GEORGE W. BUSH & SONS COMPANY
v.
MALOY ET AL., CONSTITUTING THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND

U.S. | 1925-03-02
No. 185
267 U.S. 317 Supreme Court of the United States (1925) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 69 L. Ed. 627 · 45 S. Ct. 326 · SCDB 1924-184 · 1925 U.S. LEXIS 757
Cited by 95 cases

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Synopsis

Maryland's statute requiring motor carriers to obtain permits from the Public Service Commission before using public highways violated the Commerce Clause when the Commission denied a permit to an interstate freight carrier based on considerations of existing transportation competition rather than highway safety or capacity. The Court reversed the state court's dismissal, holding that states cannot regulate interstate commerce through discretionary permit schemes, even when highways lack federal funding, because such regulation invades a field reserved to Congress under the Commerce Clause.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. . Justice Brandéis Mr. Justice McReynolds,'

Mr. . Justice Brandéis delivered the opinion of the Court.

A statute of Maryland prohibits common carriers of merchandise or freight by motor vehicle from using the public highways over specified routes without a permit. The Public Service Commission is charged with the duty to “ investigate the expediency of granting said permit ” when applied for; and it is authorized to refuse the same if it “deems the granting of such permit prejudicial to the welfare and convenience of the public.” Laws of Maryland, 1922, c. 401, § 4.

George W. Bu$h & Sons Co. applied for a permit to do an exclusively interstate business as a common carrier of freight over specified routes, alleging its willingness and intention to comply with all applicable regulations concerning the operation of motor vehicles. After due hearing the permit was denied. This suit was brought in a comt of the State to restrain the state officials from interfering with such use of the company’s tracks. The bill alleged, and it was admitted by demurrer, that the highways were not unduly congested; that they are so constructed that they can carry burdens heavier, than that which would be imposed by plaintiff’s tracks; that the operation of its trucks.would impose no different burden upon the highways than the operation of the tracks of the same kind and character by private persons, which was freely permitted; and that, in refusing the permit, the Commission had considered merely “ whether or not existing lines of transportation would be benefited or prejudiced and in this way the public interest affected.” The plaintiff claiméd that, regardless of permit, it was entitled to use the highways as a common carrier in exclusively interstate commerce. The trial court dismissed the bill. Its decree was affirmed by the highest court of the State. 143 Md. 570. The case is here on writ of error under § 237 of the Judicial Code.

This case presents two features which were not present in Buck v. Kuykendall, ante, p. 307, decided this day. The first is that the highways here in question were not constructed or improved with federal aid. This difference does not prevent the application of the rale declared in the Buck Case. The federal-aid legislation’is of significance, not because of the aid given by the United States for the construction of particular highways, but because those acts make clear the purpose of Congress that state highways sh'all be open to interstate commerce. The second feature is that here Cm permit was refused by the Commission, not in dbedience to a mandatory provision of the state statute, but ip the exercise, in a proper manner, of the broad discretion vested in it. This difference also is not of legal significance in this connection. The state action in the Buck Case was held to be unconstitutional, not because the statute prescribed an arbitrary test for the granting of permits, or because the Director of Public Works had exercised the power -conferred arbitrarily or unreasonably,, but because the sta'tute as construed and applied invaded a field reserved by the Commerce Clause for federal regulation.

Reversed.

The separate opinion of

Mr. Justice McReynolds,' delivered in. this case and the one immediately preceding, it, ante, p. 307. ,

I am of opinion that the. courts below reached correct conclusions in these causes.

The States have spent enormous sums in constructing roads and must continue to maintain and protect them at great cost if they are to remain fit" for travel.

Thes problems arising out of the sudden increase of motor vehicles present extraordinary difficulties; • As yet nobody definitely knows what should be dope.- Manifestly, the' exigency cannot be met through uniform rules laid down by Congress.

Interstate commerce has been greatly .aided — amazingly facilitated, indeed — through legislation and expenditures by the States. The challenged statutes do not discriminate against such commerce, do not seriously impede it, and indicate an honest purpose to promote the best interests of all by preventing unnecessary destruction and keeping the ways fit for maximum service.

The Federal Government has not and cannot undertake precise regulations. Control by the States must continue, otherwise chaotic conditions will quiekly develop. The problems are essentially local, and should be left with the local authorities unless and until something-is done which'really tends to obstruct the free flow of commercial intercourse..

The situation is similar to the one growing out of the necessity for harbor regulations. . State statutes -concerning pilotage, for example, have been upheld although they amounted to regúlation of interstate and foreign commerce. “ They fall within that class of powers which may be exercised by the States until Congress has seen fit to act upon the subject.” Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 332, 341.

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Citator

Cited By (31 total)

  • Masters v. Duval Cnty., 114 Fla. 205 (Fla. 1934)
    …convenient travel. See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385; Day v. City of St. Augustine, 104 Fla. 261, 139 So. 880. No restrictions upon the use of the bridge are imposed as was done as to roads in Bush Co. v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, 45 Sup. Ct. 326, 327, 69 L. Ed. 627, and other somewhat similar cases. In Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Com. of Ky., 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087, 38 L. Ed. 962, and other similar cases the controversy was as to State regulations of inter…
    1 / 2
  • State v. Fla. R.R. Comm'n, 123 Fla. 345 (Fla. 1936)
    …adequacy of existing facilities, as well as the public congestion of the highways, the test of whether or not they shall be granted, therefore the rule of Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 69 L. Ed. 623, and of Bush v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326, 69 L. Ed. 627, applies to the granting of such certificates vel non.…
    1 / 2
  • H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (U.S. 1949)
    …difference in degree, the judgment below would fully rest on the Eisenberg case. If, on the other hand, petitioner’s competitors were like itself engaged in interstate commerce [*571], Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, and Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, would be powerful precedents in favor of reversal. See also Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50; Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189. This case falls somewhere between these most nearly decisive authorities. It is closer to the Buck an…

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