal statutes must be construed by some artificial . . . rule.” United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50, 55. To assure immunity to powerful unions collaborating with employers’ associations in disregard of the Sherman Law, was not the purpose of § 6, and the provision should not be so read. This minor provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was directed…

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