CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY
v.
MCLAUGHLIN
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McLaughlin sued the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company for damages to a horse the company transported for him, but the railway had a contractual provision requiring that damage claims be made in writing and verified within five days of delivery to a claims agent in Richmond, Virginia. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment in McLaughlin's favor, holding that because McLaughlin failed to comply with the clear contractual requirement and presented no evidence excusing his failure, the railway was entitled to a directed verdict and could not be held liable for the damages.
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Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court.
McLaughlin recovered judgment against the railway company in the Circuit Court, Pocahontas County, West Virginia, for injuries to a horse which it transported from Lexington, Kentucky, and delivered to him at Seebert, West Virginia, February 17, 1914. ,
The shipment was under a “uniform live stock contract” signed by both parties and introduced in evidence by defendant in error which among other things provides:
“That no claim for damages which may accrue to the said shipper under this contract shall be allowed or paid by the said carrier or sued for in any Court by the said shipper, unless claim for such loss or damage shall be made in writing, verified by the affidavit of the said shipper or his agent and delivered to the General Claim Agent of the said carrier at his office in Richmond, Va., within five days from the time said stock is removed from said car or cars; and that if any loss or damages occur upon the line of a connecting carrier then such carrier shall not be liable unless a claim shall be made in like manner and delivered in like time to some proper officer or agent of the carrier on whose line the loss or injury occurs,”
It conclusively appears that McLaughlin did not present a verified claim to the carrier’s agent as provided by the contract. Upon its face the agreement seems to be unobjectionable and nothing in the record tends to establish circumstances rendering it invalid or excuse failure to comply therewith. The court below erred in denying a seasonable request for a directed verdict; and its judgment must be reversed. Our recent opinions render unnecessary any further discussion of the reasons for this conclusion. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Wall, 241 U. S. 87; Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190; Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319.
Reverse and remand for further proceedings mot inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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ST. Louis v. Starbird, 243 U.S. 592 (U.S. 1917)…held that such requirement must be complied with by giving notice to the agent of the delivering carrier, as the Carmack Amendment makes such carrier for this purpose the agent of the initial carrier. And see Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McLaughlin, 242 U. S. 142. The Carmack Amendment requires the receiving carrier to issue a through bill of lading and makes that bill of lading the contract of shipment, and the initial carrier is made liable for injuries in [*605] the course of transit over connecting lines…
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Baron v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 108 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1939)…m was part of the contract of transportation and was therefore binding on the plaintiff. It is argued that the time for notice of claim, fifteen days, was unreasonably short. We cannot adopt the argument. See Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 242 U.S. 142, 37 S.Ct. 40, 61 L. Ed. 207; Erie R. Co. v. Stone, 244 U.S. 332, 37 S.Ct. 633, 61 L.Ed. 1173. A provision requiring notice within fifteen days would be invalid at the present time, by reason of the Act of August 29, 1935, 46 U.S.C.A. § 183b. The eve…
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Erie R.R. Co. v. Shuart, 250 U.S. 465 (U.S. 1919)…view. Under our former opinions, the clause requiring presentation of a written claim is clearly valid and controlling as to any liability arising from beginning to end of the transportation contracted for. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McLaughlin, 242 U. S. 142; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Leach, 249 U. S. 217; Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Dettlebach, 239 U. S. 588, 593, 594; and Southern Ry. Co. v. Prescott,…
Authorities Cited
- Georgia v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (U.S. 1916)
- Cincinnati v. Rankin, 241 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1916)
- N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Wall, 241 U.S. 87 (U.S. 1916)