BRINKMEIER
v.
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.
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A railroad brakeman sued Missouri Pacific Railway for injuries sustained while coupling freight cars, claiming the cars lacked safety couplers required by the Safety Appliance Act of 1893. The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's victory, holding that the original statute applied only to cars used in moving interstate traffic, and the plaintiff's petition failed to allege that the cars in question were actually used in interstate commerce, making the claim unviable under federal law even though a 1903 amendment later broadened the statute's scope.
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Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action to recover for personal injuries sustained by a brakeman while coupling two freight cars on a side track of the defendant railway company at Hutchinson, Kansas. The defendant prevailed in the state courts, 81 Kansas, 101, and the píaintiff brings the case here. The injury occurred November 12, 1900, and the action was begun March 15, 1901.
The question first presented for decision is, whether the petition stated a cause of action under the original Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, c. 196, which made it unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad “to' haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact,” etc. The petition, if liberally construed, charged that defendant was a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad;, that the cars in question were not equipped with couplers of the prescribed type, and that the plaintiff’s injuries proximately resulted from the absence of such couplers; but there was no allegation that either of the cars was then or at any time used in moving interstate traffic. The Supreme Court of the State held that in the absence of such an allegation the petition did not state a cause of action under the original act. We think that ruling was right. The terms of that act were such that its application depended, first, upon the carrier being engaged in interstate commerce by railroad, and, second, upon the use of the car in moving interstate traffic. It did not embrace all cars used on the line of such a carrier, but only such as - were used in interstate commerce. Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 25. The act was amended March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, c. 976, so as to include all cars “used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce,” but the amendment came too late to be of any avail to the plaintiff.
In 1908, after the case had been twice tried without any decisive result, the plaintiff sought to amend his petition by charging that the cars were, used in moving interstate traffic, but the application was denied, the period of limitation having expired in the meantime. Error is assigned upon this ruling; but as it involved only a question of pleading and practice under the laws of the State, it is not subject to review by us. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408, 416.
It also was held that the evidence produced upon the third trial was not sufficient to sustain a recovery under the petition, and error is assigned upon this. As the petition did not state a cause of action under the Safety Appliance Act, but at most a right of recovery at common law, the ruling upon the sufficiency of the evidence did not involve a Federal question, and so is not open to reexamination in this court.
Finding no error in the record in respect of any Federal right, the judgment must be
Affirmed.
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Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (U.S. 1934)…merce.” This is an erroneous view. The original Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, did not embrace all cars on the lines of interstate carriers but only those engaged in interstate commerce. Brinkmeier v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 224 U.S. 268. By the amending Act of March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, the scope of the statute was enlarged so as to include all cars “ used on any railroad [*214] engaged in interstate commerce.” The statute as amended was intended to embrace all locomotives, cars,…
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Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 (U.S. 1949)…; St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 157; and see same case 148 S. W. 1099; Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Slavin, 236 U. S. 454, 457-458; and see same case 88 Ohio St. 536, 106 N. E. 1077. Compare Brinkmeier v. Missouri P. R. Co., 224 U. S. 268, with Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Renn, 241 U. S. 290. That court among other things said: “In the absence of allegations to the contrary, the inference arises that the plaintiff’s vision was unobscured and that he could have seen and avoided the c…
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Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U.S. 672 (U.S. 1913)…he pleadings and practice in their courts and the right to prescribe within what time and upon what conditions suits can be commenced and maintained. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408; Brinkmeier v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 224 U. S. 268. The motion to dismiss must be, and it is, granted. Dismissed.…
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- S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (U.S. 1911)
- Tex. & NEW Orleans R.R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U.S. 408 (U.S. 1911)