CITY OF LOUISVILLE
v.
CUMBERLAND TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

U.S. | 1914-01-05
No. 538
231 U.S. 652 Supreme Court of the United States (1914) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 58 L. Ed. 419 · 34 S. Ct. 260 · SCDB 1913-270 · 1914 U.S. LEXIS 1437
Cited by 23 cases

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Synopsis

The City of Louisville appealed orders from the District Court concerning a dispute with Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Company over utility rates, specifically challenging whether a prior Supreme Court decision required dismissal of the case or permitted further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's orders, holding that the court had discretion in determining how to handle restitution of amounts collected under challenged rates, including the option to require a bond rather than immediate payment into court.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice McKenna

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court.

Appeal from the order of March 10, 1913, referred to in Nos. 11 and 12, Original, and which order it was the object of the petition for mandamus passed on in No. 11 to command the Judge of the District Court to vacate. The appeal also includes certain other orders which preceded the making of that order. The question, which is fundamental of all, is whether the decision and decree of this court set out in No. 11, Original, and the mandate issued thereon permitted further proceedings in the suit or necessarily required its dismissal. This is the general basis of the assignments of error, and as included in it, special objection is made to the instructions given the master in the orders appealed from, to the refusal of the court to order the Telephone Company to pay into court for immediate distribution among those entitled thereto, whatever sums the company collected in excess of the ordinance rates, and deciding instead that a bond should' be required of the company for the restitution of the amounts if the ordinance rates should ultimately be held not to be confiscatory. These objections are repeated in the usual way of assignments of error. The discretion vested in the court, we considered in No. 11, Original, and repetition would serve no purpose. For the reasons there given the order of the District Court is

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • …s not called to the fact that the mandates contained a provision authorizing further proceedings; a provision that removes all question of the power of the district court. In re Louisville, 231 U. S. 639, 645; Louisville v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 231 U. S. 652. In support,of the contention that the final decrees had. the effect of discharging the complainants and their sureties from liability upon the bonds by reason of previous overcharges, it is pointed out that this part of the decrees was not appeale…
  • Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153 (U.S. 1915)
  • ST. Louis v. McKnight, 244 U.S. 368 (U.S. 1917)
    …inhibited rate continued in force; which receipt or coupon or freight bill shall be prima facie evidence of the amount paid and the date of payment..” In In re Louisville, 231 U. S. 639, 645, and Louisville v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., 231 U. S. 652, where it was held that the District Court had discretion to authorize further proceedings, the mandate ordered that the decree be “reversed with, costs, without prejudice,” and remanded “for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of…

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