HAROLD T. MORTON AND ANNA CONDON MORTON
v.
LEON A. HOLADAY
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed a personal injury judgment, finding the jury's verdict excessive and influenced by inadmissible testimony about the defendant's insurance coverage, despite a curative instruction.
Yes, the verdict was excessive and improperly influenced by the mention of insurance, warranting a new trial.
“The verdict indicates', however, that the jury could not forget that an insurance company would be required to pay the judgment.”
This quote explains the court's reasoning that the inadmissible testimony about insurance likely influenced the jury's substantial verdict.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff was awarded $4,000 for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision. After a remittitur of $67, the judgment stood at $3,933. …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jury Prejudice cases and more on FLexlaw
The writ of error under consideration brings for review judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the court below, defendant here, for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision.
The verdict was for $4,000.00. After order of the court, remittitur was entered for $67.00, so the judgment stood for $3,933.00, plus costs.
A careful consideration of the evidence discloses that the judgment was excessive.
Except for the amount of the verdict and judgment, we would be unable to see any reversible error disclosed by the record, but it does appear from the record that a witness, when testifying in behalf of the plaintiff, stated that at or about the time of the accident the owner of the automobile by which the plaintiff was injured stated that the automobile was insured. This evidence appears to have gone in unsolicited by counsel and, immediately after the witness *814had given that testimony, the trial judge instructed the jury that they would not consider that testimony as evidence in the case. The verdict indicates', however, that the jury could not forget that an insurance company would be required to pay the judgment.
We think that in view of this condition justice demands that a new trial be had.
The judgment is, therefore, reversed and the cause remanded.
So ordered.
Ellis, P. J., and Terrell, J., concur.
Whitfield, C. J., and Brown, J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
Davis, J., dissents.
(dissenting). — If juries are rendered incompetent to try a case merely because an unwitting suggestion is made in their presence that the defendant is insured against liability, then we should abandon the jury system because if such is the case, the ordinary run of mankind is-unfit to be trusted with the judgment of business affairs at all. Human rights are certainly as important as property rights. And yet we as an appellate court sustain judgment in criminal cases wherein the prosecuting attorney injects in cross examination of a defendant testifying as a witness in his own behalf the fact that the defendant has been previously convicted of a crime (where such is a fact) although we must know, as practical men, that the trial jury in the case is very likely to be somewhat prejudicially impressed by such testimony as against the defendants. On the other hand the defendant sometimes succeeds in doing the same thing against the State. I think the true rule is that when the trial judge takes' proper action to caution *815a jury against being influenced or prejudiced by outside consideration, the verdict must be allowed to stand unless clear injury is shown notwithstanding the judge’s charge.
Davis, J.
(dissenting). — If juries are rendered incompetent to try a case merely because an unwitting suggestion is made in their presence that the defendant is insured against liability, then we should abandon the jury system because if such is the case, the ordinary run of mankind is-unfit to be trusted with the judgment of business affairs at all. Human rights are certainly as important as property rights. And yet we as an appellate court sustain judgment in criminal cases wherein the prosecuting attorney injects in cross examination of a defendant testifying as a witness in his own behalf the fact that the defendant has been previously convicted of a crime (where such is a fact) although we must know, as practical men, that the trial jury in the case is very likely to be somewhat prejudicially impressed by such testimony as against the defendants. On the other hand the defendant sometimes succeeds in doing the same thing against the State. I think the true rule is that when the trial judge takes' proper action to caution a jury against being influenced or prejudiced by outside consideration, the verdict must be allowed to stand unless clear injury is shown notwithstanding the judge’s charge.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
McKINNEY Supply Co. v. Orovitz, 96 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1957)…objection when counsel for ap-pellees pursued the subject. We can discover no place in the record where the court was requested to instruct the jury to disregard the references to insurance, and no instruction was given such as in Morton v. Holaday, 121 Fla. 813, 164 So. 514. It is also evident that no objection was made in behalf of appellants to the reference to insurance in the summation by counsel for appellees. With due regard to this introduction and preoccupation with the subject by appellants throug…
-
Clark v. Yellow CAB Co. OF Miami, 195 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)…ord and find that this remark; which obviously refers to increased insurance rates as a result of recovery, can be reasonably interpreted as an appeal to passion and prejudice. See: Carls Markets v. Meyer, Fla.1953, 69 So. 2d 789; Morton v. Holaday, 121 Fla. 813, 164 So. 514 (1935). In the instant case the remark was not necessarily reversible error. The appellant [*40] objected to the remark and asked to have the jury instructed to disregard it; this was done. “The rule is well established in practically…
-
Gould v. Weibel, 62 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1952)…effect on the verdict returned by the jury, as witness the fact that it is generally held that the unnecessary disclosure to the jury of the presence of a liability insurance company in a negligence trial warrants a mistrial. See Morton v. Holaday, 121 Fla. 813, 164 So. 514; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Sec. 328, page 1025. This is not a “terrible indictment of the jury system,” as suggested by the defendant, but simply a realistic approach to the problem. For the reasons stated, the judgments appealed from ar…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence