GILLIS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF GILLIS,
v.
NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY
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A worker employed by a railroad company in interstate commerce was killed in 1912, and his administratrix brought suit under the Employers' Liability Act alleging the railroad's negligence caused his death. The trial court directed a verdict for the railroad company, and the full court affirmed, finding that the evidence showed only the deceased employee's own negligence was responsible for the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court properly directed a verdict where the evidence supported only the defendant's version of events, and the Court deferred to the lower courts' assessment of the testimony.
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Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of,the court.
Action under the Employers’ Liability statute, 35 Stat. 65. Plaintiff in error’s intestate, on November 3, 1912, while in! the railroad company’s service in interstate commerce, was killed, through the negligence, in whole or in part, it is charged, of one of the company’s officers, agents or employees.
The defenses of the company were denialof the declaration and averments that the intestate’s injuries and death were due to and caused by his own negligence and besides “were the result of acts, conditions and circumstances the happening of which was assumed” by him.
The case was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of the testimony, upon motion of defendant and over the objection and exception of plaintiff, the court ruled that upon all of the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover and directed a verdict for defendant. It was stipulated that the case was to be reported for the determination of the full court and that if the ruling and direction should be held to be right, then judgment was to be entered for defendant. “If the case ought to have been submitted to the jury, then judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of forty-five hundred ($4500) dollars.” The case was so reported. The full court reviewed the testimony quite elaborately and concluded from that review that “the only person who was negligent was the deceased and the judge was right in directing a verdict for the defendant,” and cited Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Wiles, 240 U. S. 444.
That case repeated the established principle that when the evidence justifies it it is competent for a court to direct a verdict for’ a defendant. The principle is not attacked by plaintiff. The contention, however, is that the courts below, one of which tried the case, were wrong in their estimate of the evidence and that plaintiff was entitled to the judgment of the jury upon it. We are unable to yield to the contention. Nor do we think it necessary to give a review of the evidence. It will be found in the opinion of the court and we have verified its correctness. The case turns, therefore, upon an appreciation of the testimony and admissible inferences therefrom, and even if the conclusions of the courts were moré disputable we should have to defer to them. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Whitacre, 242 U. S. 169; Erie R. R. Co. v. Welsh, 242 U. S. 303.
Judgment affirmed.
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Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (U.S. 1957)…tiff affirmed. Nelson v. Southern R. Co., 246 U. S. 253; reversal of judgment for plaintiff affirmed. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Hadley, 246 U. S. 330; affirmance of judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 1918 Term. Gillis v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 249 U. S. 515; affirmance of directed verdict for defendant affirmed. 1919 Term. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Ward, 252 U. S. 18; affirmance of judgment for plaintiff affirmed. Boehmer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 252 U. S. 496; affirmance of directed verdict for…
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United States v. S. Pac. Co., 60 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1932)…he work done.” And thus it has been held that a transfer of a number of cars from one terminal to another for delivery, without uncoupling, is a train movement and not one of switching, Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co. v. U. S., 249 U. S. 534, 39 S. Ct. 355, 63 L. Ed. 757; that the act does not limit the application of its requirements to movements on main line tracks, U. S. v. Northern Pacific R. Company, 254 U. S. 251, 41 S. Ct. 101, 65 L. Ed. 249; that the transfer of twenty-four cars from one yard…
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Waid v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 14 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1926)…application to tbe operation in question. Tbe cars were not being shifted over the crossing, but were being transferred as a unit from tbe Blue Jay siding to tbe yard of tbe defendant. Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co. v. U. S., 249 U. S. 534, 39 S. Ct. 355, 63 L. Ed. 757; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 155 N. C. 356, 71 S. E. 514; Id., 232 U. S. 548, 34 S. Ct. 364, 58 L. Ed. 721. There was error in directing a verdict for tbe defendant, and tbe judgment of tbe District Court is accordingly…
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- Great N. Ry. Co. v. Wiles, 240 U.S. 444 (U.S. 1916)
- Erie R.R. Co. v. Welsh, 242 U.S. 303 (U.S. 1916)
- Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Whitacre, 242 U.S. 169 (U.S. 1916)