UNITED STATES
v.
FREEMAN

U.S. | 1915-11-15
No. 481
239 U.S. 117 Supreme Court of the United States (1915) Caution
Also reported at: 60 L. Ed. 172 · 36 S. Ct. 32 · SCDB 1915-047 · 1915 U.S. LEXIS 1502
Cited by 49 cases

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Synopsis

The defendant was indicted in Kansas for knowingly shipping unlabeled trunks of intoxicating liquor from Missouri into Kansas, violating a federal statute requiring proper labeling on interstate shipments. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that "shipping" under the statute constitutes a continuing act that is completed when the package reaches its destination in the receiving state, rather than when it is merely delivered to the carrier, thereby establishing venue in the destination state and giving the statute meaningful application to both interstate and international shipments.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Van Devanter

Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an indictment under § 240 of the Criminal Code making it a punishable offense knowingly to “ship or cause to be shipped from one State, . . . into any other State, . . . or from any foreign country into any State, . . .” any package of or containing intoxicating liquor of any kind, “unless such package be so labeled on the outside cover as to plainly show the name of the consignee, the nature of its contents, and the quantity contained therein.” The indictment was returned in the District of Kansas and charges the defendant with violating the statute by. knowingly .shipping and causing to be shipped from Joplin, Missouri, into Cherokee County, Kansas,' six unlabeled trunks severally containing from twelve to fifteen gallons of intoxicating liquor. By a motion to quash and a demurrer it was objected that the offense denounced by the statute is complete when the • package is delivered to the carrier for shipment, and therefore that the offense charged was not cognizable in the District of Kansas but only in the Western District of Missouri. Acceding to this construction of the statute, the District Court sustained the motion to quash and the demurrer and entered a judgment discharging the defendant. The Government. brings the case here under the Criminal Appeals Act, of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.

As usually understood, to ship a package from one State into another or from a foreign country into a State is to accomplish its transportation from the one into the other by a common carrier, and is essentially a continuing act whose performance is begun when the package is delivered to the carrier and is completed when it reaches its destination. We think it is to such an act that the statute refers. To reach a different conclusion the word “ship” must be read as if it were “deliver for shipment.” No doubt it sometimes has that meaning, but it plainly is not so used in this instance. The statute deals with shipping liquor from a foreign country into a State as well as with shipping it from one State into another State.. It puts both upon the same plane and makes .them equally criminal. Whatever marks the completion of the offense in one likewise marks it in the other. If it be the delivery to the carrier in the case of interstate shipments it equally is this delivery in the case of shipments from a foreign country. And yet all will concede that Congress did not intend to do anything so obviously futile as to denounce as criminal an act wholly done in a foreign country, such as is the delivery to the carrier where the shipment is from a foreign" country into a State. So, if its words permit, as we think they do, the statute must be given a construction which will cause it to reach both classes of shipments, and thereby to accomplish the purpose of its enactment. United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S.

525. This, we think, requires that it be construed as referring to the continuing' act before indicated whereby, the transportation into a State is accomplished, whether the package comes from another State or from a foreign country. In this view the completion of the offense will always be within a jurisdiction where the statute can be enforced. The District Court rightly recognized that, under Jud. Code, § 42, formerly Rev. Stat., § 731, the offense charged was cognizable in the District of Kansas, as well as in the Western District of Missouri, if the place to which the packages were transported was the place of the completion of the offense.

Therefore nothing need be said upon that point.

Judgment reversed.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (16 total)

  • United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1941)
    …be applied beyond the reach of the congressional power which the Constitution confers.. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308; Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373; United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100. The right of the voters at the primary to have their votes counted is, as we have stated, a right or privilege secured by the Constitution, and to this § 20 also gives protection.9 The alleged, acts of appel…
  • United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (U.S. 1944)
    …secuting officers of that state would be most interested in enforcement and would best understand the scope of the laws of the state of delivery. Congress would not wish to leave immune shipments from foreign countries. Cf. United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Rutledge join in this dissent. Constitution of the United States, Art. III, § 2, cl. 3; Sixth Amendment. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 73-77; Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S…
    1 / 2
  • United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699 (U.S. 1946)
    …nt may appeal directly to this Court. Compare United States v. Johnson, 53 F. Supp. 596, with United States v. Johnson, 323 U. S. 273; United States v. Lombardo, 228 F. 980, with United States v. Lombardo, 241 U. S. 73; see United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117; United States v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U. S. 161. This is true at any rate where the statute itself contains a venue provision. Cf., however, United States v. Johnson, supra. Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act3 provides…

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