BUNKER HILL & SULLIVAN MINING AND CONCENTRATING COMPANY
v.
UNITED STATES
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The Supreme Court upheld the Government's judgment against Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining Company for the value of timber unlawfully cut from land that had been claimed under a homestead entry. The Court held that once Messenger made a valid homestead entry in 1903, the land was segregated from the public domain and could not be treated as open public mineral land subject to mining timber rights, and Messenger was estopped from claiming mineral land rights under a different statute while asserting homestead rights to the same land.
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Mr. Justice Lamar delivered the opinion of the court.
In 1903 Messenger made a homestead entry in the Coeur D’Alene Land District. He claimed to have entered in good faith and testified that he lived on the land with his family for some time. While thus in possession he cut 'many of the trees into stulls, which with the cordwood he sold to the Bunker Hill Company. In 1905 he abandoned the land and the Government brought suit against the-Mining Company and recovered judgment for the value, of the-timber in its improved state. 178 Fed.. Rep. 914.
In this court, plaintiff in error claims that the land not being suited for agricultural purposes, could not be entered as a homestead (Rev. Stat., § 2303), but being mineral land in fact was open to mining location and subject to the provisions of the act of June 3, 1878, 20 Stat. 88, c. 150, which authorizes any citizen to “enter upon public lands, being mineral lands,” open to mineral entry in order to cut timber therefrom for mining purposes. It argues that the homestead entry was void and that any citizen, Messenger included, could treat the land as public and cut the timber for mining purposes. It offered evidence tending to sustain its contention as to the character of the land, and excepts to the court’s ruling that Messenger and his vendee were estopped-from making such claim.
The statute on which the Mining Company relies, applies only to public lands, while this was no longer public in the full sense, although the title remained in the Government which could have cancelled Messenger’s entry on proof that it was valuable for mineral purposes. Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S.
392. But until some such action by”the United States, Messenger’s entry segregated the land from the public domain and made it so far private as to withdraw it fromthe operation of the law permitting other citizens to locate mines or cut timber on public mineral land. Hastings & D.
R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 537; Shiver v. United States, 159 U. S. 491, 495. Until his claim was cancelled Messenger was entitled to exclude others from the quarter-section.. And' as they would have been estopped, as against him,( from denying that he was lawfully in, possession of it as a homestead, so was he estopped, from denying that it was a homestead when sued for cutting timber in violation of the law applicable thereto. . He could not claim the rights of a.homesteader in land intended for settlement and cultivation (Rev. Stat., § 2290) and at the same time defend under another statute which related to public land valuable for mineral purposes, The Mining Company bought with notice that Messenger was a trespasser, and is liable for the timber Unlawfully removed by its vendor.
Affirmed.
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Gauthier v. Morrison, 232 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1914)…bie, 101 U. S. 473, 475; Black v. Jackson, 177 U. S. 349; United States v. Buchanan, ante, p. 72. See also Cosmos Exploxation Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co., 190 U. S. 301, 308, 315; Humbird v. Avery, 195 U. S. 480, 504; Bunker Hill Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 548, 550. It was well said by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Sproat v. Durland, supra: “To say that no relief can be granted, or that our courts are powerless to do justice between litigants in this class of cases, pending the settlement of title in t…
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United States v. Hemmer, 241 U.S. 379 (U.S. 1916)…regarded as such to which a claim has attached, though Congress may, if it be so advised, exercise control over them. Hastings & Dakota Ry. v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357, 361, 364; Hodges v. Colcord, 193 U. S. 192, 196; Bunker Hill Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 548, 550. Homestead entries under the act of 1875 cannot, therefore, be considered as having been referred to. Taylor and those in like situation did not need the aid of the act of 1884. Its language was not of confirmation of rights but was permissive…
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United States v. Buchanan, 232 U.S. 72 (U.S. 1914)…omain. The legal title remained in the Government until patent issued; but as against all except the United States he was the lawful possessor clothed with an inceptive title (Sturr v. Beck, 133 U. S. 541, 547, 549; Bunker Hill Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 548, 550), which entitled him to maintain suits in equity or actions at law to. obtain redress for a violation of his possessory rights. Russian-American Co. v. United States, 199 U. S. 570, 577. The homesteader having thus acquired the right to “treat…
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- Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U.S. 392 (U.S. 1885)
- Shiver v. United States, 159 U.S. 491 (U.S. 1895)