DAVIS, AGENT,
v.
KENNEDY, ADMINISTRATRIX OF KENNEDY, DECEASED
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The administratrix of a railroad engineer sued under the Employers' Liability Act to recover damages for the engineer's death in a train collision caused by his failure to verify that an oncoming train had passed a designated point before proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed the state court's judgment, holding that the engineer bore the primary personal duty to ascertain the other train's location, and his representative could not recover for an injury directly caused by the engineer's own breach of that duty merely because other crew members in secondary roles might have prevented the accident.
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Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action under the Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65, brought by the administratrix of David Kennedy to recover damages for his death upon a railroad while under federal control. The death was caused by a collision between two trains called No. 1 and No. 4, west of a point known as Shops which was two and a half miles west of Nashville, Tennessee. The tracks were double from Nashville to Shops but after that the track was single. No. 1, bound for Nashville, had the right of way, and the crew of No. 4, bound westward, had instructions never to pass Shops unless they knew as a fact that No. 1 had passed it. Kennedy was the engineer of No. 4. The conductor had told him that the train was crowded and had asked him to look out for No. 1, which Kennedy agreed to do. He ran his train on beyond Shops however and the collision occurred.
The trial was in a Court of the State of Tennessee, and the plaintiff got a judgment which was sustained by the Supreme Court of the State on the ground that the other members of the crew as well as the engineer were bound to look out for the approaching train and that their negligence contributed as a proximate cause to the engineer’s death. We are of opinion that this was error. It was the personal duty of the engineer positively to ascertain whether the other train had passed. His duty was primary as he had physical control of No. 4, and was managing its course. It seems to us a perversion of the statute to allow his representative to recover for an in jury directly due to his failure to act as required on the ground that possibly it might have been prevented if those in secondary relation to the movement had done more. Frese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co., 263 U. S. 1, 3.
Judgment reversed.
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Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 (U.S. 1943)…ny other problems arose. One of these was the application of the “primary duty rule” in which contributory negligence through violation of a company rule became assumption of risk. Unadilla Valley Ry. Co. v. Caldine, 278 U. S. 139; Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U. S. 147. Other complications arose from the introduction of “promise to repair,” “simple tool,” and “peremptory order” concepts into the assumption doc [*64] trine.17 In the disposition of cases the question of a plaintiff’s assumption of risk has frequentl…
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Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 (U.S. 1957)…S. 1; reversal of judgment for plaintiff affirmed. [*553] Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239; affirmance of judgment for plaintiff affirmed. Davis v. Matthews, 263 U. S. 686;* affirmance of judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 1924 Term. Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U. S. 147; affirmance of judgment for plaintiff reversed. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Groeger, 266 U. S. 521; affirmance of judgment for plaintiff reversed for new trial; evidence found sufficient for submission to jury. 1925 Term. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S.…
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Unadilla Valley Ry. Co. v. Caldine, 278 U.S. 139 (U.S. 1928)…one what he ordered. [*142] He cannot hold the Company liable for a disaster that followed disobedience of a rule intended to prevent it, when the disobedience was brought about and intended to be brought about by his own acts. See Davis v. Kennedy, 266 U. S. 147. Still considering the case as between the petitioner and Caldine, it seems .to us even less possible to say that the collision resulted in part from the failure to inform Caldine of the telephone from train No. 15. . A-failure to stop a man from d…
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- Frese v. Chicago, 263 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1923)