OLSON ET AL., CO-PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF OLSON BROS. OR OLSON & OLSON
v.
UNITED STATES SPRUCE PRODUCTION CORPORATION

U.S. | 1925-03-16
No. 128
267 U.S. 462 Supreme Court of the United States (1925) Caution
Also reported at: 69 L. Ed. 738 · 45 S. Ct. 357 · SCDB 1924-110 · 1925 U.S. LEXIS 383
Cited by 15 cases

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Synopsis

Olson Bros. sued United States Spruce Production Corporation in state court for losses incurred when the government requisitioned their logging camp to produce airplane timber during 1918, with their claim under the Dent Act subsequently disallowed. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that even if the Dent Act provided an exclusive remedy against the United States, it did not divest state courts of jurisdiction over contract claims against a state-incorporated corporation, and that statutory limitations on remedies go to the merits rather than jurisdiction.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered . the opinion of the Court.’

This case comes here directly from the District Court by a writ of error and a certificate that the action was dismissed upon the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction.

The suit was begun in a Court of the State of Oregon and removed. . It was brought against the corporation described in Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341, to recover for work done, materials furnished or destroyed, and profits lost, during the year 1918, in consequence of a requisition by the Government that the plaintiffs should devote their logging camp to the production of airplane timber alone. The declaration is long and suggests throughout an effort to state a case under the Dent. Act, March 2, 1919, c. 94; 40 Stat. 1272; and to account for this suit by the fact that the plaintiffs’ claim under that Act was disallowed.- The assurances and promises relied upon -seem to. have been the assurances and promises of successive agents of the United States that the United States would pay for iyhat the plaintiffs were asked to do.

The Court below seems to have regarded the Dent Act as giving the only remedy in cases like this, although the supposed cause of aetion afóse before that Act was passed; and according to the certificate treated the statute as excluding jurisdiction elsewhere. If the suit were against the United States, as no Court has jurisdiction over the United States except when it is granted, the ruling might have been correct. But this suit is against a corporation of the State of Washington, brought originally in a Court of Oregon to enforce a supposed liability in contract. Even if a statute of the United States created a bar, -it would be unusual if the act went to the jurisdiction rather than to the merits, Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 235; and if. the statute went further it. would be more likely to exclude jurisdiction in all other Courts rather than merely in Courts of the United States-as such. If the statute excluded jurisdiction in State as well as United States Courts the case could not be certified under § 238 of ^he Judicial Code. Fore River Shipbuilding Co. v. Hagg, 219 U. S. 175, 178. But the Dent Act does not contemplate suits against corporations in the Court of Claims, and we perceive no ground for the ruling as certified. It well may be that the Court was right in deciding that the allegations were not sufficient to justify a suit against the corporation, and our -judgment is without prejudice to a judgment dismissing the case upon the merits. But.it. was error' to decide that there was a want of jurisdiction: and therefore the judgment must be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (U.S. 1939)
    …ctly affect its property interests without such specific statutory authorization. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554; Sloan Shipyards v. United States Shipping Board, 258 U. S. 549, 568-69; Olson v. United States Spruce Production Corp., 267 U. S. 462; Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 235-37. Compare Davis v. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co., 261 U. S. 280. In 35 Land Decisions 648 the Acting Secretary of the Interior handed down on June 29, 1907, an opinion which recognized, without any dis…
  • Fed. Land Bank of ST. Louis v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229 (U.S. 1935)
    …government agencies from suit and judicial process, and their incidents, is less readily implied than immunity from taxation. See The Lake Monroe, supra; Sloan Shipyards v. U. S. Shipping Board, 258 U. S. 549, 566-568; Olson v. U. S. Spruce Corp., 267 U. S. 462; U. S. Shipping Board v. Harwood, 281 U. S. 519, 524-526; compare The Davis, 10 Wall. 15; National Volunteer Home v. Parrish, 229 U. S. 494; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 267 U. S. 76, 79. In prescribing liability to suit, the qualifying phra…
  • REX v. CIA. Pervana de Vapores, 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981)
    …1824); United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491, 493, 41 S.Ct. 165, 166, 65 L.Ed. 368 (1921); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 565, 42 S.Ct. 386, 387, 66 L.Ed. 762 (1922); Olson v. United States Spruce Production Corp., 267 U.S. 462, 463, 45 S.Ct. 357, 357, 69 L.Ed. 738 (1925); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388, 59 S.Ct. 516, 517, 83 L.Ed. 784 (1939); Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Board, Inc., 268 F. 575, 585 (S.…
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