T. H. SYMINGTON COMPANY
v.
NATIONAL MALLEABLE CASTINGS COMPANY ET AL.; MINER V. T. H. SYMINGTON COMPANY

U.S. | 1919-06-09
Nos. 31, 24
250 U.S. 383 Supreme Court of the United States (1919) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 63 L. Ed. 1045 · 39 S. Ct. 542 · 1919 U.S. LEXIS 1759 · SCDB 1918-092
Cited by 114 cases

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Synopsis

Two competing patent infringement suits involving railroad car draft rigging patents were consolidated because lower courts reached conflicting decisions about which inventor had priority and whose patent claims were valid. The Supreme Court held that the Byers patent claims were not limited to an integral pocket construction and could include multi-part assemblies, and that oral testimony offered fifteen years after the alleged invention and unsupported by physical evidence, drawings, or models was insufficient to establish that Emerick was the prior inventor over the presumptively earlier Byers patent application.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Van Devantee

Mr. Justice Van Devantee delivered the opinion of the court.

These cases are so related that they may be disposed of together. Each is a suit to enjoin the infringement of a patent. One was begun in the District of Maine and is based on letters patent granted May 7, 1901, to Jacob J, Byers on an application filed April, 21 1900. The other was begun in the Northern District of Illinois and is based on letters patent granted February 18, 1902, to William H. Emerick on an application filed May 24, 1901. Both patents cover an improvement in draft rigging for railroad cars. In each suit it became necessary to compare the patents, determine whether the invention of one was anticipated by the other, and ascertain which of the patentees was the original and first inventor. Ultimately the suits reached the Circuit Courts of Appeals for the circuits in which they were brought. In the Maine suit the court held that Byers was the prior inventor and that claims three, five and six of the patent to him were valid and infringed. 230 Fed. Rep. 821; 234 Fed. Rep. 343. In the Illinois suit the court held that Emerick was the prior inventor and that claims one, two, three and four of the patent to him were 'valid and infringed. 229 Fed. Rep. 730. These conflicting decisions led to the allowance of the present writs of certiorari.

While the discussion at the bar and in the briefs has taken a wide range, only two points need be considered.

One of the elements called for by the claims in the Byers patent which were sustained is a “pocket” or housing, which is to hold other parts in place. The corresponding element of the Emerick patent is described as “counterpart castings” and is in two parts. Whether the Byers pocket was to be integral or might be in two or more parts is a matter about which the two courts differed. In the Maine suit it was held that the claims were not limited to an integral pocket, but in the Illinois suit the ruling was the other way. The former view, as it seems to us, is the right one. There is nothing in Byers’ claims which, were sustained indicating that the pocket is to be integral, while there is a distinct call for such a pocket in claim nine. The difference in terms points persuasively to a difference in purpose, and the specification does even more', for it says “the pocket may be cast in a single piece. ” This is the common form of, designating an admissible alternative in such instruments. Of .course, the other alternative is casting it in a plurality of pieces. When this is done and the pieces are assembled they form a pocket and serve in the same way as if there were but one.

The courts differed also as to' who was the prior in-. ventor. Presumptively it was Byers, for his application and patent were both prior to Emerick’s application. Recognizing this,, the parties claiming under Emerick sought by proof to carry his invention back to an earlier date, and to that end produced the testimony of three witnesses, Emerick being one. All three testified in both suits, their testimony being substantially the same in both. In the Maine suit the court pronounced this testimony too equivocal and uncertain to establish priority as against Byers’ application and patent, but in the Illinois suit the court, although regarding the testimony as hardly satisfactory, gave effect to it. On reading it we are persuaded that it was clearly insufficient.

This court has phinted out that oral testimony tending to-show prior invention as against existing letters patent is, in the absence of models, drawings or kindred evidence, open-.to grave suspicion; particularly if the testimony be taken after the lapse of years from the time of the alleged invention. Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U. S. 286, 300. And it has said: “A conception of the mind is not an invention until represented in some physical form, and unsuccessful experiments or projects, abandoned by the inventor, are equally destitute of that character.” Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U. S. 481, 489.

- Here the evidence was oral. No model, drawing or kindred exhibit was produced. Fifteen years had elapsed since the date as of which invention was being claimed. The testimony was not direct and strong, but weak and uncertain and in some respects contradictory. At most it only disclosed a mental conception in process of development which occasionally was outlined on scraps of paper and then committed to the waste basket and was roughly worked into a wooden model four or five inches long with a-pen knife. The first real model or drawing was made about the time of the actual application for a patent and there was no attempt at reduction, to practice until after the patent was issued. Such proof under the rule just stated does not suffice.

Decree in No: 81 affirmed.

Decree in No. 84 reversed.


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  • …ly defining invention, independently of the others. See Carlton v. Bokee, 17 Wall. 463, 472; Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 609; Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U. S. 301, 319; Symington Co. v. National Malleable Castings Co., 250 U. S. 383, 385; Smith v. Snow, supra; Walker on Patents, § 220, 6th ed. As none of the flywheel claims as drawn define an invention, none can be aided by reading into it parts of the specifications, or of other claims, which the patentees failed to include in…
  • Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1935)
    …ed by the tiers of egg trays. Thus by striking and obviously intended contrast with other claims, Claim 1 covers broadly the essential elements of the Smith invention as we have already described it. Symington Co. v. National Malleable Castings Co., 250 U. S. 383, 385; Lamson Consolidated Store Service Co. v. Hillman, 123 Fed. 416, 419 (C. C. A. 7th); Wm. B. Scaife & Sons Co. v. Falls City Woolen Mills, 209 Fed. 210, 214 (C. C. A. 6th). Examination of the claim, in the light both of scientific fact and of t…
  • United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp, 289 U.S. 178 (U.S. 1933)
    …reduction to practice; the product of original thought; a.concept demonstrated to be true by practical application or embodiment in tangible form. Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 481, 489; Symington Co. v. National Castings Co., 250 U.S. 383, 386; Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 292 Fed. 480, 481. Though.¡the mental concept is embodied or realized in, ,a mechanism or a physical or chemical aggregate, the embodiment is not the invention and is not the subject of a patent. This distinction bet…

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