LEE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF LEWIS C. PAINE
v.
LEHIGH VALLEY COAL COMPANY & KATE P. DIXON
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Lee, who owned a half-interest in a coal mine, sued the Lehigh Valley Coal Company for a construction of a lease, claiming fraud, and seeking an accounting, but joined the other half-owner Kate P. Dixon as a defendant rather than a plaintiff despite her being entitled to relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Dixon was a necessary party to the litigation and that Lee could not manipulate joinder by placing her on the opposing side merely to establish federal diversity jurisdiction when both co-owners were proper parties to the dispute.
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Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill brought against the Lehigh Valley Coal Company, lessee of a coal mine, by John Alden Lee, who owns one-half of the mine in his own right and as trustee for his brother. Kate P. Dixon owns the other half. The bill seeks a construction of the lease and of an agreement made on behalf of the plaintiff’s interest on Jan-, uary-21, 1913; a declaration that certain parts of the agreement are h fraud upon the plaintiff and Kate P. Dixon; an account' to the plaintiff and Kate P. Dixon from the Coal Company, and that the lease may be de-dared to be, and to have been since January 21, 1913, in full force and effect. The Coal Company , is a corporation of Pennsylvania, the plaintiff Lee a citizen and resident of New York, and Kate P. Dixon is a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania. She is made á defendant, the bill .alleges, because of her refusal to be made a plaintiff ‘ and because to make her such party plaintiff would oust the Court of jurisdiction.’ The. bill was dismissed for want of jurisdiction by the District Court, we presúme on the ground that, so far as appeared, the arrangement of the parties was merely a contrivance for the purpose of founding a jurisdiction that otherwise would not exist. Dawson v. Columbia Trust Co., 197 U. S. 178, 181.
The plaintiff and appellant now argues that Kate P. Dixon is not a necessary party. When a defendant seeks •to remove a suit from a State Court to the District Court, of course he is entitled to contend that a party joined by. the plaintiff is not a necessary party and therefore does not make the removal impossible by defeating the jurisdiction. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers’ Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182. It is a different question whether the plaintiff can repudiate the effect of his own joinder, can retain a party to the relief sought.and yet keep him on the wrong side in order to avoid the effect of his own act. Without inquiring whether the plaintiff could have maintained the suit alone had he so elected and had he found it impossible to join Kate P. Dixon, obviously she was a ‘ necessary ’ even if not an indispensable party. (Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 139.) It would be hard upon the Coal Company to compel it to submit to an adjudication upon the lease, upon ,a fraud alleged to have been committed against both owners, and to an account, in the absence of one of the lessors. The joinder of both is much more than a mere form'. As both are named they; must be arranged upon the side on which they belong. Menefee v. Frost, 123 Fed. 633. Blacklock v. Small, 127 U. S. 96.
Decree affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (U.S. 1941)…101 U. S. 289, 298-99; Corbin v. Van Brunt, 105 U. S. 576; Evers v. Watson, 156 U. S. 527, 532; Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579; Vernier v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 24; Steele v. Culver, 211 U. S. 26, 29; Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 267 U. S. 542; Sutton v. English, 246 U. S. 199. It is contended that, notwithstanding their indissoluble bond on the controlling issue, there are “sufficient matters in controversy” between Chase and Indianapolis Gas to preclude their alignment on the same side…
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State of Wash. v. United States, 87 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1936)…M., St. P. & R. Co. v. Adams County (C.C.A.9) 72 F.(2d) 816. None of these cases involve lessors and lessees, and they are therefore not in point. Our examination discloses two cases involving lessors and lessees. In Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 267 U.S. 542, 45 S.Ct. 385, 386, 69 L.Ed. 782, where one of two lessors sued a lessee to construe and establish the lease, and obtain an accounting for both lessors, the other lessor was a “ ‘necessary’ even if not an indispensable party.” The court did not unde…1 / 2
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Md. Cas. Co. v. Boyle Const. Co., Inc., 123 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1941)…thin the jurisdiction of the court but we do not decide that question. Making the appellant with whom they had no controversy a defendant in that action, requires that he be aligned on the side on which he belongs. Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Company, 267 U.S. 542, 543, 45 S.Ct. 385, 69 L.Ed. 782. The pleader’s arrangement of the parties is not conclusive on the court. The court must look into the real facts and in considering the jurisdictional questions, will rearrange the parties according to the nature of…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- William B. Shields and others v. Barlow, 17 How. 130 (U.S. 1854)
- Salem Tr. Co. v. Mfrs'. Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182 (U.S. 1924)
- City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Saving Fund, 197 U.S. 178 (U.S. 1905)
- Blacklock v. Small, 127 U.S. 96 (U.S. 1888)