HOLLIS ET AL.
v.
KUTZ ET AL., COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CONSTITUTING THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.

U.S. | 1921-03-21
No. 397
255 U.S. 452 Supreme Court of the United States (1921) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 65 L. Ed. 727 · 41 S. Ct. 371 · 1921 U.S. LEXIS 1741 · SCDB 1920-148
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

Private gas consumers challenged two rate increases imposed by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, claiming the orders unconstitutionally discriminated against them because the United States and the District paid a lower statutory rate for gas. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, holding that the government has the authority to condition the provision of utility services within its jurisdiction on preferential pricing, and private consumers have no legal right to demand equal treatment with the government when the government negotiates its own rates.


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Opinion of the Court
Me. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a bill in equity brought by private consumers of gas to have two orders of the Public Utilities Commission that increase the rate for gas to private consumers declared void. The first order, Number 254, March 15, 1918, raised the rate from 75 cents per thousand feet to 90 cents. The second, No. 314, March 15,1919, raised it to not exceeding 95 cents; the orders being made under the authority of the Act of March 4,1913, c. 150, § 8, 37 Stat. 938, 974, et seq., establishing the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia and fixing its powers. The bill and the appeal to this Court are said to be based upon Par. .64, of § 8, 37 Stat.

988. It is alleged that the orders violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights because the rate tó be charged to the United States and to the District remains the statutory rate of 70 cents, ¿nd to certain other takers still less, and that if the United States and District had paid 90 cents for the year 1918 the Gas Company would have received a return of about six per cent. It is said .that the difference is an unlawful discrimination and that, the plaintiffs are required to make up the loss incurred by furnishing the gas to the Government and the District at less than cost. The bill was dismissed by the Supreme Court for want of equity and because not filed within one hundred and twenty days after the entry of the order of March 15, 1918, as required by § 8, Par; 65. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree on the different ground that a formal complaint and hearing before the Commission were a condition of the right to sue in the courts. The provision' in Par. 67 for the transmission of any new evidence taken in the suit to the Commission for its further consideration, and other details, were thought to indicate that the suit was in the nature of an appeal.

We are unable to agree with the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Assuming that the bill is based upon the statute the language of Par. 64 is that any person interested and 'dissatisfied with any order fixing any rate may commence' a proceeding in' equity. We do not perceive any advantage in requiring a party to file a complaint asking the Commission to review a decision just reached by it after a public hearing, nor do we. see such a requirement in the statute. On the other hand we see no requirement that the plaintiffs in equity should have appeared-in the original hearing upon the rate. They are parties to the order, equally whether they saw fit to argue the case to the Commission or not, and when they stand upon supposed constitutional rights there seems to. be no necessity of raising the. point until they get into Court. This suit is not for a revision of details but for-a decree that the orders are void as matter of law. That by reason of their pecuniary' interest the plaintiffs are persons interested within the statute, may be assumed for the purposes of decision. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42, 49.

S. C. Peavey & Co. v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 176 Fed. Rep. 409, 416, 417. Sée Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co. v. Michigan R. R. Commission, 235 U. S. 402.

On the merits however there is no doubt that the decree was right. We do not wish to belittle the claim of a taker of what for the time has become pretty nearly a necessity to equal treatment while gas is furnished to the public. But. the notion that the Government cannot make }t-a condi-, tion of allowing the establishment of gas works that its needs and the needs of its instrument the District shall be satisfied at any price that it may fix strikes us as needing no answer. The plaintiffs are under no legal obligation to take gas nor is the Government bound to allow it to be furnished. If they choose to take it the plaintiffs must submit to such enhancement of price, if any, as is assignable to the Government’s demands. We do not . consider whether the Commission has power to raise the price to the excepted class because, even if it has, the plaintiffs have no right to require equality with the Government and they have no other ground upon which to found their supposed right.

Decree affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Prendergast v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43 (U.S. 1923)
    …to be made and its granting is entirely within the discretion of the Commission, we see no reason for requiring it to be made as a condition precedent to the bringing of a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the order. See, by analogy, Hollis v. Kutz, 255 U. S. 452, 454; Re Arkansas Rate Cases (C. C.), 187 Fed. 290, 306; Atlantic Coast Line v. Interstate Commission (Com. Ct.), 194 Fed. 449, 452; Baltimore Railroad v. Railroad Commission (C. C.), 196 Fed. 690, 693, [*49] 699; and Chicago Railways v. Illinois Co…
  • Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (U.S. 1937)
    …ing was not at arm’s length. Assuming, without deciding, that the breadth of this attack relieves appellant of the necessity of applying to the commission to vacate its order before seeking equitable relief in the federal courts, see Hollis v. Kutz, 255 U. S. 452; cf. United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 167, we think that the objection is not substantial. We can find in the commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment no basis for saying that any person is immune from giving information appropriate t…
  • Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (U.S. 1934)
    …cts a like business. [*625] These differences are not lessened nor the constitutional exaction of uniformity increased because the city competes with a business which it taxes. Compare Springfield Gas Co. v. Springfield, 257 U.S. 66; Hollis v. Kutz, 255 U.S. 452; Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union, 275 U.S. 415. The state may tax different types of taxpayers .differently even though they compete. State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527; Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith,…

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