CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY
v.
CRAMER

U.S. | 1914-02-24
No. 156
232 U.S. 490 Supreme Court of the United States (1914) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 58 L. Ed. 697 · 34 S. Ct. 383 · SCDB 1913-239 · 1914 U.S. LEXIS 1380
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

Cramer sued Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company to recover $992 in damages for hogs that died or were injured during shipment, but the railroad claimed it should be liable only for the value on which freight charges were assessed, based on the shipper's representation that the hogs were worth no more than $10 per head. The Supreme Court held that the railroad's defense was valid under the Hepburn Act of 1906, which established a uniform rule for interstate commerce allowing carriers to rely on tariff valuations when goods are shipped at a lower rate based on stated value, and therefore reversed the Iowa Supreme Court's judgment that had struck the defense as prohibited by state law.

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Opinion of the Court
Me. Justice Lamae

Mr. Justice Lamae delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff Cramer, sued the Railroad Company to recover $992 the amount of damage to a car-load of 60 hogs shipped from Galt, Iowa, to Chicago, Illinois. The Company defended on the ground that the plaintiff overloaded the car and placed therein such an excessive qukntity of hay as to overheat the animals, thereby damaging some and causing the death of others. It further contended that no agent of the Company had any knowledge as to the value of the hogs, except what was stated by the shipper, who represented that their value did not exceed $10 per head and thereby secured the benefit of the lower of two rates specified in the tariff on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission and at Galt. One of these rates applied where the value of the hogs did not exceed $10 per head, and the other, a higher rate, applied where the value exceeded $10 per head. The defendant claimed that the tariffs were binding on plain tiff and that he could not, in any event, recover beyond the valuation on which' the freight was charged. This latter defense was stricken out on demurrer and the trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for more than $600. On writ of error the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sustained. the order striking out the plea on the ground that such defense was prohibited by § 2074 of the Iowa Code, which provides that:

“No contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt any railway corporation engaged in transporting persons or property from the liability of a common carrier, or carriers of passengers, which would exist had no .contract, receipt, rule or regulation been made or entered into.”

In Chicago &c. Ry. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, decided in January, 1898, it was held that this statute was valid even as applied to interstate shipments. But on June 29, 1906, Congress passed the Hepburn Act, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, which established in interstate commerce a uniform rule of liability. That rule of liability is to be enforced in the light of the fact that the provisions of the tariff enter into and form a part of the contract of shipment, and if a regularly filed tariff offers two rates,- based on value, and the goods are forwarded at the low value in order to secure the low rate, then the carrier may avail itself of that valuation when sued for loss or damage to the property. The question has been so fully considered in cases determined since the decision herein of the Supreme Court of Iowa, that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to Kansas Southern Ry. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 645; Missouri &c. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, where the facts were substantially like those here involved and where it was held that a carrier had the right to make a defense like that filed in the court below. As it was error to strike the plea, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Beversed.

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Citator

Cited By (12 total)

  • Boston and Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1914)
    …plicable to a particular commodity or class of articles, based upon a difference in valuation, the shipper must take notice, for the valuation automatically determines which of the rates is the lawful rate.” In Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cramer, 232 U. S. 490, this court said, p. 493: “That rule of liability [the uniform rule established by the Hepburn Act] is to be enforced in the light of the fact that the provisions of the tariff enter into and form a part of the contract of shipment, and if a regular…
    1 / 2
  • Boston & Me. R.R. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439 (U.S. 1918)
    …ssage of the Carmack Amendment in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. supra, and see Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 657; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cramer, 232 U. S. 490; Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 233 U. S. 173. Furthermore it has been held that a low valuation will not prevent the application of the rule making the agreement binding upon the sh…
  • Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (U.S. 1915)

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