KEOKEE CONSOLIDATED COKE COMPANY
v.
TAYLOR; SAME V. KELLY

U.S. | 1914-06-08
Nos. 372, 373
234 U.S. 224 Supreme Court of the United States (1914) Caution
Also reported at: 58 L. Ed. 1288 · 34 S. Ct. 856 · SCDB 1913-093 · 1914 U.S. LEXIS 1143
Cited by 112 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Keokee Consolidated Coke Company challenged a West Virginia statute requiring that orders issued for labor payments be redeemable in lawful money rather than merchandise scrip, arguing the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting freedom of contract and constituting unconstitutional class legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed the statute's validity, holding that a law targeted at an evil and applied where experience shows it is most prevalent does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment merely because other industries might also be subject to similar regulations, and the legislature is the proper judge of whether such measures are necessary unless the case is very clear.

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

These are actions of assumpsit brought by the defendants in error upon orders signed by employés of the plaintiff in error and addressed to it, directing it to pay to bearer 'in merchandise only from your store,’ to the value specified. These orders were upon scrip issued by the plaintiff in error as an advance of monthly wages in payment for labor performed, and the only controversy between the parties arises from the refusal of the plaintiff in error to pay the indicated amounts in money.

The facts were agreed, the Circuit Court gave judgment for the plaintiff and a writ of error was refused by the Supreme Court of Appeals. The ground of the judgment was an act of February 13, 1888, c. 118, amending and reenacting an act of 1887, c. 391, § 3, forbidding any person, firm, or corporation, engaged in mining coal or ore, or manufacturing iron or steel or any other kind of manufacturing to issue for the payment of labor any order unless the same purported to be redeemable for its face value in lawful money of the United States. The plaintiff in error saved its rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and when the Court of Appeals refused to hear the cases brought them here. The writ of error was allowed on September 25, 1912. Norfolk & Suburban Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U. S. 264, 269.

Of course we do not go behind the construction given to the state law by the state courts. The objections that are urged here are that the statute interferes with freedom of contract, and, moré especially, that it is class legislation of a kind supposed to be inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment; a West Virginia decision upon a similar statute being cited to that effect. State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179. The former of these objections, however, is disposed of by Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, and Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Barton, 183 U. S. 23.

It is more pressed that the act discriminates unconstitutionally against certain classes. But while there are differences of opinion as to the degree and kind of discrimination permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is established by repeated decisions that a statute aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset by thinking up and enumerating other instances to which it might have been applied equally well, so far as the court can see. That is for the legislature to judge unless the case is very clear. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 81. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144. The suggestion that others besides mining and manufacturing companies may keep shops and pay their workmen with orders on themselves for merchandise is not enough to overthrow a law that must be presumed to be deemed by the legislature coextensive with the practical need.

Judgments affirmed.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (44 total)

  • Gray v. Cent. Fla. Lumber Co., 104 Fla. 446 (Fla. 1932)
    …ually exists in the contemplation of the Legislature without attempting to cover the whole field of possible abuse. Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 58 L. Ed. 539, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 58 L. Ed. 1288, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 856; Griffith v. State of Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 54 L. Ed. 1151, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132. It is also conclusively settled by frequent decisions of the same court that, subject to certain limitations as respects i…
  • Waybright v. Duval Cnty., 142 Fla. 875 (Fla. 1940)
    …s for a classification on a 40,000 population unit. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 31 Sup. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, 32 Sup. Ct. 74, 56 L. Ed. 175; Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 34 Sup. Ct. 856, 58 L. Ed. 1288; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 35 Sup. Ct. 342, 59 L. Ed. 628; Rast v. Vandeman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 60 L. Ed. 679; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095. *…
    1 / 2
  • The State of Fla. ex rel. L. S. Bonsteel v. Allen, 83 Fla. 214 (Fla. 1922)
    …de by it “is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary.” Erie R. R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685; Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas co., 220 U. S. 61; Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224; Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U. S. 23; Rast v. VanDeman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342. [*235] The charge against the petitioner upon which he was taken into custody is the operation upon the highways of the state of a certain described truck or certain d…

Previewing 3 of 44 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw