DODGE
v.
UNITED STATES

U.S. | 1926-11-23
No. 341
272 U.S. 530 Supreme Court of the United States (1926) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 71 L. Ed. 392 · 47 S. Ct. 191 · 1926 U.S. LEXIS 20 · SCDB 1926-013
Cited by 189 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

During Prohibition, police officers from Providence, Rhode Island seized a motor boat transporting illegal liquor and arrested its operator, who was later convicted; the District Court dismissed a federal forfeiture action against the boat because the local police lacked authority under the National Prohibition Act to make the seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court of Appeals' reversal, holding that the Government may adopt and validate an unauthorized seizure by private parties or local officers if it subsequently pursues forfeiture through legal process, provided the property is within judicial custody when the forfeiture proceeding is filed. The Court reasoned that this approach serves justice and the law's purpose of bringing forfeitable property within the court's power, distinguishing seizure validity from the separate constitutional protections against unlawful searches.

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was a proceeding in the District Court of the United States' for the condemnation of the motor boat “Ray of Block Island.” The owners appeared as claimants and moved that the libel be dismissed on the ground that the facts alleged did not warrant a condemnation. The District Court granted the motion. . 7 F. (2d) 189. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree. 11 F. (2d) 522. As there was a conflict of decisions between different Circuit Courts of Appeal a writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. 271 U. S. 655.

The libel was brought under the National Prohibition Act; October 28, 1919, c. 85, Title II, § 26, 41 St. 305, 315. It alleged that police officers of the City of Providence, Rhode Island, discovered a man named, seemingly one of the claimants, in the act of transporting contrary to said law intoxicating liquors in the “Ray of Block Island,” over navigable waters of the United States; that the officers seized the liquors and the boat and arrested the man; that he subsequently was arrested by officers of the United States, was convicted of transporting intoxicating liquors in violation of said law and was fined; that the motor boat was now in custody of a federal prohibition director for the District of Rhode Island; and that by reason of the premises the motor boat was subject to condemnation and sale. The ground on which the libel was dismissed by the District Court was that the language of § '26, making it the duty of “ the Commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law” to seize the liquor and vehicle, did not extend to the police officers of the City, who had no authority from the State to take these steps. It is stated in argument and perhaps fairly might be assumed, if we thought it important, that when the vessel was handed over to the prohibition director the liquor was no longer aboard and that the man arrested was not present at the scene. See United States v. One Red Motor Truck, 6 F. (2d) 412. The Circuit Court of Appeals while, agreeing with the above construction of § 26 held that the Government might adopt the seizure and give it retroactive effect. This is in accord with United States v. Story, 294 Fed. Rep. 517, (Fifth Circuit) but contrary to United States v. Loomis, 297 Fed. Rep. 359 (Ninth Circuit); this last decision being considerably qualified, however, by the same Court in the later case of United States v. One Studebaker Seven-Passenger Sedan, 4 F. (2d) 534.

The Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the often quoted language of Mr. Justice Story in The Caledonian, 4 Wheat. 100, to the effect that anyone may seize any property for a forfeiture to the Government, and that if the Government adopts the act and proceeds to enforcé the forfeiture by legal process, this is of no less validity than when the seizure is by authority originally given. The statement is repeated by the same judge in Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 359, and Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197. See also Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 310. The owner of the property suffers nothing that he would not have suffered if the seizure had been authorized. However effected, it brings the object within the power of the Court, which is an end that the law seeks to attain, and justice to the owner is as safe in the one case as in the other. The jurisdiction of the Court was secured by the fact that the res was in the possession of the prohibition director when the libel was filed. The Richmond, 9 Cr. 102. The Merino, 9 Wheat. 391, 403. The Underwriter, 13 F. (2d) 433, 434. We can see -no reason for doubting the soundness of these principles when the forfeiture is dependent upon subsequent events any more than when it occurs at the time of the seizure, although it was argued that there was a difference. They seem to us to embody good sense. The exclusion of evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure stand on a different ground. If the search and seizure are unlawful as invading personal rights secured by the Constitution those rights would be infringed yet further if the evidence were allowed to be used. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (53 total)

  • United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (U.S. 1984)
    …the police. In the words of Justice Holmes: “If the search and seizure are unlawful as invading personal rights secured by the Constitution those rights would be infringed yet further if the evidence were allowed to be used.” Dodge v. United States, 272 U. S. 530, 532 (1926). As the Court further explained in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928): “The striking outcome of the Weeks case and those which followed it was the sweeping declaration that the Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or…
  • Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (U.S. 1928)
    …itself of the fruits of these acts in order to accomplish its own ends, it assumed moral responsibility for the officers’ crimes. Compare The Paquete Habana, 189 U. S. 453, 465; O’Reilly deCamara v. Brooke, 209 U. S. 45, 52; Dodge v. United States, 272 U. S. 530, 532; Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310. And if this Court should permit the Government, by means of its officers’ crimes, to effect its purpose of punishing the defendants, there would seem to be present all the elements of a ratification. If…
  • ONE 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (U.S. 1965)
    …port and Export Act, 42 Stat. 596, 21 U. S. C. § 174 (1958 ed.). Nor has the continued validity of Boyd been in any way impaired by the decisions of this Court in United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U. S. 321, or Dodge v. United States, 272 U. S. 530. The question involved in both of these eases was not the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution but that of whether evidence seized by one without statutory authority could be used when its seizure was later ratified by an…

Previewing 3 of 53 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw