EATON, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF LUKE,
v.
BOSTON SAFE DEPOSIT AND TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEE OF LEIGHTON

U.S. | 1916-03-13
No. 466
240 U.S. 427 Supreme Court of the United States (1916) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 60 L. Ed. 723 · 36 S. Ct. 391 · 1916 U.S. LEXIS 1464 · SCDB 1915-113
Cited by 65 cases

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Synopsis

A trust fund bequeathed to a beneficiary with restrictions against creditor interference did not pass to the beneficiary's bankruptcy trustee under the Bankruptcy Act, as Massachusetts law treated such spendthrift trust restrictions as limiting the character of the equitable property itself and the restrictions were enforceable against creditors and assignees in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court affirmed that federal bankruptcy law respects state exemptions and trusts valid under state law, and thus upheld the Massachusetts doctrine permitting spendthrift trusts despite the bankrupt's technical ability to assign her interest.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a bill for instructions, brought by the Trust Company, the principal defendant in error, to ascertain whether a fund bequeathed to it in trust for Mrs. Luke, codefendant in error, passed to her trüstee in bankruptcy-. The bequest was df severity-five thousand dollars, “The whole of the net income thereof to be paid my adopted daughter, Fannie Leighton Luke, wife of Otis H. Luke, of said Brookline during her life quarterly in each and every year tqgether with such portion of the principal of said trust fund ¿s shall make the amount to be paid her at least Three Thousand Dollars a year during her life, said income to be free from, the-interference or control of her creditors.” It is established law in .Massachusetts that such trusts are valid-and effective against creditors, Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Massachusetts, 170, and, subject to what we are about to say, against assignees in insolvency or trustees in bankruptcy. Billings v. Marsh, 153 Massachusetts, 311. Munroe v. Dewey, 176 Massachusetts, 184. The trustee in bankruptcy seeks to avoid the effect of these decisions on the ground that Mrs. Luke’s equitable life interest was. held by the Supreme Court of the State to be assignable, and that therefore it passed under § 70a (5) • of the Bankruptcy' Act, vesting in the trustee all property that the bankrupt “could by any means have transferred.” The Supreme Judicial Court, however, held that the above cited cases governed and that the property did not pass. 220 Massachusetts, 484.

If it be true without qualification that the bankrupt could have assigned her interest arid by so doing could have freed from the trust both the fund and any proceeds received by her, the argument would-be very strong that the státute intended.the fund to pass. There would be an analogy at least with the provision giving the trustee all powers that the bankrupt might have exercised for her own benefit, § 70 a (3), and there would be difficulty in admitting that a persori could have property over which he could exercisé all the powers of ownership except to make it liable for his debts. The-conclusion that the fund was assignable was based on two cases, and we presume was meant to go no farther than their authority required. The'first -of these simply held that an executor was not liable on' his bond for paying over an annuity to an assignee as it fell dire, when the assignor to whom it was bequeathed free from creditors had not attempted to Avoid his act. Ames v. Clarke, 106 Massachusetts, 573. The other case does not go beyond a dictum that carries the-'principle no farther. Huntress v. Allen, 195 Massachusetts, 226. It is true that where the restriction has' been .enforced there generally has been a clause against anticipation, but the present decision in following them holds the restricting clause paramount, and therefore we feel warranted in assuming that the power of alienation will not be pressed to a point inconsistent with the dominant intent of. the will. Whether if that -power were absolute the restriction still should be upheld as in case of a statutory exemption that leaves the bankrupt free to convey his rights it, is unnecessary to decide.

The law of Massachusetts treats such restrictions as limiting the character of the equitable property and inherent in it. Dunn v. Dobson, 198 Massachusetts, 142, 146. Lathrop v. Merrill, 207 Massachusetts, 6, 9. Whatever may have been the criticisms upon the policy and soundness of the doctrine, and whatever may be the power of this 'court to weigh the reasoning upon which it has been established by the Massachusetts cases, Page vEdmunds, 187 U. S. 596, 602, it has been established too long and.is too nearly sanctioned by the decisions of this court to be overthrown here. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716. Shelton v. King, 229 U. S. 90, 99. The policy of the Bankruptcy Act is to respect state exemptions, and until the Massachusetts decisions shall have gone farther than they yet have we are not prepared to say that the present bequest is not protected by the Massachusetts rule.

Decree affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By (17 total)

  • …. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10, 44 S.Ct. 232, 239, 68 L.Ed. 533 (1923) (“where the bankruptcy law deals with property rights which are regulated by the state law, the federal courts in bankruptcy will follow the state courts”); Eaton v. Boston Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427, 429, 36 S.Ct. 391, 392, 60 L.Ed. 723 (1916) (“the policy of the Bankruptcy Act is to respect state exemptions”). . For further discussion of the Michigan Act as “one of a genre of Depression-era measures intended to afford relief ... in the constr…
    1 / 2
  • In re Graham v. Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984)
    …trustee. Under this transferability-leviability standard, a bankrupt’s beneficial interest in a trust was not part of the estate if the interest could not be transferred or levied upon under state law. See Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427, 429, 36 S.Ct. 391, 392, 60 L.Ed. 723 (1916); In re McLoughlin, 507 F. 2d 177, 181 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Ahlswede, 516 F. 2d 784, 786 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 913,96 S.Ct. 218, 46 L.Ed.2d 142 (1975). Thus to the extent a state recognized…
    1 / 2
  • …under circumstances which would result in any part of .it being applied in satisfying debts previously incurred by Francis. The Bankruptcy Act presents no obstacle to carrying out the testator’s intention. Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 240 U. S. 427. As the Court of Appeals said: “The nature of the condition itself determines the controversy.” The judgment is Affirmed.…

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