CHAMBERLAIN MACHINE WORKS
v.
UNITED STATES
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Chamberlain Machine Works sought to recover full compensation for a war contract that the United States had cancelled before completion, despite having previously settled the claim with the War Department for $41,300.05, which it had accepted in writing as full satisfaction. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding that the company's vague and conclusory allegations of fraud and coercion were insufficient to overcome the binding effect of the settlement, and that to challenge a settlement on such grounds, a party must plead specific facts showing the particular acts of fraud or coercion with sufficient definiteness and certainty.
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Mr. Justice Sanford delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Chamberlain Machine Works filed its petition in the Court of Claims to recover compensation for the partial performance • of a war contract for the machining of steel shells, which had been cancelled by the United States before completion, pursuant to the terms of the contract. The petition was dismissed on demurrer, without opinion. 59 Ct. Cls. 972. The appeal was allowed in June, 1924.
The petition and an exhibit thereto disclosed that the claim was originally prosecuted in the War Department, under the Dent Act, in. yarious proceedings before the Ordinance Section of the Claims Board, the Board of Contract Adjustment,1 and the Appeal Section of the Claims Board;2 and that the Secretary of War made an award to the petitioner of $41,300.05, “ in full adjustment, payment, and discharge ” of the contract, which was accepted by the petitioner, in writing, in “ full satisfaction of any and all claims or demands ” which it had or might have pertaining to, growing out of, or incident to the contract..
The petition sought to recover on the original contract, despite the settlement made more than three years, before. It alleged, broadly, that this settlement was iniquitous and unjust, and not the voluntary act of the petitioner, but was secured by “frahd” of the officers of the War Department in the handling of the claim, by “ continued brow-beating,” and by “coercion” through which they “ literally forced ” the petitioner to take the sum offered. The general allegations of “fraud” and “coercion” were mere conclusions of the pleader; and were not admitted by the demurrer. Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118, 127. To show a cause of action it was necessary that the petition state distinctly the particular acts of fraud and -coercion relied'on, specifying by whcfen and in what manner they were perpetrated, with such definiteness and reasonable certainty that the court might see that, if proved, they would warrarit the setting aside of the settlement. See Stearns v. Page, 7 How. 818, 829; Perkins-Campbell Co. v. United States, 264 U. S. 213, 218; Cairo Railroad v. United States, 267 U. S. 350, 352. The petition contained no such specific allegations; and since its vague and general averments did not overcome thet effect of the release’, the demurrer was properly sustained. See St. Louis Railroad v. United States, 267 U. S. 346, 350.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is
Affirmed.
6 Dec. War Dept. 242.
8 Dec. War Dept. 298.
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Lucas v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 59 F.2d 617 (4th Cir. 1932)…dulently” do not add anything to the pleading. To state a cause of action it must set forth facts from which the court may see that complainants are entitled to relief, not mere conclusions of the pleader. Chamberlain Machine Works v. United States, 270 U. S. 347, 349, 46 S. Ct. 225, 70 L. Ed. 619; Cairo, etc., R. Co. v. United States, 267 U. S. 350, 352, 45 S. Ct. 247, 69 L. Ed. 651; Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118, 127, 11 S. Ct. 476, 35 L. Ed. 104. As to the second cause of action, If is sufficient to say t…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- ST. Louis v. United States, 267 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1925)
- Cairo v. United States, 267 U.S. 350 (U.S. 1925)
- Fogg v. Blair, 139 U.S. 118 (U.S. 1891)
- The Perkins-Campbell Co. v. United States, 264 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1924)