A. BOURJOIS & COMPANY, INC.
v.
KATZEL

U.S. | 1923-01-29
No. 190
260 U.S. 689 Supreme Court of the United States (1923) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 67 L. Ed. 464 · 43 S. Ct. 244 · SCDB 1922-084 · 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2511
Cited by 177 cases

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Synopsis

A. Bourjois & Company, a U.S. corporation that purchased the French cosmetics business and trademarks of A. Bourjois & Cie., sought to prevent a defendant from selling identical face powder imported from France in boxes bearing the original French trademarks and labels. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's U.S. trademark rights were infringed, ruling that ownership of goods does not include the right to sell them under a specific trademark once that trademark has been assigned to another party, and that a trademark represents the reputation and quality control of the current U.S. holder rather than merely indicating the geographic origin of manufacture.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a bill to restrain the infringement of the trade marks “ Java ” and “ Bourjois ” registered in the Patent Office of the United States. A preliminary injunction was granted by the District Court, 274 Fed. 856, but the order was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, one Judge dissenting. 275 Fed.

539. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. 257 U. S. 630, In 1913 A. Bourjois & Cie., E. Wertheimer & Cie., Successeurs, jdoing business in France and also in the United States, sold to the plaintiff for a large sum their business in the United States, with their good will and their trade marks registered in the Patent Office. The latter related particularly to face powder, and included the above words. The plaintiff since its purchase has registered them again and goes on with the business that it bought, using substantially the same form of box and label as its predecessors and importing its face powder from France. It uses care in selecting colors suitable for the American market, in packing and in keeping up the standard, and has spent much money in advertising, &c., so that the business has grown very great and the labels have come to be understood by the public here as meaning goods coming from the plaintiff. The boxes have upon their backs: “ Trade Marks Reg.

U. S. Pat. Off. Made in France—Packed in the U.

S. A. by A. Bourjois & Co., Inc., of New York, Succ’rs. in the U. S. to A. Bourjois & Cie., and E. Wertheimer & Cie.”

The defendant,•finding that the rate of exchange enabled her to do so*afN), profit, bought a large quantity of the same powder in France and is selling it here in the French boxes which closely resemble those used by the plaintiff except that they have not the last quoted statement on the backs, and that the label reads “ Poudre de Riz de Java,” whereas the plaintiff has found it advisable to strike out the suggestion of rice powder and has “ Poudre Java ” instead. There is no question that the defendant infringes the plaintiff’s rights unless the fact that her boxes and powder are the genuine product of the French concern gives her a right to sell.them in the present form.

We are of opinion that the plaintiff’s rights are infringed. After the sale the French manufacturers could not have c.ome to the United States and have used their old marks in competition with the plaintiff. That plainly follows from the statute authorizing assignments. Act of February 20, 1905, c. 592, § 10, 33 Stat.

727. If for the purpose of evading the effect of the transfer, it had arranged with the defendant that she should sell with the old label, we suppose that no one would doubt that the contrivance must fail. ’ There is no such conspiracy here, but, apart from the opening of a door to one, the vendors could not convey their goods free from the restriction to which the vendors were subject. Ownership of the goods does not carry the right to sell them with a specific mark. It does not necessarily carry the right to sell them.at all in a given place. If the goods were patented in the United States a dealer who lawfully bought similar goods abroad from one who had a right to make and sell them there could not sell them in the United States. Boesch v. Graff, 133 U. S.

697. The monopoly in that case is more extensive, but we see no sufficient reason for holding that the monopoly of a trade mark, so far as it goes, is less .complete. It deals with a delicate matter that may be of great value but that easily is destroyed, and therefore should be protected with corresponding care. It is said that the trade mark here is that of the French house and truly indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not accurate. It is the trade mark of the plaintiff only in the United States and indicates in law, and, it is fouñd, by public understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff although not made by it. It was sold and could only be sold with the good will of the business that the plaintiff bought. Eiseman v. Schiffer, 157 Fed.

473. It stakes the reputation of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods. Menendez v. Holt, 128 U. S.

514. The injunction granted by the District Court was proper under §§17 and 19 of the Trade Mark Act. Act of February 20, 1905, c. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 728, 729.

Decree oj Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.


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Cited By (47 total)

  • Hoagland v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 75 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1954)
    …rule as to the applicability of its remedial statute to a limitation period specified by contract, as distinguished from one specified by statute. And the statement by the United States Supreme Court in its opinion to the effect that [260 U.S. 682, 43 S.Ct. 244] “The statutes of the states where the goods were shipped and the suit was brought do not affect the contract, and the reasonableness of the limitation is a matter of law * * * so that the bringing of a previous suit, alleged in the declaration, doe…
  • K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (U.S. 1988)
    …more — and more convincing-evidence that Congress had a contrary intent. A Section 526 can be fully understood only in the context of the controversial judicial opinion that spawned it. In A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (CA2 1921), rev’d, 260 U. S. 689 (1923), a French producer of “Java” face powder sold to an independent United States company at a considerable premium all its United States business, along with its goodwill and full rights in its United States trademarks. The United States company…
    1 / 2
  • Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (U.S. 1947)
    …word “Champion” from the repaired or reconditioned plugs which they resell. We put to one side the case of a manufacturer or distributor who markets new or used spark plugs of one make under the trade mark of another. See Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U. S. 689; Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 194. Equity then steps in to prohibit defendant’s use of the mark which symbolizes plaintiff’s good will and “stakes the reputation of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods.” Bourjois & Co.…

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