STEWART, TREASURER WYANDOTTE COUNTY, KANSAS,
v.
CITY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS

U.S. | 1915-11-01
No. 284
239 U.S. 14 Supreme Court of the United States (1915) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 60 L. Ed. 120 · 36 S. Ct. 15 · SCDB 1915-056 · 1915 U.S. LEXIS 1517
Cited by 58 cases

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Synopsis

The county treasurer of Wyandotte County, Kansas challenged a state statute requiring counties to reimburse cities of the first class for tax rebates granted for prompt payment while also paying over penalties collected for tax delinquencies, arguing the statute violated due process and equal protection by treating taxpayers outside such cities unequally. The Supreme Court dismissed the case, holding that a county officer defending in his official capacity lacks standing to challenge state legislation regulating municipal subdivisions, and that the state's broad constitutional power to create and control municipalities was not transcended by the statute at issue.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice McKenna

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court.

This action originated in a petition for mandamus filed in the District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas, by defendant in error against plaintiff in error to require the latter to account for the .sum of $30,840.24 alleged to be due defendant in error under certain taxing statutes of the State.

Judgment was entered for defendant in error which was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of the State. The case was then brought here.

Motion is made to dismiss, on the ground that no Federal question was raised or passed on by the state court, or alternatively to affirm the judgment.

The controversy is stated by the Supreme Court of the State as follows, 90 Kansas, 846, 847:

“The question in dispute concerns the disposition of the penalties imposed by law for delinquency in the payment of taxes levied by and for the city. In substance it is this: Is the county required to reimburse a city of the first class for the amount by which the taxes collected for the city are reduced by rebates granted for prompt payment, and at the same time to pay over to the city the amount collected as penalties for delay in the payment of taxes levied by the city, while in the case of taxes levied by cities of the second and third classes, and by townships and school districts, the rebates are charged to the county and the penalties credited to it?”

The question was answered in the affirmative, citing and construing the state statutes and upon a consideration of the legislative power of the State over its municipal subdivisions. Plaintiff in error urged and now urges that the statutes so construed deprive taxpayers of the county who reside outside of cities of the first class of property without due process of law and deny them the equal protection of the law.

Plaintiff in error is not impleaded as a taxpayer nor does he defend as such. He is sued as a county officer and defends by virtue of the exercise of his functions as a county officer. In other words, he defends by virtue of laws of which he is an instrument; Constituted by the laws of the State, he yet attempts to resist one of its laws. Whether he may do so is purely a local question. Smith v. Indiana, 191 U. S. 138. He certainly has no personal interest in the litigation. Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U. S. 192; McCandless v. Pratt, 211 U. S. 437; Marshall v. Dye, 231 U. S. 250.

If, however, plaintiff in error is not estopped by that consideration he encounters another. It is manifest that the statute assailed was enacted by the State in regulation of its municipalities, and the power to do this is very broad. It was said in Railroad Company v. County of Otoe, 16 Wall. 667, 676, that “counties, cities, and towns exist only for the convenient administration of the government. Such organizations are instruments of the State, created to carry out its will.” This power of creation and control may be exercised in niany ways and may give rise to actual or asserted inequalities. It has been exercised to enlarge or contract the boundaries of municipal corporations, invest them with special powers, divide and apportion their property. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U. S. 233; Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, supra. It would be difficult to define the restrictions upon this power of control and keep it efficient. It is very certain that the Kansas statute does not transcend the limitations. We think the questions raised are more formal than substantial, and the writ of error is

Dismissed.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (26 total)

  • Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (U.S. 1962)
    …aims of the municipal intervenors do not differ materially from those of the parties who sue as individual voters, the Court need not now determine whether the municipalities are proper parties to this proceeding. See, e. g., Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U. S. 14. The original complaint named as defendants Tennessee’s Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Elections, and the three members of the State Board of Elections, seeking to make the Board members representatives of all the State’s Coun…
    1 / 2
  • Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1939)
    …gal standing here to attack the constitutionality of a state statute in order to avoid compliance with it. Smith v. Indiana, 191 U. S. 138; Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U. S. 192; Marshall v. Dye, 231 U. S. 250; Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U. S. 14. Nor can recognition by a state court of such an undifferentiated, general interest confer jurisdiction on us. Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U. S. 96, reversing Miller v. Columbus & Greenville Ry., 154 Miss. 317; 122 So. 366. Contrari…
    1 / 2
  • Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (U.S. 1933)
    …e. [*48] Their standing for that purpose, at least in the state courts, is a question of state practice (Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96, 99; Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192, 197, 198; Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14, 16), as to which the federal courts do not exercise an independent judgment. The Maryland decisions proceed on the assumption that municipal corporations assailing a statute of exemption or other special legislation have an interest in the controv…

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