UNITED STATES BEDDING COMPANY
v.
UNITED STATES

U.S. | 1925-01-05
No. 143
266 U.S. 491 Supreme Court of the United States (1925) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 69 L. Ed. 399 · 45 S. Ct. 182 · 1925 U.S. LEXIS 742 · SCDB 1924-172
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

United States Bedding Company sought recovery for losses incurred when the War Industries Board requisitioned its cotton linters stock during World War I, then released the linters after the Armistice, causing the value to decline below cost. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that recovery was barred because no valid contract existed under the Dent Act (the linters were never accepted or paid for) and the Tucker Act did not apply since the transaction involved a wholly executory arrangement that fell outside the statute of frauds requirements and was properly governed by the Lever Act, which required suit in District Court rather than the Court of Claims.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Brandéis

Mr. Justice Brandéis delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims. The petition was dismissed on demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. It alleges in substance these facts: Cotton linters are used in the manufacture of mattresses and bedding. They are also used as the base of smokeless powder. The plaintiff had in stock, on May 27, 1918, a lot of cotton linters. On that day, the War Industries Board1 issued a circular “ To dealers in and users of cotton linters” notifying them for their “ information and guidance ” that, because of the Government's requirements,- all linters were requisitioned.

On July 10, 1918, it issued a further circular on the subject. Later, the Board had direct dealing with the plaintiff about taking over its linters at their actual value. A price was offered which the plaintiff refused to accept. The “Ordnance Department then began exercising the right to commandeer by which the owner was to be given an opportunity to establish the actual value of the linters but before this commandeering process was completed the Armistice was signed and the Government did not then take the linters.” Because of the Government’s action, plaintiff had retained the linters. Because of the release by the Government after the Armistice of all linters held under such orders and regulations, the plaintiff’s stock became worth less than it had cost the plaintiff and less than its market value had been during the preceding summer. The resulting loss was $11,744.18.

Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to recover the amount of this loss. The suit must have been brought under the Dent Act, March 2, 1919, c. 94, 40 Stat. 1272, or under the Tucker Act, Judicial Code, § 145, upon the ground that there was either an express executory contract to accept and pay the war value or that what occurred was a legal taking from which an implied agreement to pay arose, under the doctrine of United States v. Great Falls Manufacturing Co., 112 U. S. 645, and later cases. We need not discuss the precise facts alleged in the petition.2 Whatever interpretation be given to the action of the War Industries Board and the Ordnance Department there set forth, the plaintiff must fail.

Recovery can not be had under the Dent Act, among other reasons, because the agreement, if any, has not been “ performed in whole or in part ” and no “ expenditures have been made or obligations incurred upon the faith of the same. Compare Price Fire & Water Proofing Co. v. United States, 261 U. S.

179. Nor is recovery possible under the Tucker Act. It cannot be had as upon an express contract, becahse the transaction comes within Rev. Stats., § 3744; was not “reduced to writing, and signed by the contracting parties with their names at the end thereof; ” and was wholly executory. South Boston Iron Co. v. United States, 118 U. S. 37; Erie Coal & Coke Corporation v. United States, decided this day, post, 518. Compare United States v. Andrews & Co., 207 U. S. 229, 243; St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. United States, 191 U. S.

159. Recovery cannot be had as upon an implied contract, because the only authority to requisition the linters was that conferred by § 10 of the Lever Act (August 10, 1917, c. 53, 40 Stat. 276, 279); and proceedings under that section are not based on contract. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 304.

Moreover, they must be brought in the District Court. United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547.

We have no occasion, therefore, to consider whether the United States could ever be liable under the Tucker Act, as for a taking, for loss suffered through the abandonment of the “ commandeering process ”, where the owner had retained possession of the property and the Government had neither accepted, used, or injured it. Compare Garrison v. City of New York, 21 Wall. 196; Bauman v. Boss, 167 U. S. 548, 598-9; Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502, 508-9. Nor need we consider whether it could have been held liable under the Lever Act, if suit had been brought in the District Court.

Affirmed.

It was created by the Council of National Defense, with the approval of the President, July 28, 1917. See Report of the War Industries Board, March 3, 1921; Act of August 29, 1916, c. 418, § 2, 39 Stat. 619, 649; Act of May 20, 1918, c. 78, 40 Stat. 556.

These are fully stated and discussed in an able opinion by Mr. Ashby Williams, In re Claims of United States Bedding Co. et al., 4 Decisions of War Department Board of Contract Adjustment, p. 325. (Proceedings under the Dent Act, March 2, 1919, c. 94, 40 Stat. 1272.)


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Cited By

  • Sons v. United States, 273 U.S. 200 (U.S. 1927)
    …ontract. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 385; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 592, 596. Compare Price Fire & Waterproofing Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 179; United States Bedding Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 491, 492; Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 340. Affirmed..…
  • Atwater & Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 188 (U.S. 1927)
    …redit therefor. But, if that be assuméd, there is nothing to' indicate, that the taking was for public use. Moreover, if property was appropriated for public usé, the taking must' have been under § 10' of the Lever Act (Bedding Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 491), and the Court of Claims had rio jurisdiction, as that section gave the district courts exclusive jurisdiction over controversies concerning compensation. United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547; Houston Coal Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 361. C…
  • Cont'l Cas. Co. v. United States, 113 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1940)
    …e for the amount thereof; * * * United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 512, 35 S.Ct. 298, 59 L.Ed. 696; Board of Education v. Maryland Casualty Company, 3 Cir., 27 F. 2d 20. United States Bedding Company v. United States, 266 U.S. 491, 45 S.Ct. 182, 69 L.Ed. 399; Erie Coal & Coke Corp. v. United States, 266 U.S. 518, 45 S.Ct. 181, 69 L.Ed. 417; Hale County, Texas, v. American Indemnity Co., 5 Cir., 63 F. 2d 275.…

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