VIGLIOTTI
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
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Vigliotti was convicted under Pennsylvania's Brooks Law of selling Jamaica Ginger (a preparation containing 88 percent alcohol) without a license after the Eighteenth Amendment and Volstead Act took effect. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the state's pre-existing Brooks Law was not superseded by federal prohibition legislation because it operated as an independent state police power measure to regulate the distribution of spirituous liquors and aid in enforcing prohibition, rather than authorizing sales that federal law prohibited.
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Mr. Justice Brandéis delivered the opinion of the court.
In the. Court of Quarter Sessions of Fayette County, Pennsylvania, Vigliotti was found guilty of selling, during the spring of 1920, spirituous liquor without a license, in violation of § 15 of the Act of May 13, 1887, P. L. 108, known as the Brooks Law. The liquor so sold was a preparation called Jamaica Ginger containing 88 per cent, of alcohol. The defendant claimed seasonably that the state law as applied deprived him -of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, because the sales complained of had been made after January 16, 1920, when the Eighteenth Amendment became effective, after which the Volstead Act was the only law applicable to sales of intoxicating liquors. This claim was overruled by the trial court; the defendant was sentenced; the judgment was affirmed by both the Superior Court, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 366, and the Supreme Court of the State, 271 Pa. St. 10; and the case comes here on writ of error under § .237 of the Judicial Code as amended. The question presented for our decision is whether the provision of the Brooks Law here applied had been superseded by the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act.
The Brooks Law, as construed by the courts of the State, prohibits every sale of spirituous liquor without a license, excepting only such sales as are made by druggists; and these are forbidden to sell intoxicating liquors except on prescription of a regular physician. The law applies however small the percentage of alcohol and although the liquor is not intoxicating. It applies to liquor sold solely for industrial uses. It does not purport to confer upon anyone anywhere the right to a license; nor does it authorize the sale of liquor in any city or county having a special prohibitory law. It merely grants to the appropriate officials, where such authority exists, discretion to give or to withhold the license under the conditions prescribed.. In case, of an' indictment for selling without a license, a sale is presumed to be unlawful and the burden is on the defendant to show the authority .on which he acted. It is thus primarily a prohibitory law; and its prohibitory features are not so dependent upon those respecting license as to be swept away by the. Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead. Act. The Supreme Court declared further that “ the Brooks Law still survives, as Pennsylvania’s own police power method of officially listing and adequately controlling the customary - sources of general supply and distribution, to the peoples within her borders, of those'kinds of liquors among which intoxicating beverages are usually, found, and she may thus-assist in prohibiting their illegal use as such.” 271 Pa. St. 15. We, of. course, accept as controlling the construction given to the statute by the highest court of the State. The question before us is whether so construed the statute violates the Federal Constitution.
The Brooks Law as thus construed does not purport to authorize or sanction anything which the Eighteenth Amendment or the Volstéad Act prohibits. And there is nothing in it which conflicts with any provision of either. "'It is merely an additional • instrument which the State supplies in the effort to make prohibition effective. That, the State may by appropriate legislation exorcise its police power to that end was expressly-provided in § 2 of the Amendment which declares that “ Congress and the several States-shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350, 387. That the Brooks.Law as construed is appropriate legislation is likewise clear. To prohibit every sale of spirituous liquors except by licensed persons may certainly aid in preventing sales for beverage purposes of liquor containing as much as one-half of one per cent, of alcohol; and that is what the Volstead Act' prohibits. If the Brooks Law as construed had been enacted the day after the adoption of the Amendment it would obviously have been “ appropriate legislation.” It is-not less so because it was already in existence. •
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Day and Mr. Justice McReynolds dissent.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (18 total)
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Spooner v. Curtis, 85 Fla. 408 (Fla. 1923)…amily purposes stated in the Federal Act, the State -is by the Fourteenth Amendment forbidden to abridge the privilege expressly conferred by the Federal law. Hall v. Moran, 81 Fla. 706, 89 South. Rep. 104; Vigliotti v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 258 U. S. 403, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338, 66 L. Ed. 686. In this case the allegation is that the defendant did “have in his possession in Duval County, Florida, intoxicating liquors, he the said Ralph Curtis not then and there having the possession of said intoxicati…1 / 2
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United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321 (U.S. 1926)…orce. A law which imposes a tax on intoxicating liquor, whether legally or illegally made, is not in conflict with another law which prohibits the making of any such liquor. Compare United States v. Stafoff, 260 U. S. 477; Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U. S. 403. There is no direct conflict between any provision of the prohibitory legislation and the .imposition of the tax here in question. [*328] Second. The claimant contends that the so-called tax on' illicitly distilled spirits theretofore imposed ceased…
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United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (U.S. 1922)…power originally belonging to the States, preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, and now relieved from the restrifetion heretofore arising out of the Federal Constitutioii. This is the ratio decidendi of our decision in Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U. S. 403. We -have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory. Each may,'without interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with.the limitation t…
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (U.S. 1883)
- Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (U.S. 1902)
- United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450 (U.S. 1921)
- Nat'l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (U.S. 1920)
- Johnson v. State, 81 Fla. 783 (Fla. 1921)
- Burrows v. Moran, 81 Fla. 662 (Fla. 1921)
- Hall v. Moran, 81 Fla. 706 (Fla. 1921)