CORONA COAL COMPANY
v.
UNITED STATES

U.S. | 1924-01-07
No. 42
263 U.S. 537 Supreme Court of the United States (1924) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 68 L. Ed. 431 · 44 S. Ct. 156 · SCDB 1923-201 · 1924 U.S. LEXIS 2818
Cited by 45 cases

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Synopsis

Corona Coal Company sued in the Court of Claims for payment of the difference between contract prices and government-set prices for coal delivered to the United States during the period when the President controlled the railroads. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because the company had filed parallel actions in federal district court against the President's agent, which violated a statutory prohibition against pursuing claims in the Court of Claims when the same cause of action is pending in another court against a person acting under federal authority. The Court held that the plain language of the statute left no room for judicial exceptions, even where application caused apparent hardship.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Sutherland

Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant sued in the Court of Claims for a balance alleged to be due for coal delivered to the United States. Some time prior to the delivery appellant had entered into contracts with certain railroad companies to supply them with coal for specified periods of time and at stated prices. Upon the passing of the railroads into the control of the Government, by virtue of the President’s proclamation of December 26, 1917, 40 Stat. 1733, the Railroad Administration claimed the right to-enforce these contracts. The right was denied; whereupon the Euel Administration requisitioned the coal “ without prejudice to your [appellant’s] right to assert a claim against the Railroad Administration or these various railroad companies,” for' any amount claimed to be legally payable. The Railroad Administration paid the prices fixed by the contracts, asserting that these were the measure of its liability. The general price for coal theretofore fixed by the Fuel Administration was more than the contract price, and this action was for the difference.. The court below sustained a demurrer to the petition and dismissed it. After the rendition of judgment and before the appeal to this Court, appellant brought actions in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against James C. Davis, as Agent for the President under the Transportation Act of 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, the causes of action therein set forth being the same as that set forth in the present case. These alleged causes of action arose out of the possession, use and operation by the President of the railroads in question and come within the provisions of § 206 (a) of the act, c. 91, 41 Stat. 461.

The Government has submitted a motion to dismiss the appeal, relying upon the provisions of § 154 of the Judicial Code, which reads:

“ No person shall file or prosecute in the Court of Claims, or in the Supreme Court on appeal therefrom, any claim for or in respect to which he or any assignee of his has pending in any other court any suit or process against any person .who, at the time when the cause of action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to act, mediately or immediately, under the authority of the United States.”

At the time the alleged causes of action arose the President was acting under the authority of the United State's, and the actions being against an agent appointed by and acting for him, fall within the terms of the statute just quoted. It is urged, however, that the actions were brought, ex necessitate rei, because they were about to become barred by expiration of the statutory period of limitation and. that, for this and other reasons, the case is not within the spirit of § 154 properly construed. But the words of the statute are plain, with nothing in the context to make their meaning doubtful; no room is left for construction, and we are not at liberty to add an exception in order to remove apparent hardship in particular cases. See Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 320; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 295; United States v. First National Bank, 234 U. S. 245, 259-260.

Appeal dismissed.


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Cited By (14 total)

  • …by the order of dismissal in April can not be resumed by a retroactive order of the subsequent November, in view of the restrictive provisions of § 154, which, by reason of the Washington suit, intervene and apply. Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 537. It only remains to inquire whether this is a proper case for the writ asked. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedial process which is awarded, not as a matter of [*96] right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. Although classed as a…
  • Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1932)
    …inst the United States in a District Court. As the words of the section are plain, we are not at liberty to add tó or alter them to effect a purpose which does not appear on its face or from its legislative history. Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 537, 540. In supporting the judgment of dismissal below, the Government relies on the Suits in Admiralty Act "of March 9, 1920, c. 95, 41 St-at. 525, 526, 527, 528, by which, it is contended, jurisdiction over the asserted cause of action is vested exc…
  • Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (U.S. 1993)
    …statute was first adopted in 1868, see Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, § 8, 15 Stat. 77, and prior encounters with § 154 of the Judicial Code of 1911, the immediate predecessor to §1500, shed some light on the issue. Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 537 (1924), was an action brought against the United States in the Court of Claims, seeking compensation for coal requisitioned by the Government. Before bringing its appeal to this Court, the plaintiff sued the President’s agent in Federal District Cou…

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