CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY
v.
MAUCHER

U.S. | 1919-01-07
No. 85
248 U.S. 359 Supreme Court of the United States (1919) Caution
Also reported at: 63 L. Ed. 294 · 39 S. Ct. 108 · 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2320 · SCDB 1918-228
Cited by 35 cases

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Synopsis

A circus employee injured when a railway's passenger train collided with the circus train sued for damages despite having agreed to release the railway from liability as part of his employment contract with the circus. The Supreme Court held that the Carmack Amendment, which governed carriers' ability to limit liability by contract, applied only to the shipment of property and not to personal injuries, and therefore state law controlled the validity of the liability waiver in this case.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice. Brandéis

Mr. Justice. Brandéis delivered the opinion of the court.

Barnum & Bailey, who owned rolling stock adapted to carrying their circus equipment and personnel, made, in 1913, a special contract with the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company concerning transportation on its lines. The railway agreed for a sum fixed, to give the right to use its tracks and locomotives fully manned and supplied, to haul the circus trains. Barnum & Bailey agreed, among other things, that the railway was not acting therein as a common carrier; that it should not be liable for any injury, though arising from negligence, either to their own person or property or to that of any of their employees; and that they would indemnify the railway against any such injury.

While the circus train was being moved in Nebraska, from Lincoln to Atlantic, Iowa, it was crashed into by one of the railway’s regular passenger trains; and Maucher, an employee of the circus, was injured. He had, by his contract of employment, agreed to release all railroad companies from any claim for injuries suffered while travelling with the circus on their lines; but he brought, in a state court of Nebraska, an-action against the railway for damages, alleging that he had been injured by its negligence. The railway defended on the ground that its contract with Barnum & Bailey, and thus with the plaintiff, operated to release it from all liability; that since the contract related to a movement in interstate commerce, its validity was to be determined by the federal law; and that by the federal law the contracts were valid, although undertaking to release the railway from liability; since it was not acting as common carrier. Santa Fe, Prescott & Phœnix Ry. Co. v. Grant Brothers Construction Co., 228 U. S.

177.

The trial court held that the liability was to be determined by the law of Nebraska; and entered judgment for plaintiff which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. 100 Nebraska, 237. The case came here on writ of error under § 237 of the Judicial Code.

The railway admits that prior to the enactment of the Carmack Amendment (Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, -595) Congress had not dealt with the right of carriers to limit by contract their liability for injuries occurring in interstate transportation, and that consequently the States were free to establish their own laws and policies and apply them to such contracts! Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S.

477. But it contends that this power of the States was superseded by the Carmack Amendment, since that amendment dealt with the power of carriers to contract in respect to such liability; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97; that it was the intention of Congress to deal with the whole subject; and that the rights of plaintiff in respect to personal injuries is governed by the federal law. But the Carmack Amendment deals only with the shipment of property. Its language is so clear as to leave no ground for the contention, that Congress intended to deal with the transportation of persons.

Furthermore, plaintiff was not even a passenger on the railway. His claim rests not upon a contract of carriage, but upon the general right of a human being not to be injured by the negligence of another.' Compare Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601, 613. The case presents no substantial federal question. The writ of error is

Dismissed.

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Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • Williams v. Keyes, 135 Fla. 769 (Fla. 1938)
    …decided or that the judgment as rendered could not-have been so without deciding it. Adams v. Russell, 229 U. S. 353, 33 Sup. Ct. 846; 57 L. Ed. 1224; Palmer v. State of Ohio, 248 U. S. 32, 39 Sup. Ct. 16, 63 L. Ed. 108; Chicago, et al., v. Maucher, 248 U. S. 359, 39 Sup. Ct. 108, 63 L. Ed. 294. We have examined the pleadings, the errors argued, the briefs of counsel, the opinion of this Court, and in none of them do we find a federal question presented, that such a question was decided, or was necessary to…
    1 / 2
  • Ivana Vidovic Mlinar v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 186 So. 3d 997 (Fla. 2016)
    …exist in which the Carmack Amendment does not preempt all state and common law claims.” Smith, 296 F. 3d at 1248-49 (citing Gooch v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 22, 42 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed. 443 (1922); Chi. Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Maucher, 248 U.S. 359, 39 S.Ct. 108, 63 L.Ed. 294 (1919); Morris v. Covan Worldwide Moving, Inc., 144 F. 3d 377, 383 (5th Cir.1998); Reeves v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1254 (M.D.Ala.1999)); see also Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F. 3d [*1001]…
  • Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (U.S. 1948)
    …. Whether passengers or their dependents shall have a right of action under such circumstances has been a question left by Congress for regulation by the state in which the injury or death occurred. See, e. g., Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Maucher, 248 U. S. 359, 363. See also cases collected in 76 A. L. R. 428-435. For many years the states did not generally authorize suits for wrongful death. Their omission of such remedies was due to traditional “common law” hostility to recoveries for death. This hosti…
    1 / 2

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