HOUSE
v.
ROAD IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 2, OF CONWAY COUNTY, ARKANSAS, ET AL.; HOUSE V. ROAD IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 5, OF CONWAY COUNTY, ARKANSAS, ET AL.
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Property owners challenged Arkansas legislation creating road improvement districts and authorizing assessments on their lands, claiming the statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment by providing inadequate notice and description of assessed properties and by arbitrarily including non-benefiting lands while excluding benefiting lands. The Supreme Court dismissed both writs of error, holding that the statute as construed by the Arkansas Supreme Court provided sufficient notice and that the legislature had authority to determine which lands should be included in a district improvement assessment.
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Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
Both of these writs must be dismissed.
No. 92.
The only ground suggested to sustain the writ in this cause is that Act No. 245, Arkansas Legislature, 1919, which established Road District No. 2 of Conway County, was duly challenged as repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a challenge must be distinct and substantial.
The act undertook to create the district with boundaries which include plaintiff’s lands and specified the proceedings for assessing benefits to meet necessary costs. Her lands were assessed as provided. Some months thereafter, by a bill in equity, she claimed insufficient notice and asked relief from both assessment and consequent penalties; also that the commissioners’ plans should be declared null and she be heard as to the merits of any assessment. She offered to pay any sum the court might find just and equitable.
The bill alleges that the statute authorized and the commissioners gave only seventeen days’ notice of the assessment, by publication, that she had no actual notice, and that the publication failed sufficiently to describe her lands. For these reasons she maintained the act did not provide due process of law and violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court, having considered the objections, held that the statute allowed twenty-eight days after the first publication during which time petitioner might have objected to the assessment, and declared this was adequate; alsp that when read in connection with the statute the notice sufficiently described the lands. Plaintiff in error now insists that the act is null because it prescribes insufficient notice and description of the assessed lands.
Accepting the statute as construed by the state court, the suggested objections to its validity appear to us wholly wanting in merit.
No. 93.
This cause grew out of the creation of District No. 5, Conway' County, by Act No. 245, and assessment for benefits thereunder. With one exception the questions now raised are the same as those in cause No. 92. As an additional ground for challenging the statute plaintiff in error claims that it is arbitrary and beyond the power of the Legislature because the proposed improvement could not benefit plaintiff’s lands, while other lands actually benefited were not included. The record does not show that this objection was placed upon any federal ground in the courts below; but, assuming that the point was properly made, we think it is clearly without merit. Houck v. Little River Drainage District, 239 U. S. 254, 265; Miller & Lux v. Sacramento Drainage District, 256 U. S. 129, 130; Valley Farms Co. v. Westchester, 261 U. S. 155, 163, 164.
Writs of Error Dismissed.
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Cont'l Nat. Bank of Jackson Cnty. v. Holland Banking Co., 66 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1933)…101, U. S. 638 [25 L. Ed. 1073]; Bissell v. Spring Valley Township, 124 U. S. 225, 230, 8 S. Ct. 495 [31 L. Ed. 411]; and Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. S. 252, 253, 14 S. Ct. 608 [38 L. Ed. 429].” See, also, United States v. Moser, 266 U. S. 236, 45 S. Ct. 60, 69 L. Ed. 262; Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 70, 41 S. Ct. 420, 65 L. Ed. 831. The rule thus stated has been uniformly followed. And the rule applies as well to defenses which might have been set up in the former suit as to those which were actual…
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Guardian Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Dillard, 15 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1926)…he board could, at any time, have increased these rates for any prospective year and that until so changed, those rates thus established were legally fixed and collectible. House v. Road Improv. Dist. No. 2, 158 Ark. 330, 346, 251 S. W. 12 (affirmed 266 U. S. 175, 45 S. Ct. 60, 69 L. Ed. 229); Jefferson v. Conway County Bridge Dist., 147 Ark. 518, 227 S. W. 769. As the receiver was empowered, under that act, to collect assessments and as the rates, for these years sought to be collected by the receiver, wer…
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Miller Cnty. Hwy. & Bridge Dist. v. Standard Pipe Line Co., Inc., 19 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1927)…the assessed benefits be not diminished. Full right of appeal from the action of the assessors was given to the commission, and thence to the county court. Compare House v. Rd. Imp. Dist. No. 2, Conway County, Ark., 158 Ark. 330, 251 S. W. 12, aft., 266 U. S. 175, 45 S. Ct. 60, 69 L. Ed. 229. In 1922, and after the assessment of benefits had been made, the appellee here, plaintiff below, purchased from the Prairie Pipe Line Company all of its property within the district and the state, and is now owner of c…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1915)
- Valley Farms Co. of Yonkers v. Cnty. of Westchester, 261 U.S. 155 (U.S. 1923)
- Miller & Lux v. Sacramento & SAN Joaquin Drainage Dist., 256 U.S. 129 (U.S. 1921)