LEROY KIMES,
v.
STATE
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Leroy Kimes was convicted of breaking and entering a cook room with intent to commit petit larceny. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction despite the prosecution's case resting almost entirely on testimony from a co-defendant who received immunity in exchange for becoming a state's witness, and despite the trial court's failure to give a cautionary instruction to the jury regarding how to evaluate such testimony.
The court held that although the trial court erred in failing to provide a cautionary instruction as required by recent precedent, the evidence was nevertheless legally sufficient to sustain the verdict, and the judgment should not be disturbed on the basis of evidentiary insufficiency. Other points raised were considered but did not constitute grounds for reversal.
“Proof of guilt against Kimes consists almost wholly of the version of the crime as given for the State by defendant Griffin, who was a self-confessed participant in its commission, if not the sole culprit responsible for it.”
Establishes that the prosecution's case depended almost entirely on the immunized co-defendant's testimony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLeroy Kimes, Jack Smith, and J. M. Griffin were jointly indicted for breaking and entering a cook room belonging to W. W. Padgett with intent to commi…
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Leroy Kimes was indicted, tried and convicted of the felony of breaking and entering a cook room, the property of one W. W. Padgett, with intent to commit petit larceny therein. Jointly indicted with Kimes for the same offense were Jack Smith and J. M. Griffin. Smith was tried and convicted on a joint trial with Kimes, while Griffin was allowed to turn “State’s evidence” and secure his immunity from prosecution.
Proof of guilt against Kimes consists almost wholly of the version of the crime as given for the State by defendant Griffin, who was a self-confessed participant in its commission, if not the sole culprit responsible for it. Griffin’s testimony was admitted in evidence by the trial judge without his giving to the jury any cautionary instruction as to how it should be received, such as this Court has recently held is required to be submitted to the jury in connection with its admission, when such special cautionary instruction is specially requested to be given at that particular time. See: Bass v. State, 121 Fla. 208, 163 Sou. Rep. 485.
As opposed to the testimony of Griffin, Kimes offered an alibi, the weight and credibility of which was for the determination of the jury under the circumstances, the rule being that proof of an alibi must be sufficient to raise in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the *868accused. Caldwell v. State, 50 Fla. 4, 39 Sou. Rep. 188; Dees v. State, 99 Fla. 1144, 128 Sou. Rep. 485. However, the jury found the two defendants guilty, so the question for this Court to decide is whether or not as a matter of law the jury’s verdict should be set aside for a manifest insufficiency of the evidence to support it, even though conflicting. Compare: Wernokoff v. State, 121 Fla. 62, 163 Sou. Rep. 225; Howell v. State, 121 Fla. 326, 163 Sou. Rep. 691.
Our conclusion is that the evidence, while not altogether satisfactory from an evidentiary standpoint, is nevertheless legally sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment and that therefore the judgment should not be disturbed on that ground alone. Other points have been considered but are not found to constitute grounds for reversal.
Affirmed.
Whitfield, C. J., and Brown, J., concur.
Terrell, and Buford, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
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Flowers v. State, 152 Fla. 649 (Fla. 1943)…present at the time and place of the commission of the crime charged. See Dees v. State, 99 Fla. 1144, 128 So. 485. Proof of an alibi must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt in the mind of the jury. See Kines v. State, 121 Fla. 866, 164 So. 517. The accused, under the law, is not required to establish proof of an alibi beyond a reasonable doubt. See Blakes v. State, 133 Fla. 12, 182 So. 447. The proof of an alibi depends on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of t…1 / 2
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Kellerman v. State, 261 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…tends toward a conclusion contrary to that advocated by appellant, for that opinion in sustaining the conviction does not recite or allude to evidence corroborating the testimony of the accomplice there. In 1935, the Supreme Court in Kimes v. State, 121 Fla. 866, 164 So. 517, found the corroboration evidence was not satisfactory and the proof of guilt rested almost wholly upon the testimony of the self-confessed principal culprit. Nevertheless the burglary conviction was affirmed. We have noted that the ca…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Caldwell v. State, 50 Fla. 4 (Fla. 1905)
- Dees v. State, 99 Fla. 1144 (Fla. 1930)
- Bass v. State, 121 Fla. 208 (Fla. 1935)
- Howell v. State, 121 Fla. 327 (Fla. 1935)
- Wernokoff v. State, 121 Fla. 62 (Fla. 1935)