CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY
v.
DEVINE, ADMINISTRATOR OF MASON

U.S. | 1915-11-08
No. 391
239 U.S. 52 Supreme Court of the United States (1915) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 60 L. Ed. 140 · 36 S. Ct. 27 · SCDB 1915-049 · 1915 U.S. LEXIS 1508
Cited by 17 cases

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Synopsis

A railroad worker died due to the company's negligence, and his administrator recovered damages under the federal Employers' Liability Act in the trial and appellate courts. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, rejecting the railroad's arguments that there was insufficient evidence of negligence and interstate commerce involvement, and that state law limiting recovery should apply, holding that the federal Employers' Liability Act exclusively governed claims arising under it regardless of state statutory limits.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Chief Justice White,

Memorandum opinion by

Mr. Chief Justice White,

by direction of the court.

The recovery under the Employers’ Liability Act in the trial court, affirmed by the intermediate and supreme court, was for the damage caused.by the death of Mason through the negligence of the defendant company. 266 Illinois, 248. Two propositions are relied upon for reversal: first, a refusal to instruct a verdict on the ground that there was no evidence tending to show either negligence or that the company or the deceased at the time of the particular transaction from which the injury arose was engaged in interstate commerce, and second, a further refusal to instinct that a state statute limiting the amount of recovery was controlling although the suit was under the act of Congress. These contentions are Federal (Seaboard Air Line v. Padgett, 236 U. S. 668, 673; Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 509) and there is jurisdiction, as we do not find thém wholly frivolous.

Overruling the motion to dismiss, we come to consider whether we should grant the motion to affirm, and for that purpose we must decide whether the propositions are so wanting in substance as not to require further argument. Rule 6, paragraph 5. We are of the opinion that as to both propositions an affirmative answer is required. We say this because as to the first it is apparent that there is no ground upon which to rest the assertion that there was no tendehcy of proof whatever on the subjects stated, but to the contrary the record makes it clear, and the arguments in support of the proposition demonstrate, that it alone involves a mere dispute concerning the weight of conflicting tendencies of proof. And the same conclusion is necessary as to the second, because in substance and effect the want of merit in that proposition has by necessary intendment been so conclusively established by the previous decisions of this court. concerning the exclusive operation and effect of the Employers’ Liability Act over the subject with which it deals as to exclude all ground for the contention which the proposition makes. Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 53-55; Mich. Cent. R. R. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 66-67; St. Louis, Iron Mtn. & So. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 655.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Hess, 73 Fla. 494 (Fla. 1917)
    …here. It is sufficient to say that it was there held that the exclusive remedy for injuries received by railroad employees while engaged in interstate commerce is under the Federal Employers Liability Act. See Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Devine, 239 U. S. 52, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 239 U. S. 548, 36 [*503] Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Wabash R. R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729. Section 6 of the Federal Employers Liability Act provides that no action shall b…
  • …decisions of the Supreme Court have conclusively established the exclusive operation of the Employers’ Liability Act over the subject with which it deals to the exclusion of all State statutes relating thereto. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Devine, 239 U. S. 52, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27. The Federal Employers’ Liability Act is the supreme and paramount law of the land with respect to the liability of interstate carriers by rail for injuries to or the death of employees while engaged in interstate commerce. Fla…
  • Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Alston, 113 Fla. 423 (Fla. 1934)
    …t here. It is sufficient to say that it was there held that the exclusive remedy for injuries received by railroad employees while engaged in interstate commerce is under the Federal Employers Liability Act. See Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Devine, 239 U. S. 52, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 239 U. S. 548, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Wabash R. R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729. “Section 6 of the Federal Employers Liability Act provides that no action shall be maint…

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