THE SOUTH COAST

U.S. | 1920-03-01
No. 68
Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Pitney and Mr. Justice Clarke dissent.
251 U.S. 519 Supreme Court of the United States (1920) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 64 L. Ed. 386 · 40 S. Ct. 233 · SCDB 1919-135 · 1920 U.S. LEXIS 1636
Cited by 97 cases

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Synopsis

The Supreme Court upheld a maritime lien filed against the steamship South Coast for necessary supplies furnished in San Pedro, California, rejecting the vessel owner's argument that the master lacked authority to bind the ship because it was under charter. The Court held that under the Act of June 30, 1910, a master appointed by a charterer presumptively has authority to procure supplies and create liens on the vessel, and the supplier had no reasonable means to discover that the master's authority was restricted by the charter terms, particularly where the charter itself contemplated that liens might be imposed.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a libel against the Steamer South Coast, belonging to the claimant, a California corporation, and registered in San Francisco, for necessary supplies furnished in San Pedro, California. The answer denies the authority of the master to bind the steamer. The bare vessel at the time was under charter to one Levick, the contract stipulating that Levick was to pay all charges and to save the owner harmless from all liens or expenses that it might be put to in consequence of such liens. There was also a provision that the owner might retake the vessel in case of failure of Levick to discharge within thirty days any debts which were liens upon it, and another for surrender of the vessel free of all liens upon Levick’s failure to make certain payments. When the supplies were ordered representatives of the owner in San Pedro warned the libellant that the steamer was under charter and that he must not furnish the supplies on the credit of the vessel. He replied that he would not furnish them in any other way, but the reply does not affect the case because by the terms of the charter the master who ordered them, although appointed by the owner, was under the orders of Levick. It is agreed by both courts below that if the owner had power to prevent the attaching of a lien by its warning it had done so. Both courts however held that the charter gave the master power to create the lien. 233 Fed. Rep. 327. 247 Fed. Rep.

84. S. C. 159 C.

C. A. 302. By the Act'of June 33, 1910, c. 373, § 1, 36 Stat. 604, a maritime hen is given for such supplies and by § 3 a presumption is declared that a master appointed by a charterer has authority from tibe pwner to procure them. It is true that the act goes on that nothing in it shall be considered to give a lien where the furnisher knew, or by the exercise of . reasonable diligence could have ascertained, that because of the terms of a charter-party, or for any other reason, the person ordering the necessaries was without authority to bind the vessel. But the authority of the owner to prohibit or to speak was displaced, so far as the charter went, by that conferred upon the charterers, who became owners pro hac vice, and therefore, unless the charter excluded the master’s power, the owner could not forbid its use. The charter-party recognizes that liens may be imposed by the charterers and allowed to stand for less than a month and there seems to be no sufficient reason for supposing the words' not to refer to all the ordinary maritime’ liens recognized by the law. The statute had given a lien for supplies in a domestic port and therefore had made that one of these ordinary liens.

Therefore the - charterer was assumed to have power to' authorize the master to impose a lien in a domestic port, and if the assumption expressed in words was not equivalent to a grant of power, at least it cannot be taken to have excluded it. There was nothing from which the furnisher could have ascertained that the master did not have power to bind the ship.

Decree affirmed.

Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Pitney and Mr. Justice Clarke dissent.


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Cited By (26 total)

  • United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482 (U.S. 1923)
    …y if known would have shown that the master at least, if not the agent who ordered the supplies, had authority to impose a lien, since the charter-party contemplated the possibility of one beiyg created and provided for its removal. The South Coast, 251 U. S. 519, is cited as establishing the position.But there is a sufficient difference in the language employed there and here, to bring about a different result. In The South Coast the contract went no farther than to agree to discharge liens within a month.…
  • …that the mere fact that the charterer is bound to provide and pay for the supplies excludes the supplier from having a maritime lien when the charter party contains no prohibition against its creation. We think that our decision in The South Coast, 251 U. S. 519,4 negatives such a conclusion. That was a case of a bare-boat charter which provided that the charterer should pay for all supplies and all other charges and save the owner harmless from all liens. The supplies were ordered by the master, but, thoug…
  • …st likely to defeat it— maritime liens for supplies and torts— unless, as this one did not, an outright prohibition against liens is expressed and knowledge thereof imputed to the lienor under Section 973. South Coast Steamship Co. v. Rudbach, 1920, 251 U.S. 519, 40 S.Ct. 233, 64 L.Ed. 386; cf. United States v. Carver, 1923, 260 U.S. 482, 43 S.Ct. 181, 67 L.Ed. 361. It would be odd if the taking of an inadequate and ineffective security having little real value were to amount either to the establishing of…

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