JOHN EDWARD JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1964-10-13
No. 64-23
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HORTON and HENDRY, JJ.
167 So. 2d 903 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1964) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

The appellate court affirmed the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief, holding that the waiver of a preliminary hearing without counsel did not constitute reversible error, especially when the defendant later pleaded not guilty at arraignment and was represented by appointed counsel for his guilty plea.


Holding

No, the waiver of a preliminary hearing without counsel is not reversible error, especially when the defendant pleads not guilty at arraignment and is later represented by appointed counsel for a guilty plea.


Key Quotes

“The principal point relied on for reversal is that the appellant waived a preliminary hearing on a capital charge without the benefit of counsel.”

States the main argument raised by the appellant on appeal.

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Facts & Procedural History

The appellant sought relief under Criminal Procedure Rule 1, arguing he waived a preliminary hearing on a capital charge without the benefit of counse…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

By this appeal, the appellant urges error in the denial of his application for relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule 1, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix. The principal point relied on for reversal is that the appellant waived a preliminary hearing on a capital charge without the benefit of counsel.

Upon being arraigned in open court, it appears from the record that the appellant pleaded not guilty, was adjudicated insolvent, and had eminent trial counsel appointed to represent him who, after an investigation and consultation with the appellant, withdrew the plea of not guilty to first degree murder and submitted a plea of guilty to second degree murder.

It has previously been held that a preliminary hearing is not such a critical step as to require accused to have counsel. See: Webster v. State, Fla.App.1963, 156 So.2d 890; Blake v. State, Fla.App.1964, 163 So.2d 20; Howard v. State, Fla.App.1964, 164 So.2d 229; Sam v. State, Fla.App.1964, 167 So.2d 258, [opinion filed September 16, 1964], This is particularly true where, as in the instant case, the defendant pleads not guilty at the arraignment.

The record fails to demonstrate any error on the part of the trial judge in denying the relief sought and, therefore, same is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Randall v. State, 188 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
    …as been repeatedly held that normally a preliminary hearing is not such a critical stage of a [*336] criminal prosecution as to entitle a defendant to counsel. E. g., Montgomery v. State, Fla.1965, 176 So. 2d 331; and Jackson v. State, Fla.App.1964, 167 So. 2d 903. The record does not show that defendant’s rights were prejudiced by lack of counsel at this proceeding. As to point two, appellant claims that the record does not show that he had counsel when he was arraigned and pleaded guilty, but the record re…

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