BEKINS VAN LINES, INCORPORATED, ET AL.
v.
RILEY, STATE CONTROLLER OF CALIFORNIA
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Bekins Van Lines, a motor freight common carrier, challenged a California tax law imposing a 5% gross receipts tax on common carriers operating between fixed termini while subjecting other motor freight carriers to different taxation, arguing the classification violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the challenge, holding that the state had a reasonable basis for the classification because common carriers using fixed routes impose greater wear on highways and greater public safety risks than other carriers, making them a constitutionally distinct class subject to differential taxation.
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Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice McReynolds,
announced by the Chief Justice.
Appellants, as common carriers, are engaged in transporting freight by motor vehicles for hire along public highways between fixed termini and over regular routes within California. The 1926 Amendment to the Constitution and the statutes of that State lay upon such carriers a tax of 5% of their gross receipts in lieu of all other taxes, while other freight carriers, common and private, by motor vehicles, are subjected to different and, it is alleged, less burdensome taxation. Cal. Const., Art. 13, § 15; March 5, 1927, Chap. 19, 1927 Cal. Stats.
By this proceeding, instituted July 21, 1928, appellants ask that the constitutional amendment and the statute which undertake to lay such tax upon them be declared discriminatory and in conflict with § 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment; also that an injunction issue against the State Controller forbidding him from attempting to enforce payment.
Upon motion, without written opinion, the District Court — three judges sitting — dismissed the bill. The cause is here by direct appeal; and the only matter for our determination is the validity of the challenged classification.
The power of a State in respect of classification has Often been declared by opinions here. We are unable to say that there was no reasonable basis for the one under consideration; the court below reached the proper result; and its decree must be affirmed.
Appellants voluntarily assumed the position of common carriers operating between fixed termini and enjoy all consequent benefits. That a marked distinction exists between common and private carriers by auto vehicles, appears from Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583 and Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570. Sufficient reasons for placing common carriers, operating as appellants do, in a special class are pointed out by Raymond v. Holm, 165 Minn. 215; State v. Le Febvre, 174 Minn. 248; Iowa Motor Vehicle Assn. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 207 Iowa 461; Liberty Highway Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, 294 Fed. 703. Their u$e of the highways probably will be regular and frequent and, therefore, unusually destructive thereto. Also it will expose the public to dangers exceeding those consequent upon the occasional movements of other carriers.
Although relied upon by counsel and said to be almost identical with the case at bar, Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, gives no support to claim of undue discrimination. We regard the controversy as not open to serious doubt and further discussion of it seems unnecessary.
Affirmed.
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Cahoon v. Smith, 99 Fla. 1174 (Fla. 1930)…cted or reconstructed” under the Federal Act. The State law is operative upon State highways when not in conflict with applicable dominant Federal authority. See Carley v. Snook, — U. S.—, 50 Sup. Ct. R. 204, 74 Law Ed. —; Bekins Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U. S. 80, 50 Sup. Ct. R. 64, 74 Law Ed. —; Iowa Motor Vehicle Assn. v. Board, 207 Iowa 461, 221 N. W. R. 364; Williams v. Riley, 280 U. S. 78, 50 Sup. Ct. R. 63, 74 Law Ed. There are excepted from the operation of the statute: ‘< * * * corporations or pers…
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Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (U.S. 1931)…etion in classification in the exercise of its power of regulation is constantly recognized by the decisions of this Court. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 161; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 382, 384; Bekins Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U. S. 80, 82; Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 123; Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66, 73. But the constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws is interposed against discriminations that are entirely [*567] arbitrary. In determining what is…
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Cont'l Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1932)…v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509, 513, 514: “ The distinction between property employed in conducting a business which requires constant and unusual use of the highways, and property not so employed, is plain enough.” See, also, Bekins Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U. S. 80, 82; Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66, 73. The fourth exemption is “ of transportation of children to and from school.” The distinct public interest in this sort of transportation affords sufficient reason for the classification. The State…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583 (U.S. 1926)
- Mich. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (U.S. 1925)
- Quaker City Cab Co. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 277 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1928)