JOHN E. BIGMAN, TRUSTEE AND INDIVIDUALLY, AND MIRIAM BIGMAN, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
UNIVERSITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF CORAL GABLES, A UNITED STATES CORPORATION, AND MARLIN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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Appellants as optionors sought review of a decree finding they had no right to terminate an option on real estate. The court affirmed that the optionors could not terminate the option but reversed the chancellor's decision to return monies and transfer the case to determine damages, instead ordering specific performance to reinstate the option.
The appellants as optionors had no right to terminate the option agreement. Specific performance is the appropriate remedy, requiring reinstatement of the option with the option period abated from the date of the wrongful termination attempt until the mandate's effective date.
“The optionee [for consideration] during the term of his option has a right that the option giver shall not repudiate nor make performance impossible or more difficult, and said right is enforceable by all the usual judicial remedies including judgment for damages, injunction and decree for specific performance.”
Establishes the legal principle that optionees have enforceable rights against optionors during the option period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn option agreement existed concerning real estate, with Marlin Development Company as the optionee. The appellants (optionors) attempted to terminate…
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Appellants, plaintiffs and counter-defendants in the trial court, seek review of a-final decree on a counterclaim which found that the appellants, as optionors, had no right to- terminate an option but, rather than reinstating the option which pertained to real estate, the chancellor ordered the return of monies to the appellee, Marlin Development Company paid under the agreement and transferred the matter to the common law side of the court for a determination of damages. The appellants have appealed and brought said final decree on for review.
We affirm the chancellor’s finding that the appellants had no right to terminate the option, but reverse those portions of the decree wherein he adjudicated the return of the monies advanced and the transfer of the case to the law side of the court to determine damages, with directions to enter a final decree reinstating the option and! abating the option period from the date of the abortive termination letter, [to wit: March 12, 1963] until the effective date of this court’s mandate.
The optionee [for consideration] during the term of his option has a right that the option giver shall not repudiate nor make performance impossible or more difficult, and said right is enforceable by all the usiial judicial remedies including judgment for damages, injunction and decree for specific performance. See: McFerran v. Heroux, 44 Wash.2d 631, 269 P.2d 815; 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 4, p. 838; Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 1A, pages 498, 579. While it is true that specific performance is not a matter of right but discretionary with the chancellor, [see: Levene v. Enchanted Lakes Homes, Inc., Fla.App.1959, 115 So.2d 89; Mills v. Beims, Fla.App.1961, 132 So.2d 228] failure to award specific performance in the instant case constituted an abuse of judicial discretion. Due to the option agreement involved herein, the only manner in which the appellee could obtain adequate relief *332would he by the decreeing of specific performance by the trial court.
Therefore, the actions of the chancellor are affirmed in part and reversed in part, with directions as set forth above.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, with directions.
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Cited By
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Syd P. Krantz v. Donner, 285 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)…reunder, on the payment by him of the balance due on the [*701] purchase price of the property.” 29A Fla.Jur., supra, at p. 695. Hughes v. Jemco, Inc., Fla.App.1967, 201 So. 2d 565; Gigman v. University Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n, Fla.App.1964, 170 So. 2d 330; Sperling v. Davie, Fla.1949, 41 So. 2d 318. A review of the record in the case sub judice reflects the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to the alleged fraudulent transaction and as to the bona fide nature of the conveyance thereby p…
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Fleischmann v. Donner, 300 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)…ase within the time stipulated. The purchaser during the term of the option has a right that the vendor shall not repudiate the option and said right is en-forcible by the usual judicial remedies. Bigman v. University Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n, 170 So. 2d 330 (Fla.App.1964). A summary judgment may be entered when the record shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ham v. Heintzelman’s Ford, Inc., 256 So. 2d 264 (Fla.App.1971). Wh…
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Aerojet-General Corp. v. Reubin O'Donovan Askew, 453 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1971)…he option was exercised before the end of the six month period and specific performance was decreed even though the value of the property had substantially increased. In Bigman v. University Federal Savings and Loan Association, 1965, Fla. App.3rd, 170 So. 2d 330, 331, the Court noted: “The optionee [for consideration] during the term of his option has a right that the option giver shall not repudiate nor make performance impossible or more difficult, and said right is enforceable by all the usual judicial…
Authorities Cited
- Mills v. Beims, 132 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Levene v. Enchanted Lake Homes, Inc., 115 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)