FORREST T. GAY ET UX., APPELLANTS,

v.

ERNEST MUJICA, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES

WHITE, Judge.

This is a case of first impression. Interlocutory appeal was filed by Forrest Gay and wife as homeowners in a suit instituted on their petition for rule to show cause why liens filed against their home should not be settled pro rata or can-celled.1 Hearing was had on the petition and the court entered an order limiting the time to enforce liens to 22 April 1964.

The respondents were certain persons or firms not in privity with the petitioners who had filed claims of liens against the petitioners’ property. Prior to completion of the home the general contractor absconded without giving petitioners any statement as to unpaid bills of subcontractors or materialmen.

Two lienors, Ernest Mujica and Robbins Mfg. Co., counterclaimed for enforcement of their respective liens. At the same time they filed their “Notice of Pendency of Action to Enforce Lien.” Their rights are not contested in this appeal. Four other lienholders, Akins Electric Co., B. & F. Linoleum and Tile Co., City Paint Center, and Carson Plumbing Co., Inc., filed timely counterclaims seeking enforcement of their respective liens but they did not at that time file a “Notice of Pendency of Action to Enforce Lien.”

The petitioners thereafter moved for summary decree against the latter four lienholders for failure to comply with § 84.21 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.2 The one year period allowed under that statute for filing notice of lis pendens had not expired and the court granted oral motions to allow the lienholders to file their Notice of Pen-dency and for a continuance to permit them to do so. From this order the petitioners brought their interlocutory appeal.

In order to acquire an enforceable lien when the lienholder institutes action, there is no question but that the notice of pendency of action must be filed within the one year period. See Cowherd & Sanderlin, Inc. v. Modern Improvement Co., Inc., Fla.App.1962, 142 So.2d 786; Adams v. Kenson Supply Co., Fla.App.1962, 137 So.2d 27; Trushin v. Brown, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So.2d 357. There is some authority, however, that the failure to file such notice does not bar enforcement of the lien where the lienholder is joined as a party defendant and where a plaintiff mortgagee has filed an appropriate notice. Johnson v. Rossell, Fla.App.1963, 156 So.2d 190. It is arguable that the Johnson doc*85trine would apply also to inverse actions instituted by the homeowner against the lienholder under § 84.23(4) Fla.Stat., F.S.A.3 That question, however, need not be decided on this appeal because here all of the appellee-lienholders were not joined as party defendants and the appellee-lienholders did in fact file their notices of lis pendens within the one year period defined in § 84.21 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

The prime point for consideration therefore, is whether the notice of lis pendens can be filed at any time prior to the expiration of one year from the filing of the claim of lien; or, whether the appellees are barred from enforcing their liens for failure to file such notice at the time they answered and counterclaimed in the proceedings.

Section 84.21 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. provides that no subject lien shall continue for longer than one year after the claim of lien has been filed “unless within that time” an appropriate action is commenced and “a notice of the pendency of such action is filed.” In Cowherd & Sanderlin, Inc. v. Modern Improvement Co., Inc., supra; Adams v. Henson Supply Co., supra, and Trushin v. Brown, supra, the notices of pendency were each filed after the expiration of the years time. Hence those cases are not controlling on the pertinent point.

The appellants concede that under § 84.21 Fla.Stat., F.S.A., lienholders would have one year within which to file their notice of lis pendens. They urge, however, that when an action is filed under § 84.23(4) Fla.Stat., F.S.A., the time for filing such notice is shortened. The appellees, on the other hand, argue that § 84.23(4) does not limit the duration of the lien; that it merely provides a method by which a property owner may elect to institute suit against the lienholder rather than wait to be sued himself; that since § 84.21 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. sets a one year period for filing the notice of pendency of action, the chancfillor’s order was not erroneous. We agree with this latter contention.

Section 84.23(4) Fla.Stat., F.S.A. does not specifically limit the normal period of time for filing a notice of pendency of action nor does it even imply that such notice must be given when that statute is used. If such notice was indeed necessary, the lienholders complied by filing their notices within the time prescribed by § 84.21 Fla. Stat., F.S.A. Accordingly the chancellor did not err in confirming the right to file the subject notices after answer and counterclaim where the same could be done within one year from the date of filing of each claim of lien.

Affirmed.

SHANNON, J., concurs.

SMITH, C. J., dissents with opinion.

SMITH, Chief Judge

(dissenting).

I concur in that part of the decision of the majority to the effect that these lienors were required to file a notice of pendency of the action because (1) they were not made parties defendant in an action to enforce another lien in which such a notice had been filed and the lien was not transferred to a cash deposit or bond, which are the exceptions as to notice stated in § 84.-21, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and (2) the action of *86the owners in which they were a party was not an action to foreclose a mortgage or other lien upon the same real property in which a notice of pendency of action was filed, which is the remaining exception to notice set forth in § 84.23, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

Section 84.21, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., provides that no lien shall continue for a longer period than one year after the claim of lien has been filed unless within that time an action to enforce the lien is commenced and a notice of the pendency of such action is filed. Section 84.23, Fla.Stat., F. S.A., provides that a lien may be discharged by several named methods, among them being the failure to commence an action to enforce the lien within a time provided by order of the court. I find no difficulty or inconsistency in applying the terms of the foregoing statutes to the facts of this case and thereby arriving at the conclusion that when the court shortened the time within which the lienors were required to bring an action to enforce their liens this order had the effect of also shortening the time within which they could file a notice of the pendency of the action. Such a construction applies the well-known rule of statutory construction that the legislative intent is gathered from the entire statute rather than from any one part. To say on the one hand that an action must be filed within a shortened time but on the other hand one of the requisites of such an action (filing a notice of pendency of the action) may be filed at a later time, is in my judgment, unnecessarily applying one section of the act to the exclusion of another applicable section. I believe the result reached by the majority is contrary by analogy to the many decisions holding that a notice of pendency of the action must be filed within the time in which the action must be filed. See West Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Hurley, Fla.App. 1964, 168 So.2d 328; Johnson v. Roswell, Fla.App. 1963, 156 So.2d 190; Cowherd and Sanderlin, Inc. v. Modern Improvement, Fla.App.1962, 142 So.2d 786; Adams v. Kenson Supply Co., Fla.App.1962, 137 So.2d 27; and Trushin v. Brown, Fla.App.1961, 132 So.2d 357.

I therefore conclude that these lienclaim-ants were required to file a notice of pen-dency of the action, which notice must be filed within the shortened period of time for bringing the action and that by failing to file such a notice these lienors failed to bring themselves fairly within the statutory provisions as they were required to do in order to avail themselves of the benefits of the act. I am further persuaded to this-view because of the fact that many of the initial decisions construing the mechanics, lien law of Florida cite decisions of the New Jersey and New York courts because-their statutory provisions are similar to the-Florida statute and the precise question' presented here has been determined there as I believe it should be determined here.. See Cox v. Hruza, 1959, 54 N.J.Super. 54, 148 A.2d 193; Siracusa v. Inch Corporation, 1937, 164 Misc. 820, 298 N.Y.S. 878; Johnson v. Waldo Griffiths, Inc., 1932, 144 Misc. 773, 259 N.Y.S. 386; and Wheeler v. Almond, 1884, 46 N.J.L. 161.