SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY ET AL.
v.
DARNELL-TAENZER LUMBER COMPANY ET AL.

U.S. | 1918-01-21
No. 132
245 U.S. 531 Supreme Court of the United States (1918) Caution
Also reported at: 62 L. Ed. 451 · 38 S. Ct. 186 · SCDB 1917-193 · 1918 U.S. LEXIS 2112
Cited by 181 cases

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Synopsis

The Supreme Court held that a shipper who paid excessive railroad rates to carriers could recover reparation from the carriers even though the shipper passed the cost on to its purchasers, rejecting the argument that cost-shifting eliminated recoverable damages. The Court reasoned that damages are measured at the point of direct loss rather than following subsequent business transactions, and only the party in direct contractual relation with the carrier—the one who actually paid the excessive charge—could recover, not remote downstream purchasers.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit brought by the defendants in error to recover reparation from the railroads for charging a rate on hardwood lumber, alleged to be excessive. The Interstate Commerce Commission had found the rate to be excessive and had made an order for reduction from 85 to 75 cents, which was obeyed, and also one for reparation to the extent of the excess, which was not obeyed. 13 I.

C. C.

668. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained by the Circuit Court on the ground that it was not alleged that the plaintiffs had paid the excessive rates or that they were damaged thereby. 190 Fed. Rep.

659. The declaration was amended, but at the trial the judge directed a verdict for the defendants, presumably on the ground argued here, that it did not appear that the plaintiffs were damaged. The judgment was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 221 Fed. Rep. 890. 137 C.

C. A.

460. At a new trial the jury were instructed that if they found the rate charged unreasonable and that prescribed by the Interterstate Commerce Commission reasonable, they should. find for the plaintiffs in accordance with the Commission’s award.

The jury found'for the plaintiffs and this judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 229 Fed. Rep. 1022. 143 C.

C. A. 663.

The only question before us is that at which we have hinted: whether the fact that the plaintiffs were able to pass on the damage that they sustained in the first instance by paying the unreasonable charge, and to collect that amount from the purchasers, prevents their Recovering the overpayment from the carriers. The answer is not difficult. The general tendency of the law, •in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step. • As it does not attribute remote consequences to a defendant so it holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has suffered a loss. The plaintiffs suffered losses to the amount of the verdict when they paid. Their claim accrued at once in the theory of the law and it does not inquire into later events. Olds v. Mapes-Reeve Construction Co., 177 Massachusetts, 41, 44. Perhaps strictly the securing of such an indemnity as the present, might be regarded as not differing in principle from the recovery of insurance, as res inter alios, with which the defendants were not concerned. If it be said that the whole transaction is one from a business point of view, it is enough to.reply that the unity in this case is not sufficient to entitle the purchaser to recover, any more than the ultimate consumer who in turn paid an increased price. He has no privity with the carrier. State v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 81 Vermont, 459. See Nicola, Stone & Myers Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 14 I.

C. C. 199, 207-209. Baker Manufacturing Co. v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 21 I.

C. C.

605. The carrier ought not to be. allowed to retain bis illegal profit, and the only one who can take it from him is the one that alone was in relation with him, and from whom the carrier took the sum. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co. v. Ballou & Wright, 242 Fed. Rep.

862. Behind the technical mode of. statement is the consideration well emphasized by the Interstate Commerce Commission, of the endlessness and futility of the effort to follow every transaction to its ultimate result. 13 I.

C. C.

680. Probably in the end the public pays the damages in most cases of compensated torts.

The cases like Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U. S. 184, where a party that has paid only the reasonable rate sues upon a discrimination because some other has paid less, are not like the present. There the damage depends upon remoter considerations. But here the plaintiffs have paid cash out of pocket that should not have been required of them, and there is no question as to the amount, of the proximate loss. See Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 236 U. S. 412, 429. Mills v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 238 U. S. 473.

An objection is taken to the jurisdiction of this court upon writ of error. An application is made for a certiorari in case the objection is held good, and as we should grant the latter writ in that event the question has no importance here except as a precedent. We are inclined to take the course followed sub silentio in Mills v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., and to treat , cases brought under § 16 of the Act to .Regulate Commerce which authorizes the j binder of all plaintiffs and all defendants as standing on a peculiar ground.

Judgment affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By (54 total)

  • …v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (1917), another treble-damage antitrust case.7 With respect to overcharge cases arising under the transportation laws, similar views were expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U. S. 531, 533 (1918), and by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Adams v. Mills, 286 U. S. 397, 406-408 (1932). In those cases the possibility that -plaintiffs had recouped the overcharges from their customers was held irrelevant in assessing damages.8 [*491] United s…
    1 / 3
  • Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (U.S. 1977)
    …the “victim of an overcharge is [immediately] [*751] damaged within the meaning of § 4 to the extent of that overcharge,” Id., at 491. The particularly apt precedent supporting this proposition was Southern Pacific Co. v. DarnellTaenzer Lumber Co., 245 U. S. 531 (1918),7 where a pass-on defense had been rejected because of “[t]he general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, . . . not to go beyond the first step,” and the Court’s belief that “[t]he carrier ought not to be allowed to retain his…
  • …imilar construction of the remedial provision of the Interstate Commerce Act a few years later: “The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U. S. 531, 533 (1918).30 When Congress enacted § 4 of the Clayton Act in 1914, and when it reenacted that section in 1955, 69 Stat. 282, it adopted the language of § 7 and presumably also the judicial gloss that avoided a simple literal interpretation. As th…

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