BADDERS
v.
UNITED STATES

U.S. | 1916-03-06
No. 521
240 U.S. 391 Supreme Court of the United States (1916) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 60 L. Ed. 706 · 36 S. Ct. 367 · 1916 U.S. LEXIS 1460 · SCDB 1915-109
Cited by 365 cases

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Synopsis

Badders was indicted for depositing letters in the mail to execute a fraudulent scheme in violation of federal law, and he challenged his conviction on grounds that Congress lacked power to regulate the mailing of letters as a mere incident to fraud and that the punishment constituted cruel and unusual penalties. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Congress has authority to regulate the deposit of letters in the U.S. mail and may prohibit such acts done in furtherance of schemes deemed contrary to public policy, and that each mailing may constitute a separate offense without violating constitutional prohibitions on excessive punishment.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

This case is brought to this court from the District Court under § 238 of the Judicial Code, Act qf March 3,' 1911,- c. 231; 36 Stat. 1087, 1167, on the ground that it involves the construction and application of the Constitution of the United States, The plaintiff in error was indicted for placing letters in the mail for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud devised by him, in violation of § 215 of the Criminal Code, Act of March 4,1909, c. 321; 35 Stat. 1088, 1130. There were twelve counts, on seven of which, each relating to a different letter, he was found guilty. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment on each count, the periods being concurrent not cumulative, and also to a fine of $1,000 on each, or $7,000 in all. The grounds for coming to this court are first that § 215 of the Criminal Code is beyond the power of Congress as applied to what may be a mere incident of a fraudulent scheme that itself is outside the jurisdiction of Congress, to deal with; and second that if it makes the deposit of each letter a separate offence subject to such punishment as it received in this case it imposes cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines.

These contentions need no extended answer. The overt act of putting a letter into the postoffice of the United States is a matter that Congress may regulate. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727. Whatever the limits to its power, it may forbid any such acts done, in 'furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not. In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110, 134. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 507. United States v. Stever, 222 U. S. 167, 173. See Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U. S. 321, 357. United States v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140, 144. Intent may make an otherwise innocent act criminal, if it is a step in a plot. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 206. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396. The acts alleged have been found to have been done for the purpose of executing the' scheme, and there would be no ground for contending, if it were argued, that they were too remotely connected with the scheme for the law to deal with them. The whole matter is disposed of by United States v. Young, 232 U. S. 155; 161. As to the other point, there is no doubt that the law may make each putting óf a letter into the postoffice a separate offence. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U. S. 625. In re Henry, 123 U. S. 372, 374. And there is no ground for declaring the punishment unconstitutional. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126,135. Ebeling v. Morgan, supra.

The other matters discussed are before us only as incident to the constitutional questions upon which the case was brought here. As those questions merely attempt to reopen well established and familiar law It is not necessary to go beyond them. Brolan v. United States, 222 U. S. 215, 216, 222. There, is the more reason for declining further consideration iu the extravagant and unnecessary multiplication of exceptions and assignments of error that often has been condemned by this court. Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 509. . If there were anything in the objections to the indictment they are not of a kind to involve constitutional rights, Lamar v. United States, 240 U. S. 60, although the argument attempts to give a constitutional turn to them and to other technical complaints, such as that the judge was absent during a part of the deliberations of the grand jury. We find no error in this or the other particulars mentioned in argument. Jones v. United States, 162 Fed. Rep. 417, 421. S. C., 212 U. S. 576. Commonwealth v. Bannon, 97 Massachusetts, 214, 220. See Brees v. United States, 226 U. S. 1, 11. As to the arraignment see Garland v. Washington, 232 U. S. 642, 646, 647. We deem it unnecessary to go into further detail.

Judgment affirmed.

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Cited By (94 total)

  • Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932)
    …ed. The-offense as-to each separate bag was complete when that bag was eut, - irrespective of any' attack upon, or mqtilation of, any other bag.” See also In re Henry, 123 U. S. 372, 374; In re De Bara, 179 U. S. 316, 320; Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391, 394; Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. 89, 127; United States v. Daugherty, 269 U. S. 360; Queen v. Scott, 4 Best & S. (Q. B.) 368, 373. Two..Section 1 of the Narcotic Act creates the offense of selling any of the forbidden drugs except in or from the ori…
  • Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1972)
    …Thus, it is apparent that the dissenters’ position in O’Neil had become the opinion of the Court in Weems. Weems was followed by two cases that added little to our knowledge of the scope of the cruel and unusual language, Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391 (1916), and United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407 (1921).27 Then [*326] came another landmark case, Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 (1947). Francis had been convicted of mur…
  • Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1983)
    …e punishment” doctrine of Weems to a punishment consisting solely of a sentence of imprisonment, despite numerous opportunities to do so. E. g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980); Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391 (1916); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616 (1912). In 1972, nearly 90% of the convictions in federal courts followed pleas of guilty or nolo contedere. H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 36 (1973). No one will ever know if or wh…

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