JOHNSON
v.
UNITED STATES
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Johnson was indicted for concealing money from his bankruptcy trustee, and he challenged his conviction on grounds that his books, which had been transferred to the trustee pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act, were improperly admitted as evidence against him at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that a debtor loses any privilege against the use of his books as evidence once they are lawfully transferred to a trustee in bankruptcy, as the transfer is a necessary incident of property distribution rather than a means of obtaining criminal evidence, and does not compel the defendant to testify against himself.
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Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an indictment for concealing money from the defendant’s trustee in bankruptcy. The defendant was convicted and sentenced subject to exceptions which raised in different forms the questions whether his books properly were admitted against him and whether the evidence warranted the verdict.-
On the first point the facts are simply that the books had been transferred to the trustee in accordance-with § 70 of the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 544, c. 541, and were produced before the grand jury and béfore the petit jury at the trial. That the transfer lawfully could be required is established by Matter of Harris, 221 U. S. 274. But the defendant lays hold of an expression in that case, ‘the properly careful provision to protect him from use of the books in aid of prosecution,’ as an intimation that the books could not be put to such a use.
Courts proceed step by step. And we now have to consider whether the cautious statement in the former case marked the limit of the law in a case where no rights, if there were any, were saved-when the books were transferred. The answer was implied in that decision. A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production. The transfer by bankruptcy is no different from a transfer by execution of a volume with a confession written on the fly leaf. It is held that a criminal cannot protect himself by getting the legal title to corporate books. Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478. But the converse proposition is by ho means true, that he may keep the protection from the introduction of documentary evidence that he would have had while he retained it, after the title and possession have gone to some one else.
It is true that the transfer of the books may have been against the defendant’s will, but it is compelled by the law as a necessary incident to the distribution of his property, not in order to obtain criminal evidence against him. Of course a man cannot protect his property from being used to pay his debts by attaching to it a disclosure of crime. If the documentary confession comes .to-a third hand alio intuitu, as this did, the use of it in court does not compel the defendant to be a witness against himself.
As to the question of evidence, it is enbugh to say-that there was evidence tending as far as it went to show that the defendant foresaw what was coming and attempted to save something from the wreck. There is no certificate-that.all the evidence is before us, and we should not be warranted in declaring ás matter of law that the Government did not make out a case. See Seigel v. Cartel, 164 Fed. Rep. 691.
Judgment affirmed.
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Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1977)…zure of these records were conducted by law enforcement personnel... . This case thus falls within the principle stated by Mr. Justice Holmes: "A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production." Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458, 33 S.Ct. 572, 57 L.Ed. 919 (1913). This principle recognizes that the protection afforded by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment "adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him." Couch v. United S…1 / 2
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State v. Tsavaris, 382 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…ilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: “A party is privileged from producing the evidence, but not from its production.” Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458, 33 S.Ct. 572, 57 L.Ed. 919 (1913). The Constitution explicitly prohibits compelling an accused to bear witness “against himself”: it necessarily does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another.. Compulsion upon the person ass…1 / 2
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Aguila v. Frederic (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)…o., 647 So. 2d 340, 341 (La. 1994). Finally, because “the Fifth Amendment is a personal privilege,” Couch, 409 U.S. at 328, 93 S. Ct. at 616, Aguila is “privileged from producing the evidence, but not from its production.” Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458, 33 S. Ct. 572, 572, 57 L. Ed. 919 (1913). As Aguila cannot be compelled to bear witness against himself, adhering to our prior precedent, we conclude that “the trial court’s order directing petitioner to reveal information regarding [his] cell…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (U.S. 1913)
- Matter of Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (U.S. 1911)