CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY
v.
BRYANT, ADMINISTRATOR
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A railroad employee was shot and killed by a foreman, and the railroad company was sued for damages; the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against the railroad, holding that because the employee may have been discharged before the fatal shooting, the Federal Employers' Liability Act did not necessarily apply, and the case could proceed under state law.
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Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action seeking to. charge the petitioner for the death of the respondent’s intestate, who was shot and killed by the foreman of a gang in which the deceased if not discharged would have worked. At the trial the petitioner demurred to the evidence, on the ground, among others, that at the time of the killing the parties were engaged in interstate commerce. The demurrer was overruled and the respondent (plaintiff) got judgment, which was affirmed by an equally divided Court. If the parties were governed by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act the respondent might have difficulties from the decisions of this Court. Davis v. Green, 260 U. S.
349. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Southwell, 275 U. S.
64. But the deceased was killed on Monday, and there was some evidence that he had been discharged on the Saturday before; If so the Act of Congress did not govern and the parties were left to the State law, with which we have no concern. The writ of certiorari would not have been granted but for the impression that there was no doubt that the deceased was employed by the petitioner in interstate commerce up to the moment immediately preceding his death.
Judgment affirmed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Davis v. Green, 260 U.S. 349 (U.S. 1922)
- Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Southwell, 275 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1927)