SOUTHWESTERN BREWERY AND ICE COMPANY
v.
SCHMIDT
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A brewery servant sued for injuries sustained when a defective cooker exploded while he was using it, claiming the employer had promised to repair it soon as an inducement to continue working. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, holding that an employer may remain liable for failing to provide a safe workplace despite the employee's awareness of danger, if the employer induced the employee to continue working by promising to remedy the hazard. The Court rejected the employer's defenses regarding leading questions, the release allegedly signed by the plaintiff, and the damages calculation.
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Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action by a sérvant.for personal injuries. The declaration alleged that it was the plaintiff’s duty to cook brewer’s mash, in a cooker, that, the cooker was so' out of repair that-the plaintiff was unwilling to use it, but-that the defendant-requested him-to go on until it could' be repaired and promised that it should be within a very short time; that the plaintiff did go on, relying upon the promise, that the cooker gave way and the plaintiff was badly scalded. The defendant denied the allegations and pleaded plaintiff’s contributory negligence and a release. In a replication the plaintiff denied his mental capacity at the time the release was made. There was a verdict for the plaintiff subject to special findings which by the law of New Mexico control, Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 165 U. S. 593, and the defendant alleged exceptions. These were overruled by the Supreme Court of the Territory and the judgment affirmed.
The first point argued is that the defendant was entitled to judgment on the special findings, because the fourth was that the cooker at the time was not ini such a bad condition that a man of ordinary prudence would not have used the same. But the eleventh was that the defendant did not use ordinary care in furnishing the cooker and in having it repaired, and the sixth, that the defendant promised the plaintiff that the cooker should be repaired as an inducement for him to continue using it. So it is evident that the fourth finding meant only that the plaintiff was not negligent in remaining at work. Whatever the difficulties may be with the theory of the exception, 1 Labatt, Master and Servant, ch. 22, § 423, it is the-well settled law that for a certain time a master may remain liable for a failure to use reasonable care in furnishing a safe place in which to work, notwithstanding the servant’s appreciation of the danger, if he induces the servant to keep on by a promise that the source of trouble shall be removed. Hough v. Texas & Pacific R. R. Co., 100 U. S. 213.
Next it is argued that the judgment should be set aside because the court allowed somewhat leading questions to be asked to bring out the plaintiff’s reliance upon the defendant’s promise. If this matter is open it is enough to say that the plaintiff is a German and seemingly did not understand the questions put to him' very well, and that it would require a very much stronger case than this to induce an appellate court to revise the discretion of the trial court and grant a new trial upon such a ground. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Urlin, 158 U. S. 271, 273. The next point, that there was no credible evidence to sustain the verdict, so far ,as it does not -rest on the preceding one, was for the jury, not for this court. .
Fourthly it is argued that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove his incompetence at the time of making the release. It seems from the record that an instruction to that effect was given but that it was omitted from the bill of exceptions. The Supreme Court of the Territory took notice of the fact, and we certainly should not go behind their decision upon a matter of local practice in order to reverse1 a judgment upon a technicality and an assumption contrary to the fact. Santa Fe County v. Coler, 215 U. S. 296.
. Finally it is said that the instructions as to the measure of damages were wrong. The court instructed the jury •that they might consider the plaintiff’s.loss of time with reference to his ability to earn money, the impairment of his capacity to earn money, whether temporary or permanent, disfigurement, and pain, past or reasonably certain to be suffered in the future — and that they should deduct from the amount, if any, the disbursements made Under the release which the finding of the jury set aside. It is objected that a part of the disbursements were wages during the plaintiff’s disability, but it did not matter whether they were ór not if the transaction was rescinded. With regard to future pain &c. the judge did not go beyond the conservative rule laid down in such cases as Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Lindeman, 143 Fed. Rep. 946, 950. The rest of. the argument is a discussion of evidence with which wé have nothing to do.
Judgment affirmed.
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Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492 (U.S. 1914)…lying upon the promise does not assume the risk unless at least the danger be so imminent that no ordinarily prudent man under the circumstances would rely upon such promise. Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213, 224; Southwestern Brewery v. Schmidt, 226 U. S. 162, 168. This branch of the law of master and servant seems to be traceable to Holmes v. Clarke, 6 Hurl. & Norm. 348; Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurl. & Norm. 937. In the light of these principles, the rulings of the trial court in the case at bar must be co…
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United States v. Brooks (two cases), 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949)…ployees against their employers, it is well settled that wages and other payments made by the employer to the employee are properly deductible in mitigation of damages. See 25 C.J.S., Damages, § 98, p. 646; Southwestern Brewery & Ice Co. v. Schmidt, 226 U.S. 162, 33 S.Ct. 68, 57 L.Ed. 170; Bell-Knox Coal Co. v. Gregory, 152 Ky. 415, 153. S.W. 465; Michalsky v. Centennial Brewing Co., 48 Mont. 1, 134 P. 307. Pertinent, also, are Foldings to the effect that payments made on account of damages by one tort feas…
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United States v. Price, 288 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1961)…ents specifically to compensate him for his injury, the tortfeasor need not pay twice for the same damage, and therefore such compensation payments should be taken into account in fixing tort damages. Southwestern Brewery & Ice Co. v. Schmidt, 1912, 226 U.S. 162, 169, 33 S.Ct. 68, 57 L.Ed. 170; Knecht v. United States, 3 Cir., 1957, 242 F. 2d 929, 931; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 98. On the other hand, where the injured plaintiff’s compensation comes from a “collateral source,” it should not be offset against the s…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593 (U.S. 1897)
- Choctaw v. McDADE, 191 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1903)
- Hough v. Ry. Co., 100 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1879)
- N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Urlin, 158 U.S. 271 (U.S. 1895)
- Copper Queen Consol. Mining Co. v. Territorial Bd. of Equalization of the Territory of Ariz., 206 U.S. 474 (U.S. 1907)
- FOX v. Haarstick, 156 U.S. 674 (U.S. 1895)
- Kane v. N. Cent. Ry. Co., 128 U.S. 91 (U.S. 1888)
- Sweeney v. Lomme, 22 Wall. 208 (U.S. 1874)
- Comm'rs of Santa FÉ Cnty. v. Territory of New Mexico Ex rel. Coler, 215 U.S. 296 (U.S. 1909)
- Armijo v. Armijo, 181 U.S. 558 (U.S. 1901)