FULLERTON-KRUEGER LUMBER COMPANY
v.
NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY ET AL.
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Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Company sued Northern Pacific Railway Company to recover excess freight charges allegedly violating Minnesota law, but the Railway Company successfully invoked the state's six-year statute of limitations, which had expired before the action was brought in 1921. The Supreme Court affirmed that the Federal Transportation Act of 1920, which excluded the period of federal control from limitation periods, did not retroactively revive causes of action that had already been barred by state law before the federal statute's effective date. The Court applied the established rule that statutes are presumptively prospective unless express language or necessary implication indicates otherwise.
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Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
After suing out the writ of error, No. 152, the Lumber Company obtained a certiorari, No. 179, to review the same judgment. The record plainly discloses that a right under an act of Congress was claimed below and denied. The cause is properly here by certiorari and upon it the issue can be decided. That adequate ground for the writ of error was specially set up below is not clear. It will be dismissed.
On January 24, 1921, the original action was brought in the District Court, Hennepin County, to recover excess freight charges demanded by respondents between November 25, 1912, and September 16, 1913, in violation of § 4347, Minnesota General Statutes, 1913. Admitting original liability, the Railway Company relied upon the local statute of limitation, fixing six years as the time within which such actions must be begun. To this the reply was that the prescribed period of limitation had been extended by paragraph (f), § 206, Federal Transportation Act 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 462, which provides, “ The period of Federal control shall not be computed as a part of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in claims for reparation to the Commission for causes of action arising prior to Federal control.” And upon the sole point of law thus raised the cause is before us.
The petitioner maintains that Congress intended to revive actions against carriers when the period designated by the state statute for bringing them had expired during federal control and asserts that the mischief to be remedied indicates such purpose and the ordinary meaning of the words employed discloses it. The respondent insists that a statute should never be given retroactive effect where another construction is fairly permissible, as here; that if in the circumstances the act of Congress be so construed it would create new causes of action and thus permit the taking of property without due process of law.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held, rightly, we think, that the Transportation Act was not intended to revive or restore rights of action barred before it became effective.
“ It is a rule of construction, that all statutes are to be considered prospective, unless the language is express to the contrary, or there is a necessary implication to that effect.” Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328, 347; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 599; Twenty Per Cent. Cases, 20 Wall. 179, 187; Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 559; Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 534. And see Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co., 233 N. Y. 213.
Applying this rule, we find no circumstances existing when the statute in question was enacted, nor any language therein, which shows that it should be applied to causes barred by limitation before its passage.
The judgment below is
Affirmed.
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Citator
Cited By (28 total)
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Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435 (U.S. 1935)…onstrued to operate retrospectively unless the legislative intention to that effect unequivocally appears. Twenty per Cent. Cases, 20 Wall. 179, 187; Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 559; Fullerton-Krueger Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 266 U. S. 435, 437. The principle is strictly applicable to statutes which have the effect of creating an obligation. An administrative regulation is subject to the rule equally with a statute; and accordingly, the regulation here involved must be taken to operat…
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William Danzer & Co., Inc. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633 (U.S. 1925)…e is a necessary implication to that effect, recently has held that § 206 (f) does not apply to causes of action which were barred by a state statute of limitations before the passage of the Transportation Act. Fullerton Company v. Northern Pacific, 266 U. S. 435, 437. Plaintiff suggests that the only period of limitations applicable to claims for reparation is that prescribed by § 16 (3), and argues that, as the period of federal control exceeded two years, § 206 (f) must be construed retrospectively or gi…
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Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U.S. 56 (U.S. 1927)
Previewing 3 of 28 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529 (U.S. 1922)
- Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (U.S. 1884)
- Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596 (U.S. 1873)
- Twenty per Cent. Cases, 20 Wall. 179 (U.S. 1873)