UNITED STATES
v.
BOSTON BUICK COMPANY; SAME V. IRON CAP COPPER COMPANY

U.S. | 1931-02-02
Nos. 42 and 43
282 U.S. 476 Supreme Court of the United States (1931) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 75 L. Ed. 470 · 51 S. Ct. 206 · 1931 U.S. LEXIS 19 · SCDB 1930-087
Cited by 31 cases

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Synopsis

The Supreme Court decided whether interest on tax credits for overpaid income taxes should be calculated under the 1921 or 1924 Revenue Act, which provided different interest periods and amounts. The Court held that the Commissioner's approval of the refund and credit schedules constituted the "allowance" of the credits, making the 1924 Act's more favorable interest provisions applicable to these taxpayers. This established that interest on tax refunds and credits must be computed according to the statutory provisions in force at the time the allowance is actually granted.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Roberts

Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases involve the same, question as United States v. Swift & Co., ante, p. 468; namely, what constitutes the allowance of a credit to a taxpayer who has overpaid his income or profits taxes. The issue is made on facts somewhat'different from those involved in that case. It is whether interest to be paid on the amounts credited to the taxpayers shall be calculated as provided by § 1324 of the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 316) or by § 1019 of the. Revenue Act of 1924 (43 Stat. 346). Interest runs from different periods under these acts. As the allowance made by the Act of 1924 is more favorable to the taxpayers in these cases, they claimed interest on their credits under that act. The Commissioner awarded them interest under the Act oí 1921. The date of the allowance of the credits becomes important because we have held that interest on refunds and credits must be computed according to the statutory provision in force at the time of their allowance. United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U. S. 160; Blair v. Birkenstock, 271 U. S. 348.

Upon audit of respondents' returns for 1918 it was disclosed that their taxes had been overassessed for that year. In March, 1924, the Commissioner approved schedules which informed the Collector of the overassess-ments and instructed him to check the same against the taxpayers’ accounts, determine whether to abate in whole-or in part, determine any overpayment, and apportion the same as between credit and refund. In July,-' 1924, the Collector, completed his work, as to both taxpayers’ accounts, and-executed and forwarded to the Commissioner schedulés of refunds and’ credits attached to the schedules of overassessments. The Commissioner placed his certificate of approval on the schedules of refunds and-credits on July 31 and August 7. The Revenue Act of 1924 became effective June-2, 1924. If the credits were allowed -after the effective date of that statute the respondents are entitled to interest computed, in accordance with § 1019 of that act; if before, they are entitled to interest computed as provided by § 1324 of the Revenue Act of 1921. The District Court held that the provisions of the 1924 act applied, and the. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its judgments. On petition of the United States this court issued writs of certiorari in both cases.

In view of the. decision in United States v. Swift & Co., supra, we hold that the Commissioner’s approval of the schedule of refunds and credits constituted the allowance, and that interest is to be computed as required by the Act of 1924.

The judgments are Affirmed,


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Citator

Cited By

  • Routzahn v. Reeves Bros. Co., 59 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1932)
    …7, 542, 42 S. Ct. 393, 60 L. Ed. 753; Phila., H. & P. R. Co. v. Lederer, 242 F. 492, 494 (C. C. A. 3); Coffey, Coll., v. Exchange Bank of Lennox, 296 F. 807, 809 (C. C. A. 8). In support of its contention appellee cites U. S. v. Boston Buick Co., 282 U. S. 476, 478, 51 S. Ct. 206, 75 L. Ed. 470; Peerless Paper Box Mfg. Co. v. Routzahn, Coll. (D. C.) 22 F.(2d) 459; 460; Logan-Gregg Hdw. Co. v. Heiner (D. C.) 26 F.(2d) 133, and also the opinion of the District Court in Landesman-Hirsheimer Co. v. Routzahn 2…
    1 / 2
  • Gans S. S. Line v. Bowers, 82 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1936)
    …he collector. The Swift. [*183] Case held, where the statute of limitations made a determination of the question necessary, that this last act of the Commissioner constituted the allowance of the credit. See, also, United States v. Boston Buick Co., 282 U.S. 476, 51 S.Ct. 206, 75 L.Ed. 470. Therefore, the bookkeeping entries made here by the collector, and subject to revision by the Commissioner at the time of his final certification of the allowance, cannot be considered a collection by the collector. It…
  • Parks & Woolson Mach. Co. v. United States, 58 F.2d 868 (Ct. Cl. 1932)
    …the schedule of refunds and credits until April 24, 1924. Since the credit in this ease was taken April 24,1924, the aetion was not timely. United States v. Swift & Co., 282 U. S. 468, 51 S. Ct. 202, 75 L. Ed. 464; United States v. Boston Buiek Co., 282 U. S. 476, 51 S. Ct. 206, 75 L. Ed. 470. The attempted collection of the 1917 tax by credit was void and of no effect under section 609 of the Revenue Act of 1928, which provides : “(a) Credit against Barred Deficiency. Any credit against a liability in resp…
    1 / 2

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