ABILENE NATIONAL BANK
v.
DOLLEY, BANK COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

U.S. | 1913-03-17
No. 175
228 U.S. 1 Supreme Court of the United States (1913) Caution
Also reported at: 57 L. Ed. 707 · 33 S. Ct. 409 · 1913 U.S. LEXIS 2345 · SCDB 1912-136
Cited by 19 cases

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Synopsis

Abilene National Bank challenged Kansas's Bank Depositors' Guaranty Act, claiming it unconstitutionally discriminated against national banks and impaired their contractual obligations. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case, holding that states may lawfully establish competing banking schemes that provide advantages to state banks, and that contracts entered into after such laws take effect are necessarily subject to those laws and create only such obligations as the law permits.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a bill to restrain the putting into operation of the Kansas Bank Depositors’ Guaranty Act (March 6, 1909, Sess. Laws 1909, c. 61), and to have it declared un constitutional. It seems to have been filed at about the same time as the bill in Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U. S. 121, in which case thé law was upheld. The main difference, between the two suits is that the other was brought by - state banks, and this by national banks. The Circuit Court of Appeals .held the bill bad on demurrer, 179 Fed. Rep. 461; 102 C. C. A. 607; and it was dismissed. A writ , of certiorari was denied by this court. 218 U. S. 673. In view of the decisions in 219 U. S. and in this case below we shall add comparatively few words.

The ground peculiar to this case is an alleged discrimr inátion against national banks. Allegations in the bill as to the purpose and intent of the statute of course are immaterial. They introduce rib new facts, and leave the question as it would be without them, namely, whether anything can-be. discerned in the terms'or effect of the act that infringes the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. .A good-deal of .the argument seems to be that the statute will make state banks so.attractive to the public that the national banks will suffer. It is replied that experience has not justified the prophecy.- But everi if it had, there : is nothing to hinder the States from permitting a competing business, and doing what Kansas has done with intent to make it popular arid safe. The national banks are free., to. come into the Scheme. The suggestion that they could nót come iri and. rérnain national banks, is simply a statement, of the situation of all competitors. They cannot retain the advantages of their adverse situation and share those.rif the parties with whom they, contend. . The statutes’of the-United States-whén they^dó-not attempt to prohibit competition with national, banks do not forbid competitors to succeed.

The specific’discrimination pointed out is that under the Kansas statutes the national banks do not share equally with depositors, in the. assets of an insolvent state bank. The bill alleges.that the plaintiffs necessarily have and make deposits with state banks, and that banks necessarily borrow money from other banks and rediscount paper in other banks, and that the obligation of their contracts will be impaired and they will be deprived of their property without, due process of law, contrary to Art. I, § 10, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The section of the statute specified as having this effect is § 4, which contemplates the primary application of the assets of the bank and the double liability ,of stockholders to depositors. It is replied that the word depositors obviously was used by mistake for creditors and that the statute was amended by substituting the latter word in 1911- (March 13, 1911, Sess; Laws 1911, c. 62, p. 103, § L.) But further the language of the bill and the argument show that the complaint refers to future transactions, not to past. There is nothing sufficient to raise a question as to dealings before the law went into effect. - Contracts made after ,the law. was inforce of course are made subject to it, and imposé only such obligations and create only such property as the law permits. Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, 494. Cross Lake Shooting & Fishing Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S. 632, 638, 639.

The greater part of the bill is taken' up with objections to the scheme of the statute in which the plaintiffs have no concern and that have been disposed of. by the former decision of this court upon the Kansas act. There is nothing in it that calls for further remark.

Decree affirmed.


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Cited By

  • Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (U.S. 1997)
    …r constitutional system of dual sovereignty. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. The dissent is wrong in suggesting, post, at 950, n. 9, that the Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 228 U.S. 1 (1912), eliminate the possibility that the duties imposed on state courts and their clerks in connection with naturalization proceedings were contingent on the State’s voluntary assumption of the task of adjudicating citizenship applications. The Se…
  • …the Federal Constitution which prohibits a depositor from consenting, when he draws a check, that payment may be made by a draft. And, as the statute is prospective in its operation, Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489; Abilene National Bank v. Dolley, 228 U. S. 1, 5, there is no constitutional obstacle to a State’s providing that, in the absence of [*660] dissent, consent shall be presumed. Laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and f…
  • Madera Water Works v. Madera, 228 U.S. 454 (U.S. 1913)
    …s well after works had been built there by private persons as before, the plaintiff took the risk of what might happen. An appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment to protect property from a congenital defect must be vain. Abilene National Bank v. Dolley, 228 U. S. 1, 5. It is impossible not. to feel the force of the plaintiff’s argument as a reason for interpreting the Constitution so as to avoid the result, if it might be, but it comes too late. There is no pretence that there is any express promise to private…

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