BRACHT
v.
SAN ANTONIO & ARANSAS PASS RAILWAY COMPANY
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Bracht shipped vegetables by rail from Texas to Dallas under a bill of lading that specified an intrastate Texas movement, but after arrival in Dallas, the carrier rerouted the shipment to Kansas City at the shipper's request, where the cargo was damaged. The Supreme Court held that the initial carrier's contractual obligation extended only to Dallas, and absent notice or reasonable expectation of further interstate movement, the carrier was not liable under the Carmack Amendment for damage occurring after the originally contemplated destination.
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Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court.
June 10, 1915, the petitioner delivered to respondent Railway Company at Ingléside, Texas, a carload of vegetables consigned tó himsélf at Dallas, Texas, a point off its lines, where he intended to sell them. He accepted a bill of ladingjipon the face of which was plainly printed— “For use only between points within thé State of Texas.” It contained no reference to a diversion or reshipment; and the record discloses no rule or regulation by the state statutes or authorities on that subject.
The car inoved over respondent’s road to Waco and then over the M. K. & T. Railway to Dallas, where it appears to have arrived promptly with contents in good condition. Upon petitioner’s request, made after such arrival, the M. K. & T. Railway forwarded the car to Kansas City over its own lines, took up the original bill of lading and issued an interstate one acknowlédging receipt of the vegetables at Dallas! When the car reached Kansas City the contents were in bad condition and thereupon petitioner sued respondent as the initial carrier claiming a right to recover damages under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (34 Stat. 584, c. 3591).
The court below held that the provisions in interstate, tariffs permitting reconsignment or change of destination did not apply, that the carrier only agreed to transport, to Dallas and was not liable for damage sustained beyond that point.
Respondent’s contract appears to have related only to a movement between points in the same'-State. It had no notice or'reason to suppose that the freight would pass beyond the destination specified. The original undertaking was an intrastate transaction, subject, of course,- to any applicable rules and regulations prescribed by state authority. The record discloses none; and we are unable to say as matter of federal law that the tariff schedules for interstate shipments or the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act constituted part of the agreement. The general' principles announced in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 411, are applicable. Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S., 101; Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111, and similar cases are not controlling. They involved controversies concerning carriage between points in the same State which was really but part of an interstate or foreign movement reasonably to be anticipated by the contracting parties —a recognized step towards a destination outside the State. The distinctions are elucidated in Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. Here neither shipper nor respondent had in contemplation any movement beyond the point specified and the contract between them must be determined from the original bill of lading and the local laws and regulations.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Baltimore & Ohio Sw. R.R. Co. v. Settle, 260 U.S. 166 (U.S. 1922)…aumont, Sour Lake & Western Ry. Co., 56 I. C. C. 212. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334, was a case of this character. Sec also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 472; Bracht v. San Antonio & Aransas Pass Ry. Co., 254 U. S. 489; Illinois Grain to Chicago, 40 I. C. C. 124; Kettle River Co. v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 52 I. C. C. 73, 77. On the other [*174] hand there are many instances where the grant by tariffs of extensive transit or reconsignment privileges have rendere…
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Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 12 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1926)…en overruled. On the contrary, the Settle Case refers to it as entirely consistent with the later decisions of the court, and it has been cited as controlling authority as late as the 254th U. S. report. Bracht v. San Antonio & Aransas Pass Ry. Co., 254 U. S. 489, 41 S. Ct. 150, 65 L. Ed. 366. In the Settle Case, Mr. Justice Brandeis emphasized as sound law the essential doctrine of the ease, and the language used by him supports the decision of the District Court in this ease. He said: “The mere fact that…1 / 2
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Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. LEE (E.D.N.C. 1926)…answer to. the question is that, under the terms of the original contract of shipment, made in good faith and fairly expressed, every obEgation of the initial carrier ceased at Wilmington. It has been so decided. Bracht v. San Antonio & A. & P. Ry., 254 U. S. 489, 41 S. Ct. 150, 65 L. Ed. 366. The mere fact that raE shipment begins at Wilmington, or that there is a change of title at WEmington, or that there is a rebilEng at Wilmington to parties other than the original consignees, does not determine the es…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Tex. & NEW Orleans R.R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111 (U.S. 1913)
- R.R. Comm'n of Ohio v. Worthington, 225 U.S. 101 (U.S. 1912)
- Gulf v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403 (U.S. 1907)