COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF OHIO V. STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
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Pennsylvania and Ohio filed separate complaints against West Virginia in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, and the Court consolidated the cases for purposes of taking testimony and appointed a Commissioner to receive evidence without making findings of fact or conclusions of law. The Court established a detailed schedule for the parties to present evidence in phases between May 1920 and May 1921, with complainants presenting first, followed by the defendant, then rebuttal and surrebuttal testimony.
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On Consideration of the respective motions of the complainants for the appointment of a Special Master and of the defendant for the appointment of a Commissioner to take the testimony and report the same to the Court and of the motions to consolidate the cases for the purpose of taking such testimony,
It is now here Ordered that the motions to consolidate the cases for the pujóse of taking the proofs be, and the same are hereby, granted.
It is Further Ordered that Mr. Levi Cooke, of the District of Columbia, be, and he is hereby, appointed a Commissioner to take and return the testimony in these causes, with the powers of a Master in Chancery, as provided in the rules of this Court; but said Commissioner shall not make any findings of fact or state any conclusions of law.
It is Further Ordered that the complainants shall take their evidence, at such place or places as they may indicate, between the first day of May, 1920, and the first day of October, 1920, upon giving ten days’ notice of the time and place of taking such evidence to the counsel for the defendant; that the defendant may take evidence, at such place or places as it may indicate, between the first day of October, 1920, and the first day of March, 1921, upon giving ten days’ notice of the time and place of taking such evidence to the counsel for the complainants; that the complainants shall take their evidence in rebuttal between the first day of March, 1921, and the first day of April, 1921, at such place or places as they may indicate, upon giving ten days’ notice to counsel for defendant, and the defendant shall then conclude the taking of its evidence in surrebuttal on or before the first day of May, 1921, upon giving ten days’ notice of the time and place of taking such evidence to the counsel for complainants. Provided, however, that if complainants shall conclude the taking of their evidence in chief before the first day of October, 1920, and shall give notice thereof, that time for the taking of evidence in chief on the part of defendant shall begin to run fifteen days after the giving of said notice by the complainants; and if the defendant shall conclude the. taking of its evidence before the first day of March, 1921, and shall give notice thereof, the thirty-one days’ time for the taking of evidence in rebuttal on behalf of the complainants shall begin to run fifteen days after the giving of said notice by the defendant; and the thirty days’ time for the taking of evidence on behalf of defendant in surrebuttal shall begin to run from the termination of said thirty days’ allowed for the taking of the evidence in rebuttal by the complainants; but nothing in this proviso contained shall operate or be construed to postpone the ultimate dates for the commencement of the time for the taking of the defendant’s evidence in chief, the complainants’ evidence in rebuttal and the defendant’s evidence in surrebuttal, respectively, first above specified.
It is Further Ordered that the said complainants and the defendant, respectively, shall make such deposits with the Clerk of this Court for fees, costs and expenses of the said Clerk and of the said Commissioner as they may from time to time be requested by said Clerk.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Republic OF China v. Am. Express Co., Inc., 190 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1951)…Cir., 178 F. 2d 884, 885; Kuhn v. Canteen Food Service, 7 Cir., 150 F. 2d 55, 56. . “Jointness” is present where one of the parties is secondarily or derivatively liable, — see the Hohorst case; Oneida Nav. Corp. v. W. & S. Job & Co., 252 U.S. 521, 40 S.Ct. 357, 64 L.Ed. 697 — or where the asserted liabilities of the defendants, one of whom is dismissed, are very closely interrelated; see Bank of Rondout v. Smith, 156 U.S. 330, 15 S.Ct. 385, 39 L.Ed. 441; Moss v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 96 F. 2d…
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Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1947)…obtains. The rule itself appears never to have been questioned, though naturally details in its application have at times presented problems. Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., supra; Oneida Nav. Corporation v. W. & S. Job & Co., 252 U.S. 521, 40 S.Ct. 357, 64 L.Ed 697; Bank of Rondout v. Smith, 156 U.S. 330, 15 S.Ct. 358, 39 L.Ed. 441; Hunteman v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 5 Cir., 119 F. 2d 465, certiorari denied 314 U.S. 647, 62 S.Ct. 89, 86 L.Ed. 519; cases cited supra. As applied, the rule…
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Moss v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 96 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1938)…., 15 F. 2d 49), and where there has been involuntary dismissal as to one of several parties (Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 148 U.S. 262, 13 S.Ct. 590, 37 L.Ed. 443, and see Oneida Navigation Corporation v. W. & S. Job & Co., 252 U.S. 521, 40 S.Ct. 357, 64 L.Ed. 697). A case somewhat analogous to the one here is Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 12 S.Ct. 935, 36 L.Ed. 768, as explained in Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 148 U.S. 262, at page 266, 13 S.Ct. 590, 37 L.Ed. 443. The Sha…