JOHNSON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND

U.S. | 1920-11-08
No. 289
Mr. Justice Pitney and Mr. Justice McReynólds dissent.
254 U.S. 51 Supreme Court of the United States (1920) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 65 L. Ed. 126 · 41 S. Ct. 16 · 1920 U.S. LEXIS 1236 · SCDB 1920-043
Cited by 139 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A federal postal employee was convicted under Maryland law for operating a government motor truck without a state driver's license while transporting mail. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that states lack the power to require federal employees to obtain licenses or meet state-imposed conditions as a prerequisite to performing their official duties, as such requirements interfere with the instrumentalities of the federal government itself in violation of principles established in McCulloch v. Maryland.

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was an employee of the Post Office Department of the United States and while driving a government motor truck in the transportation of mail over a post road from Mt. Airy, Maryland, to Washington, was arrested in Maryland, and. was tried, convicted and fined for so driving without having obtained a license from the State. He saved his constitutional rights by motion to quash, by. special pleas which were overruled upon de>murrer and by motion in arrest of judgment. The facts were admitted and the naked question is whether the State has power to require such an employee to obtain a license by submitting to an examination concerning his competence and paying three dollars, before performing his official duty in obedience to superior command.

The cases upon the regulation of interstate commerce can not be relied upon as furnishing an answer. They deal with the conduct of private persons in matters in which the States as well as the general government have an interest and which would be wholly under the control of the States but for the supervening destination and the ultimate purpose of the acts. Here the question is whether the State can interrupt the a fcs of the general government itself.

With regard to taxat on, no matter how reasonable, or how universal and undi-.criminating, the State’s inability to interfere has been regarded as established sb ice McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.

316. The decision in that case was not put upon any consideration of degree but upon the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way at least, the instrumentalities of the United States; 4 Wheat. 429, 430; and that is the law today. Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 525, 526. A little later the scope of the proposition as then understood was indicated in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 867. “Can a contractor for supplying a military post with provisions, be restrained from making purchases within any State, or from transporting the provisions to the place at which the troops were stationed? or could he be fined or taxed for doing so? We have not yet heard these questions answered in the affirmative.” In more recent days the principle was applied when the governor of a soldiers’ home was convicted for disregard of a state law concerning the use of oleomargarine, while furnishing it to the inmates of the home as part of their rations. It was said that the federal officer was not “subject to the jurisdiction of the State in regard to those very matters of administration which are thus approved by Federal authority.” Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, 283. It seems to us that the foregoing decisions establish the law governing this case.

Of course an employee of the United States does not secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment. That was decided long ago by Mr. Justice Washington in United States v. Hart, Pet.

C. C. 390. 5 Ops. Atty. Gen.

554. It very well may be that, when the United States has not spoken, the subjection to local law would extend to general rules that might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the employment — as, for instance, a statute or ordinance regulating the mode of turning at the corners of streets. Commonwealth v. Closson, 229 Massachusetts, 329. This might stand on much the same footing as liability under the common law of a State to a person injured by the driver’s negligence. But even the most unquestionable and most universally applicable of state laws, such as those concern ing murder, will not be allowed to control the conduct of a marshal of the United States acting under and in pursuance of the laws of the United States. In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1.

It seems to us that the immunity of the instruments of the United States from state control in the performance of their duties extends to a requirement that they desist from performance until they satisfy a state officer upon examination that they are competent for a necessary part of them and pay a fee for permission to go on. ^Süch a requirement does not merely touch the Government servants remotely by a general rule of conduct; it lays hold of them in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that the Government has pronounced sufficient. It is the duty of the Department to employ persons competent for their work and that duty it must be presumed has been performed. Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290, 293.

Judgment reversed.

Mr. Justice Pitney and Mr. Justice McReynólds dissent.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (43 total)

  • James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (U.S. 1937)
    …iscriminatory did not suffice to save them. Taxes on franchises granted by the federal government, taxes upon the office or salary of a federal official, though non-discriminatory, nevertheless fell under the ban. It was said in Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 55: “Here the question is whether the State can interrupt the acts of the general government itself. With regard to taxation, no matter how reasonable, or how universal and undiscriminating, the State’s inability to interfere has been regarded as…
    1 / 3
  • Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (U.S. 1958)
    …e a State sought authority over plans and specifications for a federal dam, in Leslie Miller, Inc., v. Arkansas, supra, where state standards regulating contractors conflicted with federal standards for those contractors, and in Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, where a State sought to exact a license requirement from a federal employee driving a mail truck. The conflict seems to us to be as clear as any that the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution was designed to resolve. As Chief Justic…
    1 / 2
  • Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (U.S. 1931)
    …as any application been made by Wilbur, who is proceeding to. construct said dam in complete disregard of this law of Arizona. The United States may perform its functions without conforming to the police regulations of a State. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51; Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96. If Congress has power to authorize the construction of the dam and reservoir, Wilbur is under no obligation to submit the plans and specifications to the State [*452] Engineer for approval.1 And the Federal Gove…

Previewing 3 of 43 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited (32 total)

View all 32 cited authorities →

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw