PANAMA RAILROAD COMPANY
v.
PIGOTT, A MINOR, BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM, MORRELL
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A seven-year-old boy was struck by a railroad engine backing a boxcar at an unguarded crossing in Panama, and the Panama Railroad Company was held liable for his injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, rejecting the company's arguments that Panamanian law provided a different standard of liability for negligent employees and that damages for pain could not be recovered, and held that the trial court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether the company's failure to maintain a flagman or gate at the crossing constituted negligence.
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Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action brought in the District Court of the Cmial Zone for the Division of Cristobal to recover from the Panama. Railroad Company for personal injuries suffered by the minor, Pigott, in the City of Colon, Republic^ of Panama. Pigott recovered a judgment which, was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 256 Fed. Rep.
837. The case is brought to this Court under the Panama Canal Act, August 24, 1912, c. 390, § 9, 37 Stat. 560, 566.
The facts may be stated in a few words. The minor, a boy of seven, was run over when attempting to cross the railroad track on a Street in Colon. There was evidence that the crossing was much used ánd that, especially in the afternoon, the time of the accident, there usually were many children about; there were, however, neither gates nor a watchman at the place. A hedge higher than the child somewhat obstructed the view. The engine was backing a box car and did not have the'iookout required. by the company’s rules There was evidence also that it gave no warning by bell or whistle. In short by the criteria of the common law the plaintiff had a right to go to the jury with his case.
The fundamental argument for the plaintiff in error is that the law of Panama was not applied in determining the principles of liability or in fixing the rule of damages. It is contended that if, as there was evidence to prove, due care had been used in the selection of servants by the railroad, the company was not answerable for their negligence, and that in any event there could be no recovery for pain. Both of these contentions are simply attempts to reargue what’was decided in Panama R. R. Co. v. Toppin, 252 U. S.
308. The plaintiff in error certainly did not get less than it was entitled to when, in view of contradictory testimony from lawyers on the two sides, the Court left the law of Panama to the jury. The Court was warranted in also leaving to the jury the question whether proper care required the company to have a flagman or gate at the crossing and the other safeguards that wé have mentioned. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S.
408. In view of the extreme youth of the plaintiff we cannot say that the court erred in allowing the jury to attribute his misfortune to the defendant’s conduct alone, whatever difficulties there might be in the case of an older person; and we perceive no other ground for not allowing the verdict and the decision of the two courts below to stand. -
Judgment affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. Slayton, 29 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1928)…rating the gates should be stationed at the crossing while such trains are operated. Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U. S. 161, 24 L. Ed. 403; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485; Panama R. Co. v. Pigott, 254 U. S. 552, 41 S. Ct. 199, 65 L. Ed. 400; N. Y. S. & W. R. Co. v. Moore (C. C. A.) 105 F. 725; D., L. & W. R. Co. v. Devore (C. C. A.) 114 F. 155. The test is the particular danger of the crossing, even though it be in a village. N. P. Ry. Co. v. Moe (C. C. A.…1 / 2
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Kinghorn v. Pa. R. Co. (two cases), 47 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1931)…rains, but traffic at. this place was heavy enough and the view a traveler had was sufficiently obstructed to justify submitting the question. Grand Trunk R. Co. of Canada v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485; Panama R. R. v. Pigott, 254 U. S. 552, 41 S. Ct. 199, 65 L. Ed. 400; New York, S. & W. R. Co. v. Moore (C. C. A.) 105 F. 725. We think the outcome of this appeal must depend upon whether or .not the plaintiff was. guilty of contributory negligence. In dis-eussing.this phase of the case…1 / 2
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Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Ciechowski, 10 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1925)…the federal eases this was not such a crossing that a jury might require for it a flagman or a gate. The first decision is Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 409, 12 S. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485, which has been reaffirmed in Panama R. Co. v. Pigott, 254 U. S. 552, 41 S. Ct. 199, 65 L. Ed. 400, and followed in Evans v. Erie R. Co., 213 F. 129, 129 C. C. A. 375 (C. C. A. 6), and Murphy v. Penn. R. Co., 1 F.(2d) 929 (C. C. A. 6). The doctrine is not that a jury may pass upon the issue in every ease, but only wh…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408 (U.S. 1892)
- Panama R.R. Co. v. Toppin, 252 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1920)