EX PARTE INDIANA TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, PETITIONER
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In an admiralty case pending in federal district court, a judge had issued an order allowing more than 270 persons to become co-libelants despite lacking jurisdiction to do so, prompting the defendant to seek a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court held that the judge who made the challenged order was the essential party respondent to the prohibition petition and could not be substituted with the co-libelants, though those parties could later be heard to support the judge's return to the rule. The Court extended the deadline for the judge's response to allow adequate time to file a return.
© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Memorandum opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice White,
by direction of the court.
Speaking in a general sensé, on the ground that in an admiralty cause pending in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, one of the judges of that court had, by an order which he was absolutely devoid of jurisdiction to make, permitted more than 270 persons to become co-libelants, an application by the defendant in the cause was made on the sixteenth day of October, 1916, for leave to file a petition for prohibition directed to the judge in question, to prevent the carrying out of the order. On the twenty-third of October permission to file the petition for prohibition was granted and a rule to show cause was directed to be issued to the Honorable Kenesaw M. Landis, the judge by whom the order complained of was made. On the day upon which this rule was returnable, December 4, there was no response to the rule made on behalf of the respondent judge, but by oral motion a request was made on behalf of the parties who it was asserted had been mistakenly permitted to become co-libelants, that they be treated as the respondents to the rule and be permitted in that capacity to file a return to the rule, a copy of which return was prepared to be filed and presented for filing in case the permission asked was granted, and that request is the matter now before us for consideration.
We are of opinion, however, that the substitution of respondents asked for cannot be granted, since it is apparent that the judge who rendered the order and against whom the writ prayed for, if allowed, is to be directed, is the essential party respondent, however much when his return to the rule is made either by his authority or because of their interest in the result or as friends of the court, the persons to be adversely affected by the granting of the relief prayed may be heard to sustain the. sufficiency of the return when that subjéct arises for consideration. We therefore transfer the date fixed for the return in the original rule to show cause from the fourth day of December, 1916, to the fifteenth day of January, 1917, in order to afford ample opportunity for the making by the respondent judge of the return which the original order calls for. And it is so ordered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577 (Fla. 1932)…essential that the parties plaintiff in the inferior court be served with and given an opportunity to plead to the rule to show cause, it may on proper showing be amended and the proceeding take that course. Ex parte Indiana Transportation Company, 242 U. S. 281, 37 Sup. Ct. 126, 61 L. Ed. 301. It is settled law in this state that prohibition may be an appropriate remedy to prevent judicial action, when the judge is disqualified, as well as when the judge is without jurisdiction to act in the cause. State…1 / 2
-
The Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Koonce, 147 Fla. 616 (Fla. 1941)…essential that the parties plaintiff in the inferior court be served with and given an opportunity to plead to the rule to show cause, it may on proper showing be amended and the proceeding take that course. Ex parte Indiana Transportation Company, 242 U. S. 281, 37 Sup. Ct. 126, 61 L. Ed. 301. “It is settled-law in this State that prohibition may be an appropriate remedy to prevent judicial action, when the judge is disqualified, as well as when the judge is without jurisdiction to act in the cause. State…1 / 2
-
DE Parcq v. The United States Dist. Court FOR S. Dist. OF Iowa & the Honorable William F. Riley, 235 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1956)…gs had and taken in the trial court, has not been controverted nor challenged by return, motion or otherwise, and all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusions of law, must be accepted by us as true. Matter of Indiana Transportation Co., 242 U.S. 281, 37 S.Ct. 126, 61 L.Ed. 301; State ex rel. Hall v. Burney, Mo.App., 84 S.W. 2d 659; 73 C.J.S., Prohibition, § 29 (2), p. 108; 42 Am.Jur., Prohibition, Section 44, p. 179. The facts will be further developed in the course of this opinion. The purpor…