JOSEPH E. PILSON, APPELLANT,
v.
LEO GUILLERY AND BERTHA GUILLERY, APPELLEES
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This case concerns whether a divorced woman's separate property can be used to satisfy debts incurred by her husband during their marriage, when she co-signed promissory notes without formal legal consent as required for married women's property conveyances. The court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the wife, finding her separate property protected.
No, a divorced woman's separate property is not liable for her husband's debts incurred during their marriage, even if she co-signed promissory notes, if she did not execute the notes with the specific formal consent required for married women's property conveyances under Florida law.
“which renders the separate property of a married woman unavailable for application on the debts of her husband "without her consent given by some instrument in writing executed according to the law respecting conveyances by married women"”
This quote establishes the constitutional protection for a married woman's separate property and the specific requirement for consent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff sued the defendants, a divorced couple, on promissory notes they had signed while married. The wife argued that the notes represented he…
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Plaintiff brought an action on certain promissory notes against the makers Leo Guillery and Bertha Guillery. When they signed the notes the defendants were husband and wife. Later, when suit was filed they had been divorced. Bertha Guillery defended by claiming the benefit of the provision of Article XI, section 1, of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., which renders the separate property of a married woman unavailable for application on the debts of her husband “without her consent given by some instrument in writing executed according to the law respecting conveyances by married women” [and her signatures on the notes here were not so formalized]. Her answer, and her affidavit *548in support of a motion for summary judgment without contradictory evidence, represented that the obligations for which she signed the notes were those of her husband, incurred in his business, in which she had no part. We can not agree with the appellant in his contention that the showing of Bertha Guillery in this respect was insufficient, and we conclude that the trial judge was eminently correct in granting summary judgment in her favor. See Jette v. Harbison, 158 Fla. 418, 28 So.2d 858; Kovens v. Bluestone, Fla.1962, 145 So.2d 473; First National Bank of Melbourne v. Berg, Fla. App.1963, 153 So.2d 331.
Affirmed.
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Citator
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Waechter v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 181 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)….Jur., Constitutional Law §§ 11-14. To attain the objects clearly intended in the adoption of Article XI, Section 1, judgment against as well as execution upon the wife’s separate property must be barred.” To the same effect see Pilson v. Guillery, 168 So. 2d 547 (Fla.App.1964). The final question on this appeal is whether under the rule in Edwards v. Meyer, 100 Fla. 235, 130 So. 57 (1930), the sale of the subject chattels by appellant’s husband, in which she is not shown to have participated, operated to a…
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Am. Nat'l Bank OF Jacksonville v. Brantley, 204 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)…g that the debt here sued upon was not the debt of the appellee wife, but rather that of her husband, it follows that judgment in favor of the appellee was correctly entered. Angle v. Crow, 184 So. 2d 688 (Fla.App. 4th 1966), and Pilson v. Guillery, 168 So. 2d 547 (Fla.App. 3d 1964). Affirmed. WIGGINTON, Chief Judge; and JOHNSON, J., concur.…
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Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & Liquidator of S. Bank of St. Petersburg v. Playford, 217 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…s Section 708.08 (1967), F.S.A. gives the wife the right to obligate herself on a note as if she were unmarried. In First National Bank of Melbourne v. Berg, 153 So. 2d 331 (Fla.App.1963) the note was the husband’s obligation. In Pilson v. Guillery, 168 So. 2d 547 (Fla.App.1964) there was an antecedent obligation of the husband for the satisfaction of which the wife joined in the execution of a note which the Third District Court of Appeal held invalid against her separate property. In American National Bank…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jette v. Harbison, 158 Fla. 418 (Fla. 1947)
- First Nat'l Bank OF Melbourne v. Berg, 153 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Kovens v. Bluestone, 145 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1962)