BROOKE
v.
CITY OF NORFOLK ET AL.
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A Virginia city and state assessed taxes on the corpus of a trust fund created under a Maryland will and held entirely in Maryland, seeking to tax a Virginia resident beneficiary as if she owned the whole trust principal despite her having only a life income interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a state cannot tax property located outside its borders or assess a taxpayer on property she does not own, possess, or control, even when the beneficiary resides within the state.
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Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
The petitioner applied in the local form of proceeding for the correction of two assessments for taxation alleged to be erroneous and contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of first instance, The Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, upheld both assessments as valid, and the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected a petition for a writ of error on the ground that the judgment below was plainly right. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. 274 U. S. 734.
The assessments complained of were for City and State taxes upon the corpus of a trust fund created by the will of a citizen of Maryland resident in Baltimore at the time of her death. This will bequeathed .to the Safe Deposit and Trust Company of-Baltimore eighty thousand dollars in trust to pay the income to the petitioner for life, then to her daughters for their lives, and, upon the death of the last survivor, to divide the principal between the descendants then living of the daughters per stirpes. The will was proved in Maryland and in 1014 was admitted to probate in the Corporation Court of Norfolk as a foreign will. The property held in trust has remained in Maryland and no part of it is or ever has been in Virginia.
The petitioner has paid’ without question a tax upon the income received by her. But the doctrine contended for now is that the petitioner .is chargeable as if she owned the whole. No doubt in the-case of tangible property lying within the State and subject to a paramount lien for taxes, the occupant actually using it may be made personally liable. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 218 U. S. 551, 562. Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U. S. 10, 16. But here the property is not within the State, does not belong to the petitioner and is not within her possession .or control., The assessment is a bare proposition to make the petitioner pay upon an interest to which she'is a stranger. This cannot be done. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567, 575.
Judgment reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (18 total)
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Hayes Wood v. Ford, 148 Fla. 66 (Fla. 1941)…, 74 L. Ed. 180, where the whole corpus of the intangible personal property was assessed in Virginia to the trustee domiciled in Maryland and holder of the legal title with possession for administrative purposes. In Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U. S. 27, 48 Sup. Ct. 422, 72 L. Ed. 767, the assessment was of the whole corpus of the trust fund against the life tenant beneficiary after the payment of the State income tax thereon, by the beneficiary. In Baltimore v. Gibbs, 166 Md. 364, the entire value of the corpus o…1 / 2
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Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1976)…be unassailable by due process attacks. Consistent with this view the Supreme Court of the United States upheld prejudgment attachment statutes. McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820, 49 S.Ct. 344, 73 L.Ed. 975 (1929); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 48 S.Ct. 422, 72 L.Ed. 768 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921). But recently the concepts of due process have been expanded by the United States Supreme Court and the expansion entered the field of commercial law in Sniadach…
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Harrop B. Phillips and Anor R. Phillips v. Guin & Hunt, Inc., 344 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1977)…e law, the courts later upheld the interests of creditors who demanded quick and effective remedies. With deference toward these interests, the United States Supreme Court frequently upheld prejudgment statutes. Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 48 S.Ct. 422, 72 L.Ed. 768 (1928); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921). As the American economy continued to expand and depend on a massive and complicated system of credit, the courts began [*571] to reevaluate the rights and dutie…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (U.S. 1904)
- Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567 (U.S. 1926)
- Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Commonwealth of Ky., 218 U.S. 551 (U.S. 1910)