EX PARTE NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY ET AL.
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Northern Pacific Railway Company sought a mandamus writ to overturn a district court's dismissal of its suit challenging a state railroad rate order as unconstitutional, after a single judge dissolved a temporary restraining order and dismissed the case on the merits without assembling the three-judge panel required by statute. The Supreme Court held that a single judge lacked jurisdiction to hear motions to dissolve the restraining order or dismiss the bill when an application for an interlocutory injunction was pending, and directed the lower court to vacate the dismissal and convene a three-judge court to properly hear the injunction application as required by federal law.
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Per Curiam:
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. A rule to show cause was issued and a return has now been made to the rule. From the petition and the return the facts are shown to be as follows: The Northern Pacific Railway Company and three others brought a suit in the District Court for the District, of Montana against the Board of Railroad Commissioners of that State and others to prevent the enforcement of a rate order made by the board, the objection urged against the order being that it was in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States and with certain provisions of the commerce laws -of Congress. ' The plaintiffs applied for a temporary restraining order and for an interlocutory injunction. District Judge Pray granted a temporary restraining order , which was to continue in force “ until the plaintiffs’ application for an interlocutory injunction be heard and determined by three judges as provided by statute.” Afterwards, but before three judges were assembléd to hear the application for an in terloeutory injunction, District Judge Bourquin, sitting alone, entertained a motion by the defendants to dissolve the temporary restraining order, and also a motion to dismiss the bill on the merits. The plaintiffs objected that a single judge was without authority to entertain or act upon either motion, but Judge Bourquin overruled the objection, sustained the motion to dismiss and entered a final decree of dismissal. Of course, the decree, if valid, operated not only as a revocation of the temporary restraining order but also as a denial of the application for an interlocutory injunction.
. Manifestly the suit was within the terms and spirit of § 380, Title 28, of the United States Code. When Judge Pray granted a temporary restraining order to be effective until the application for an interlocutory injunction should be heard and determined, it became his duty under that section immediately to call two other judges, one of whom should be either a circuit. justice or a circuit judge, to assist him in hearing arid determining the application for an interlocutory injunction. Not only so, but the section as amended by the Act of February 13,1925, c. 29, 43 Stat. 938, extends the requirement respecting the presence of three judges to the final hearing in srich a suit.. Urider our decisions construing and applying the section, Judge Bourquin sitting alone was without jurisdiction, to hear either the motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order or the motion to dismiss the bill bn the merits. In the presence of the application for an interlocutory injunction — which was at no timé withdrawn but constantly pressed — a single judge, whether Judge Pray or Judge Bourquin, was as much without authority to dismiss the bill on the merits as he would be to grant either an interlocutory or a permanent injunction. Our decisions leave no doubt on these points. Ex parte Metropolitan Water Company of West Virginia, 220 U. S. 539; Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 260 U. S. 212, 216-217; Virginian Railway Company v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 671-673; Ex parte Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 279 U. S. 822.
. It follows that the rule against the respondents must be made absolute with directions to them to vacate the decree of dismissal entered by Judge Bourquin and to take immediate steps for assembling a court of three judges to hear and determine the application for an interlocutory injunction conformably to § 380. We assume it will not be necessary to issue a fórmal writ.
Rule made absolute.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (19 total)
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Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (U.S. 1933)…ourt' was warranted in taking jurisdiction and the case fell within § 266 of the Judicial Code, a single judge was not authorized to dismiss the complaint on the merits, whatever his opinion of the merits might be. Ex parte Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 280 U.S. 142, 144; Stratton v. St. Louis S. U. Ry. Co., 282 U.S. 10, 15. But the provision requiring the presence of a court of three judges necessarily assumes that the District Court has jurisdiction. In the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is essential…
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Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (U.S. 1943)…t of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491; Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co. v. Ward, 242 U. S. 1. Finally, it is urged that practice since the Judiciary Act of 1925 sanctions the present assumption of jurisdiction. Cases like Ex parte Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 280 U. S. 142, ordering a district judge to summon three judges to hear a suit under § 266 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. § 380), must be put to one side. This is one of the excepted classes under the Act of 1925 in which direct review lies from a district co…
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United States Alkali Exp. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (U.S. 1945)…state officer or tribunal, see In re Chetwood, supra; McClellan v. Carland, supra; Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U. S. 539; Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U. S. 86; Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U. S. 9; Ex parte Northern Pacific R. Co., 280 U. S. 142; Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S. 510; or by which they have deprived a party of a trial by jury. Ex parte Simons, 247 U. S. 231; Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 305. For these reasons we think the case is an appropriate one for review of the distric…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1926)
- Ex parte Metro. Water Co. of W. Va., 220 U.S. 539 (U.S. 1911)
- Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212 (U.S. 1922)
- Wilson v. McLane, 279 U.S. 822 (U.S. 1929)
- Ex parte Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 279 U.S. 822 (U.S. 1929)