DAVIS, AS AGENT OF THE PRESIDENT, ETC.
v.
SLOCOMB, ADMINISTRATRIX OF SLOCOMB

U.S. | 1923-11-12
No. 530
263 U.S. 158 Supreme Court of the United States (1923) Caution
Also reported at: 68 L. Ed. 226 · 44 S. Ct. 59 · SCDB 1923-023 · 1923 U.S. LEXIS 2730
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

A citizen of Washington brought suit under state law against the Great Northern Railway and a presidential agent for negligence resulting in death while the railway was under federal control, and the case was removed to federal court on grounds of both diversity of citizenship and arising under federal law. The Supreme Court held that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was final because the only valid ground for removal was diversity of citizenship, as Congress did not intend to confer removal rights based on federal question jurisdiction upon suits against the presidential agent substitute under the Transportation Act of 1920, just as such rights had not existed for suits against the Director General during federal control.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Brandéis

Mr. Justice Brandéis delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit was brought in 1921 by a citizen of Washington' in a court of that State to recover, under a state statute, for death caused by the negligence of the Great Northern Railway while under federal control. The Government had surrendered possession February 28, 1920. The Railway, a Minnesota corporation, and James Cox Davis, as agent designate^ by the President pursuant to § 206a of Transportation Act 1920, February 28, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, were made defendants. ' Removal to the federal court was prayed for, and granted, on the ground of diversity of citizenship and also on the ground that the suit-was one arising under the laws of the United States. The District Court ordered that the suit be dismissed as against the Railway; and later entered judgment against Davis. That judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals and is brought here by writ of error under § 241 of the Judicial Code. Respondent moves to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that under § 128 the judgment below is final.

The cause of action for a death was created by state statute. But the case is one arising under the laws of the United. States; for it is only by reason of the federal law that any suit may be brought against this defendant. Sonnentheil v. Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U. S. 401, 404—5; Matter of Dunn, 212 U. S. 374. The amount in controversy exceeds one thousand dollars besides costs. The ground of removal set out in the petition is both diversity of citizenship and that the case arises under federal law. It may, therefore, be brought here under § 241 (Southern Pacific Co. v. Stewart, 245 U. S. 359, 562), unless the case is one of those arising under federal law in which Congress has denied the right of removal to the federal court, and/or is one of those so arising in which the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals has been made final. The question presented is ; one of con-, struction.

The right to sue the Government for injuries arising under federal control rests on § 10 of the Federal Control Act, March 21,1918, c. 25, 40 Stat. 451. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554. That section provides that “Actions at law . . may be brought by and against such carriers . . as now provided by law;” but that there shall not be “transferred to a Federal court any action . - which . . was-not so transferable prior to the Federal control.” Therefore, if, during federal control, this suit had been begun against the Director General he could not have removed it to the federal court on the ground that it is a suit arising under the laws of the United States; and, since the jurisdiction of the District Court would have rested wholly on diversity of citizenship, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals would have been final. Upon the termination of federal control it was necessary to make provision for suits then pending, and also for such as might thereafter be brought based on causes of action arising during the period of operation by the Government. This was done in Transportation Act 1920, by § 206, subdivisions a, b, c, d, and /, which pro-videj among other things, that an agent to be designated by the President shall be substituted for the Director General in suits then pending; and that the agent shall be made the defendant in suits thereafter commenced. That act contains no provisión relating to the removal of causes to the federal courts: There is no reason to suppose that Congress intended to make a change in this respect and give the right of removal in suits then pending, merely because the representative of the Government was, after February 28,-1920, tobe designated agent and to have limited powers, instead of being the Director General who possessed broad powers. Nor is any reason suggested why Congress should have desired to confer upon such agent larger rights of removal, or of review by this Court, than had been enjoyed theretofore by the Director General. In the absence of specific provision to that effect we must assume that Congress intended to leave the law unchanged. ,

The only ground fon removal in this case was diversity of citizenship. Hence the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is final.

Writ of error dismissed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25 (U.S. 1934)
    …uary 28, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 461, for injuries, whether the cause of action is based on the Federal Employers Liability Act, or a state statute or the common law, may not be removed even if there is diversity of citizenship. Davis v. Slocomb, 263 U.S. 158, 160. The lower courts have divided on whether the 1916 amendment repeals this provision by the Employers Liability Act pro tanto. That it has: Elliott v. Wheelock, 34 F. (2d) 213; contra, Knapp v. Byram, 21 F. (2d) 226. Likewise, removal is prohib…
  • Nw. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Burchwell Co., Inc., 349 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1965)
    …ted and impliedly approved the Ross case. The Supreme Court cases relied on in Transamerican were decided before the 1927 amendment of section 3(2) of the act. See 108 F. 2d at 997, citing Louisville & N. R.R. v. Central Iron Co., 1924, 265 U.S. 58, 44 S.Ct. 59, 68 L.Ed. 900 and earlier cases. At the time Transamerican was decided, the proposed Transportation Act of 1939 was still in the conference committee. In April 1940, after the court decided Transamerican, the conference committee added several para…
  • Schroeder v. Davis, 32 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1929)
    …that the dismissal was a final disposition of the cause in that court. The action was not removable as one arising under the laws of the United States, Blevins v. Hines (D. C.) 264 F. 1005; Walters v. Payne (C. C. A.) 292 F. 124; Davis v. Slocomb, 263 U. S. 158, 44 S. Ct. 59, 68 L. Ed. 226, nor was it removable because of diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the designated Agent. The designated Agent was merely a nominal party acting for the Government. There was no personal liability upon hi…
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